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I. INTRODUCTION
Just as China in the 1960s had perpetual revolution, so the
United States in the 1980s had perpetual income tax legislation.
Congress passed historic watershed tax bills in 19811 and 1986.2
1 Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1982)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
2 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended
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Important, though not historic, packages of tax legislation were
enacted in 1982, 3 1984,4 and 1987.5 In 1983 and 1985, Congress
began considering the bills that passed the following years; 1988 saw
the election of a President who promised significant tax legislation;
and 1989 was devoted to wrangling about his proposals (which may
pass in 1990).6
Even more peculiar than the rapid pace of 1980s tax legislation
was the wildly erratic and cyclical7 nature of tax policy. In this
country, tax policy tends to take either of two forms. First, under
what I call an "instrument-alist" approach, tax law ostensibly serves
social and economic policy goals (for example, increasing produc-
tivity, home ownership, or competitiveness) by providing preferen-
tial treatment for selected types of income. This approach is
characterized not so much by a fixed agenda as by a willingness to
use the tax system to pursue a broad array of goals. Second, the
approach that in the last forty years has captured the label "tax
reform" aims to tax different types of economic income more
equally and to prevent high-income taxpayers from entirely avoiding
significant tax liability.
8
Although tax legislation has shown cyclical tendencies since the
early days of the federal income tax, 9 the problem reached a new
level in the 1980s. In the entire history of the income tax system,
the 1981 Act was the high water mark of tax instrumentalism.1
0
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
3 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324
(1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
4 Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1986) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
5 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330
(1989) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
6 Federal budgetary pressures provide onlya partial explanation for this activity, and
no explanation at all for the watershed 1981 and 1986 Acts. The 1981 Act helped to
create these pressures by cutting taxes without a commensurate reduction in spending.
The 1986 Act had an explicit premise of revenue neutrality.
7 My use of the term "cyclical" should not be confused with the voting paradox of
"cycling," or unstable outcomes when voters have multiple alternatives that they rank
in different orders, that has been widely discussed in the law and economics and
political science literature. See I. MCLEAN, PUBLIC CHOICE 25-26 (1987).
8 My statement that there are two approaches addresses only one type of cleavage
in tax legislation: disagreement about the taxable income base. Other cleavages, such
as the dispute about the proper level of progressivity, can also be politically important.
9 See infra notes 32-38 & 61-84 and accompanying text.
10 See, e.g., J. WRITE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAx
235 (1985) (arguing that the 1981 Act "was unique only because it was extreme, not
because it established new trends in tax legislation").
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It provided tax incentives on a previously unheard of scale, through
provisions such as sharply accelerated depreciation for capital
equipment, universal individual retirement accounts (IRAs) and
other savings incentives for individuals, and a host of benefits for
particular industries. By contrast, the 1986 Act was the all-time
leading example of tax reform.1 1 It eliminated longstanding tax
preferences such as the partial exclusion for capital gains (in
existence since 1921) and the investment tax credit (in existence for
all but two years since 1962). Moreover, it contained an array of
provisions that impeded efforts by high-income taxpayers to
eliminate entirely their tax liabilities through the use of remaining
preferences.1 2 Now in 1990, Congress is considering a return to
instrumentalism, through restoration of a capital gains preference
and savings incentives similar to those eliminated in 1986.13
The oscillating congressional approach would be less surprising
if it had resulted from changes in the political landscape; for
example, if tax instrumentalists had been defeated in the mid-1980s
and then restored to power at the end of the decade. Yet, for the
most part, this has not been the case. 14 For example, President
Reagan and Congressman Rostenkowski (the chairman of the Ways
and Means Committee) played critical roles in shaping both the
1981 and the 1986 legislation. Senator Packwood, in 1986 the
chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, started out "sort of
lik[ing]" the highly preferential post-1981 law just "the way it
[was]."1 5  He then spearheaded the dramatic 1986 changes, but
more recently has championed the restoration of tax breaks that, as
chairman, he helped eliminate.
u See, e.g., J. BIRNBAUM & A. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT Gucci GULCH: LAWMAKERS,
LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM (1987) (recounting the "saga"
of the 1986 tax legislation); T. CONLAN, M. WRiCHTsON, & D. BEAM, TAXING CHOICES:
THE POLITICs OF TAX REFORIM (1990) [hereinafter TAXING CHOICES] (studying the Act
as a vehicle to illuminate the "new politics of reform").
12 The principal such provisions were the passive loss rules, see 26 U.S.C. § 469
(1988), and the greatly expanded alternative minimum tax, see id. §§ 55-59. While the
1986 Act resembled the 1981 Act in reducing tax rates, here it served to counteract,
rather than to complement, the change in size of.the income tax base.
13 See S. 2071, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
14 Some changes in personnel have been significant, such as the election of
President Bush, a long-time tax instrumentalist. See, e.g., J. BIRNBAUM & A. MURRAY,
supra note 11, at 94 (describing then-Vice President Bush's passionate defense of tax
preferences for the oil and gas industry).
15 See id. at 19.
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How can such erratic behavior by both institutions and individu-
als be understood and explained? While the tax context may be
important, the question also raises fundamental issues about politics
and the legislative process. This Article will therefore examine
various theories concerning why Congress legislates, evaluating
them both in general and as explanations for the recent course of
tax legislation. My goal is to provide both a specific case study and
a broader positive account of the institutional forces that shape
legislation, using each to illuminate the other.
To organize the discussion, I will focus on what are currently the
two dominant approaches in the legal and economic literature.
First, there is public interest theory, under which the government
attempts to improve the general welfare, for example, by financing
public goods and correcting instances of market failure.' 6 Con-
ceived somewhat more broadly, the public interest view emphasizes
the importance of ideology and the desire to make good policy,
which are seen as motivating legislators to seek to improve society
(according to their perhaps controversial notions of what is good).
As I will show, public interest theory has been powerfully challenged
in its narrow form as lacking a causal mechanism and failing to
explain actual government behavior. 17 In its broader form (relat-
ing to ideology), the view has received some empirical support, but
seems to over-predict the coherence and stability of legislative
policy-making.
Second, there is a branch of public choice theory called the
economic theory of regulation.' 8  This view holds, in brief, that
legislation (along with other government action) is a product
supplied to well-organized interest groups that are struggling to
16 For a description of this view, see Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL
J. ECON. & MGMT. ScI. 335, 336 (1974). As I will discuss, the public interest view can
be analogized loosely to the comparably optimistic pluralist or welfare state liberal
school of thought in the political science literature. See infra notes 154-220 and
accompanying text. Examples of this school include D. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL
PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND PUBLIC OPINION (1951) and R. DAHL, A PREFACE
TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956). But see T. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY,
POLICY, AND THE CRISIS OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY (1969) (criticizing the theory).
17 See, e.g., R. MCCORMICK & R. ToLLISON, PoLrrICIANs, LEGISLATION, AND THE
ECONOMY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE INTEREST-GROUP THEORY OF GOVERNMENT 3-7 (1981)
(comparing a market failure approach with a public choice approach in explaining the
role of government in the economy).
18 For convenience and following common usage, I will call this "public choice
theory" although my comments will not apply to any branch thereof apart from the
economic theory of regulation.
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maximize the incomes of their members, 19 often at the expense of
the less well-organized. 20 In effect, legislation is sold to the
highest bidder, with bids being paid in the currency of votes,
campaign contributions, and personal benefits such as honoraria.
21
As I will show, this view has some explanatory power, but in its
strongest form is not only theoretically implausible but has been
empirically refuted in an extensive political science literature that
public choice writers simply ignore. Public choice theory flattens
the motivations and overlooks the independent influence of both
politicians and the general voting public. Its explanation of why
interest groups often succeed in "rent seeking" (securing transfers
from the general public that are negative-sum for society22) turns
out to be merely one application of a broader principle: that
government policy tends to provide visible benefit in exchange for
less visible (even if unduly high) cost. Finally, public choice theory
fails to explain fully not only the 1986 Act, where special interest
groups were generally the big losers, but also the 1981 Act, where
such groups were unusually big winners.
The problems with public choice theory have recently begun to
attract critical attention.23  Unfortunately, however, many of the
19 See Posner, supra note 16, at 335-36.
20 See, e.g., M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS (1965) (questioning the customary view that individuals in large
groups act to achieve common or group interests).
21See, e.g., Doernberg& McChesney, On the AcceleratingRate and DecreasingDurability
of Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. REV. 913, 926 (1987) [hereinafter Accelerating Rate] ("[T]he
'economic theory of regulation' sees government action supplied in response to ...
well-organized groups that are willing to pay for it in votes, campaign contributions, and
so forth." (footnote omitted)); cf. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through
Statutoty Ineipretation: An Interest Group Mode 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986)
[hereinafter Statutoiy ntepretation]. Macey adds to the forms ofpayment"whatever else
politicians value," without addressingwhether interest groups can supply everything that
politicians value. See id. at 228.
22 See, e.g., G. TuLLOCK, THE EcONOMIcs OF SPECIAL PRIVILEGE AND RENT SEEKING
55 (1989) (defining "rent-seeking" as a situation in which a government proposal has
a negative social impact).21 See, e.g., Farber & Frickey, TheJurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REV. 873
(1987) (finding public choice theories too simplistic to adequately explain the legislative
process); Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 63
(1990) (finding that purely economic assessments of welfare create misperceptions about
the role of social well-being in legislation); Kalt & Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the
Economic Theoiy of Politia, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 279 (1984) ("[A]pproaches which confine
themselves to a view of political actors as narrowly egocentric maximizers explain and
predict legislative outcomes poorly."); Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing. A Skeptical Look
at the Theoretical and "Empirical"Practice of the Public Choice Movemen 74 VA. L. REV. 199
(1988) [hereinafter M. Kelman] (extending the Critical Legal Studies analysis of the legal
1990]
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theory's critics, unable to imagine any third alternative to public
interest theory and public choice theory, have seemingly assumed
that, to the extent one of the two theories is false, the other must
be true. If and when legislation is not just rent seeking by interest
groups, it must be altruistic, socially beneficial, or a source of
immense public satisfaction. 24  As I will show, however, this
panglossianism is neither logically nor empirically supportable. The
foes of public choice theory, like its friends, fail to understand how
self-interested political behavior apart from wealth maximization
shapes legislative outcomes.
Public interest and public choice writers, because of their shared
failure to consider the implications of self-interest aside from wealth
maximization, make an assumption that often turns out to be false.
They assume that legislation is primarily directed to some substan-
tive end and intended to have particular real world effects (whether
improving society or enriching a particular group). In fact,
politicians' claims to intend real world effects are often a pretext,
rather than a serious effort. Even if legislation nonetheless has
substantial real world effects, from a subjective standpoint these
may be incidental.
In many cases, Congress legislates because its members and
others who influence it value and benefit from the activity of
legislating. The reasons for such behavior can be divided into two
categories. First, proposing and enacting legislation is a means of
symbolic communication with members of the general public, of
causing them to like a politician without the inconvenience (and
possible political inconsequence) of actually having to benefit them
tangibly.25  Thus, without regard to its actual effects, legislation
economist's world view to public choice material); Kelman, Why Public Ideas Matter, in
THE POWER OF PUBLIC IDEAS 31 (R. Reich ed. 1988) [hereinafter S. Kelman] (arguing
that public spirit is an important factor in the policy-making process); Orren, Beyond
Self-Interesi, in THE POWER OF PUBLIC IDEAS, supra, at 13 (using the shortcomings of
political and economic models to show self-interest as a poor theory of public choice);
Sunstein, Interest Groups in Ainerican Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 48-49 (1985)
[hereinafter Interest Groups] (describing a continuum between interest-group pressures
and individual deliberation by legislators, along which legislative decisions are made).
24 See Hovenkamp, supra note 23, at 100-06; S. Kelman, supra note 23, at 52-53.
25 The classic work concerning this type of political behavior is M. EDELMAN, THE
SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS (1964); see also C. ELDER & R. COBB, THE POLITICAL USES
OF SYMBOLS (1983) (describing the role of symbols in political activities). Members of
Congress seek reelection in many ways other than through conveying tangible benefits
through legislation. See, e.g., M. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON
ESTABLISHMENT (1977) (noting that casework and pork barreling are more safe and
profitable than lawmaking activities for a reelection oriented congressman); D. MAYHEW,
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can promote reelection. Second, succeeding legislatively is a means
of exercising and demonstrating one's power. It is inherently
gratifying (as when an emperor enjoys seeing statues of himself),
and it increases one's prestige and status in political circles. Thus,
without regard to its actual effects, legislation can promote self-
interested goals apart from reelection.
26
To the extent that one seeks to legislate for reasons apart from
anticipated real world effects, it may be enough that the stated goal
of legislation is superficially plausible and relates to areas of public
concern. The proponent need not invest much effort in considering
whether the legislation actually will do what it promises. Any such
assessment is difficult in any case, but even where possible it may be
politically unimportant. Politics does not have a well-functioning
marketplace of ideas.
The various views of the legislative process that I have outlined
are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, all can apply simultaneously,
27
and only a complex multi-factored approach can begin to do justice
to the underlying reality. I will argue, however, that the particular
factors I emphasize-voters' taste for symbolism and politicians' taste
for power and prestige-are extremely important yet have largely
CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 5 (1974) (arguing that congressmen can
usefully be viewed as "singleminded seekers of reelection"); N. POLsBY, POLITICAL
INNOVATION IN AMERICA: THE PoLITICs OF POLICY INITIATION 162-63 (1984)
(describing how senators specialize and publicize their interests to enhance their
political futures); A. RANNEY, CHANNELS OF POWER: THE IMPACT OF TELEVISION ON
AMERICAN POLrICS 151 (1983) (showing how incumbents increasingly concentrate on
defining a public image); H. SMITH, THE POWER GAME: HOW WASHINGTON WORKS 122-
27 (1988) (listing the enormous advantages enjoyed by incumbents in getting elected).26 See, e.g., R. FENNO, CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES (1973) (noting alternative goals
of gaining influence within Congress, creating good public policy, and fostering career
aspirations beyond Congress); J. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC
POLICIES 42,129-30 (1984) (noting goals ofenhancing intra-Washington reputations and
promoting personal interest and values); H. LASSWELL, POWER AND PERSONALITY 38
(1948) (noting politicians' intense craving for respect); J. MANLEY, THE POLITICS OF
FINANCE (1970) (naming importance, power, and prestige as the primary attractions of
a seat on the House Ways and Means Committee); R. RIPLEY, CONGRESS: PROCESS AND
POLICY 118-19 (4th ed. 1988) (describing politicians' satisfaction upon the completion
of a bill); H. SMITH, supa note 25, at 34-36 (describing the ostentatious wealth
characterizing the Washington political scene); Price, Congressional Committees in the
Policy Process, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 161, 167 (L. Dodd & B. Oppenheimer 3d ed.
1985) (noting that congressmen seek "power, prestige and preferment within
Congress").
2' For example, all of the theories would be consistent with proposed legislation,
poorly thought out in terms of its likely effects, that at once ideologically pleased its
proponents, made them important congressional "players," and favored campaign
contributors or constituents.
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been ignored by previous commentators. These factors indeed are
dominant as explanations of recent tax legislation, where other
causal factors have reduced importance due to the muddiness of
ideological cleavages in taxation and the severe limits to both the
public's and politicians' understanding of tax issues.
28
Under the particular historical circumstances of the 1980s, the
principal effect of the symbolic and prestige factors on tax legisla-
tion was to create the legislative equivalent of "churning" a portfolio
account. Since both of the dominant opposing policies (tax instru-
mentalism and tax reform) sounded appealing, but only the one less
recently tried could be presented as a bold new departure, Congress
shuttled back and forth between them. I will suggest, however, that
these factors need not always lead to alternating tax reform and tax
instrumentalism. They can lead just as easily to one instrumentalist
bill after another, with tax incentives being reduced only when their
beneficiaries become unpopular or revenue concerns are pressing.
The alignment during the mid-1980s between tax reform and the
symbolic and prestige factors was somewhat fortuitous and may
prove short-lived. In particular, tax reform requires that tax issues
be politically prominent-as they were throughout the 1980s29 but
may not always be hereafter. It therefore may be facing at least
temporary setbacks.
This modest prediction, however, pretty well exhausts the
capacity of my model (or any that does not ignore important causal
factors) to forecast the future. Factors such as prestige and
symbolism have inherently unpredictable consequences. Moreover,
the tax system is too much at the mercy of outside events (such as
war, the performance of the economy, and intellectual fashions) to
follow a predictable path. One of this Article's principal purposes
will be to show the serious limitations of any attempted science of
prediction, whether derived from public choice theory3 ° or
28 See, e.g., J. BUCHANAN & R. WAGNER, DEMOCRACY IN DEFICIT: THE POLIFICAL
LEGACY OF LORD KEYNES 129-34 (1977) (explaining taxpayers' difficulties in evaluating
the true costs and benefits of government services); S. HANSEN, THE POLITICS OF
TAXATION: REVENUE WITHOUT REPRESENTATION 179-80 (1983) (noting the public's
ignorance about specific tax provisions); R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE
IN THEORYAND PRACTICE 100-01 (5th ed. 1989) (asserting that taxpayers underestimate
the cost of taxation that they actually bear).
2 For example, taxes were a major issue of contention in the 1980, 1984, and 1988
presidential campaigns. Moreover, the 1981 and 1986 Acts were the most prominent
legislative stories of their respective years (although the 1981 Act shared top billingwith
President Reagan's military and domestic spending proposals). Cf S. HANSEN, suPra
note 28, at 177 (noting the importance of tax issues in congressional races).
30 Judge Richard Posner states that the goal of law and economics, a movement with
[Vol. 139: 1
BEYOND PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC INTEREST
political science.31 Aside from serving as a corrective to legal
arguments based on incomplete understandings, a richer under-
standing of legislative politics, although desirable for its own sake,
will turn out not to be quite so useful as one might have hoped.
The discussion proceeds as follows. Section II reviews the
recent history of tax legislation. Section III examines public interest
theory and its inadequacies as revealed in part by public choice
theory. Section IV discusses public choice theory and, through
discussion of its inadequacies, develops a richer account of
legislative behavior that stresses the symbolic and prestige factors.
Section V explores some of the broader implications of the
preceding discussion, for topics ranging from statutory interpreta-
tion, to current legal theories about "republicanism," to the
question of how one should assess the tradeoff between internal
rigor and empirical accuracy that ambitious theoretical models, such
as those in law and economics, inevitably involve.
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF CYCLICAL TAx LEGISLATION
A. Legislation From the Beginning of the Income Tax Through
the 1970s: The Evolution of Tax Instrumentalism
and Tax Reform
The trend of cyclical tax instrumentalism and tax reform, which
reached its peak in the 1980s, has its roots in the early days of the
federal income tax. The income tax of 1864 contained a number of
tax preferences for real estate and farm income.3 2 By the 1930s,
attacks on "loopholes"3 3 for unfairly benefiting the wealthy had
become an occasional feature of tax politics, inspiring periodic
legislation. 34 Despite these attacks, Congress continued to enact
and retain significant tax preferences, including those for capital
scientific aspirations that includes public choice theory, is "to increase our ability to
predict and control our environment." Posner, The Future of Law and Economics: A
Comment on Ellickson, 65 CH.-KENT L. REV. 57, 61 (1989).
31 It is instructive thatJohn Witte's perceptive and thorough study of tax politics,
published in 1985, closes with the prediction that the dramatic tax reform proposals
then being discussed probably would not lead to sweeping legislation. See J. WrrrE,
supra note 10, at 385-86. This prediction was proven wrong the following year.
32 SeeJ. WrrrE, supra note 10, at 69.
" The term "loophole" is out of fashion, largely because it seems to connote the
exploitation of unintended technical gaps in the law, whereas much tax planning relies
on opportunities to reduce one's liability that Congress intentionally provided.
3 SeeJ. WrrrE, supra note 10, at 98-104.
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gains, life insurance, oil production, and interest on municipal
bonds.
The full potential for cyclical legislation could not be realized
until World War II raised the stakes and the number of interested
parties by permanently changing the income tax from a low-revenue
"class tax" into a high-revenue "mass tax."35 The postwar era saw
an initial flurry of legislation that generally expanded tax preferenc-
es. 36  At the same time, preferences became more regularly
controversial. Throughout: the 1950s, liberal Democratic Senators
such as Hubert Humphrey and Paul Douglas, concerned with giving
real effect to the nominal progressivity of the income tax system,
drew attention to and unsuccessfully sought to repeal "loop-
holes."3 7  President Eisenhower, however, put an end to major
change in either direction. by deciding after 1954 to oppose all
significant tax legislation.3
The cyclical pattern started in earnest under President Kennedy,
who in 1961 proposed tax legislation that would prove seminal for
both stages in the cycle. On the one hand, he urged what he called
"tax reform."39 This important term merits a brief explanation
before we consider the tax instrumentalist part of Kennedy's
program.
The term "tax reform" has such a "motherhood"-type sound that
its opponents sometimes either deny that it has specific content or
else try to appropriate it. Senator Russell Long once said (during
Senate debate about "reform" provisions that his committee had
deleted from a tax bill), "I have always felt that tax reform is a
35 See S. HANSEN, supra note 28, at 86; Jones, Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role of
Propaganda in the Expansion ofthe Income Tax During World War II, 37 BUFFALO L. REV.
685, 685-86 (1989).
36 The Revenue Acts of 1945 and 1948 focused principally on marginal rates and
personal exemption amounts, rather than on the rules for taxing particular kinds of
income. SeeJ. WR=rE, supra note 10, at 131-35. However, tax preferences were an
important subject (and for the most part were expanded) in four revenue acts enacted
between 1950 and 1954. See id. at 137-50.
37 See, e.g., L. EISENSTEIN, THE IDEOLOGIES OF TAXATION 183, 185, 202, 220 (1961)
(explaining the difficulty of defining "loophole"); H. HUMPHREY, TAX LOOPHOLES 7-12
(1952) (stating that during the 1940s, nearly every major tax bill raised taxes on the
many and granted millions of dollars in loopholes to the few);J. WrITE, supra note 10,
at 141-42 (noting the numerous provisions added to a tax bill before passing the
Senate).
38 SeeJ. WrrrE, supra note 10, at 150-54. Eisenhower took this stance in order to
prevent Congress from reducing taxes. See id.
39 See Special Message to the Congress on Taxation, 1961 PUB. PAPERS 290, 290-91
(Apr. 20, 1961) [hereinafter Special Message].
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change in the law that I favor, or if it is the other man defining tax
reform it is a change in the law that he favors."40 In fact, howev-
er-as Senator Long himself probably knew4 1-the term has a
specific meaning in both political and academic circles. It refers to
moving in the direction of uniform and comprehensive taxation of
economic income (generally, by broadening the existing tax base4 2)
on the ground that such movement will promote equity and
economic efficiency.43  Political tax reform often focuses more
narrowly on "abuses" by high-income taxpayers, such as deducting
lavish personal living expenses or completely avoiding tax liabili-
ty.
4 4
Henry Simons, who formulated the now widely accepted
economic definition of income as the sum of the fair market values
of the taxpayer's consumption and change in net worth during the
relevant accounting period,45 used the term "tax reform" as early
as 1943 to describe his proposals for moving toward implementation
of this definition. 4 6 By the late 1950s and early 1960s, Simons'
views (and use of the term "tax reform") had caught on among
40 J. WITE, supra note 10, at 192 (quoting 122 CONG. REc. 18,553 (1976)).
41 Senator Long was well known during his tenure as a highly intelligent man, but
one given on the Senate floor to rhetorical "histrionics" at the expense of strict
objectivity. See T. REESE, THE PoLmIcs OF TAXATION 173-74 (1980). As an example,
he once claimed that the case of "GrandmaJones," a fictional aging widow who owned
six shares of oil company stock, was representative for purposes of analyzing who
benefits from the capital gains preference. See L. EISENSTEIN, supra note 37, at 132, 154-
55. On another occasion (witnessed by the author), Long pretended ignorance of well-
known tax accounting principles, arguing that intangible drilling costs ought to be
deducted rather than capitalized, despite creating future capital value, because "that
money has been spent, and it's gone." Shaviro, Perception, Reality, and Strategy: The New
Alternative Minimum Tax, 66 TAXES 91, 109 n.119 (1988). In 1986, on the verge of
voluntary retirement from the Senate, Long expressed a more sympathetic view of tax
reform, calling the 1986 Act 'the best revenue bill in fifty years." J. BIRNBAUM & A.
MURRAY, supra note 11, at 282.42 Tax reform can also involve narrowing a tax base that is broader than economic
income or that taxes a type of income more than once. See H. SIMONS, FEDERAL TAX
REFORM 40 (1950).
455e, e.g., 2 TREASURY DEP'T REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS,
SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (1984) (stating that fair and simple taxation of the
family unit is a "vital component" of the Department's proposals).
4. See TAXING CHOICES, supra note 11, at 36.
45 See H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A
PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 50 (1938).
46 See H. SIMONS, supra note 42, at v (prefatory note by Aaron Director). Most of
this book had been circulated by Simons in 1943 under the title Post War Federal Tax
Reform. See id.
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academics and were inspiring congressional hearings and a spate of
scholarly publications.
47
President Kennedy's 1961 tax proposals were stronger on the
rhetoric of tax reform than on delivery. His most prominent reform
proposal-denying deductions for business meals and entertainment
that conveyed untaxed personal benefits to the recipients-may have
been chosen as much for its rhetorical salience as for its relative
importance on the tax reform agenda. It permitted Kennedy to
fulminate against "expense account living" and "luxury spending"
that he worried would harm the "moral fibre" of our society.
4 8
This tendency of political tax reform to focus on the rhetorically
salient would be repeated frequently in the years to come.
In addition to its reform aspects, Kennedy's legislative package
included a new and important element of tax instrumentalism. An
economic slowdown late in the Eisenhower years had prompted
public discussion of a roughly contemporaneous decline in levels of
saving and investment in the American economy.49  Concerns
about economic growth had in the past been thought to suggest rate
reduction.5 0 Kennedy, however, called instead for tax relief that
was directly targeted to investment in capital equipment. 51 He
proposed a tax credit, under which corporations could reduce their
tax liabilities by specified percentages of their increased investment
in depreciable assets.52 This proposal was relatively novel for a tax
preference (with the exception of capital gains) in having a claimed
47 See, e.g., Bittker, An Optional Simplified Income Tax, 21 TAX L. REV. 1, 3 (1965)
(noting the introduction of a 1964 tax reform amendment in the Senate); Blum, Federal
Tax Reform-Twenty Questions, 41 TAXES 672, 672 (1963) (noting an American Bar
Association project to study federal income tax reform); Davidson, Objectives of and
Guides for Tax Refor; in HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 86TH CONG., 1ST SESS., TAX
REVISION COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS ON BROADENING THE TAX BASE 139 (Comm. Print
1959) [hereinafter TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM] (explaining that this issue in tax reform
is the relation of income tax rates to economic progress); Jacoby, Guidelines of and
Guides for Tax Reforn, in TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM, supra, at 157 (noting that
American society is becoming more egalitarian in the distribution of income, wealth,
and economic power); Lanning, Some Realities of Tax Reform; in TAX REVISION
COMPENDIUM, supra, at 19 (stressing the need for a tax revision extending to the entire
taxing system). The scholarly usage dominated political discourse. See Special Message,
supra note 39, at 290-94;J. BIRNBAUM & A. MURRAY, supra note 11, at 14-16.
48 See Special Message, supra note 39, at 299.
49 SeeJ. WriTE, supra note 10, at 156.
50 See id. at 89; see also A. MELLON, TAXATION: THE PEOPLE'S BUSINESS 93-107
(1924) (claiming that the "vital defect" in the tax system of the time was that the tax
burden was borne by "wealth in the making," not by "capital already in existence").
51 See Special Message, supra note 39, at 290-94.
52 SeeJ. WrrrE, supra note 10, at 156.
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macroeconomic effect on aggregate investment rather than targeting
a particular industry.
In retrospect, the claim that a capital investment incentive of
this sort can significantly increase aggregate investment has largely
lost intellectual credibility. Many scholars support a proposal that
superficially seems to differ from the investment tax credit only in
how far it goes: adoption of a consumption tax, under which
business investment, instead of merely being tax-favored, would not
be taxed at all until it was consumed. 3 Moreover, everyone agrees
that this broader proposal would have some tendency to promote
investment (assuming that government spending and the amount
raised through taxes remained unchanged), although the magnitude
of the effect is unknown.
The Kennedy approach, however, today is recognized as not
merely a lesser form of the consumption tax but fundamentally
flawed. A non-universal investment incentive (such as one that
favors investments in machines but not human capital, and that
does not benefit companies, such as newly founded ones, that have
no tax liability to offset) tends to shift the allocation of investment,
leading to reductions in its profitability before tax, far more than to
increase the amount of investment. 54 Moreover, when the tax
system simultaneously favors returns from business investment and
permits interest expense deductions, taxpayers are encouraged to
engage in tax arbitrage transactions, pairing tax-favored returns
against fully deductible interest, that either may be shams, or else
may be very poor investments that lose money before tax.
55
Historical data, although suspect given the difficulty of ruling out
independent variables, tends to confirm the lack of correlation
between enactment or repeal of investment incentives and aggregate
levels of investment.56
53 See, e.g., Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax 87 HARV.
L. REV. 1113 (1974) (arguing that a tax on personal consumption would simplify
reporting and more equitably distribute tax burdens); Isenbergh, The End of Income
Taxation (forthcoming 45 TAX L. REv. (1990)).
54 See C. STEUERLE, TAXEs, LoANs, AND INFLATION 130-36 (1985); Isenbergh, supra
note 53. At a certain point, a non-universal investment incentive might be broad
enough for its effect on aggregate investment to outweigh its effect on the allocation
of investment. Consider, for example, the pre-1988Japanese system, which exempted
from tax most interest income and capital gains. See Homma, Maeda, & Hashimato,
Japan, in COMPARATIVE TAX SYSTEMS: EUROPE, CANADA, ANDJAPAN 406-15 (J. Pechman
ed. 1987).
5 See C. STEUERLE, supra note 54, at 136.
- Gross private domestic investment, as a percentage of gross national product,
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In the early 1960s, the problems of using the investment tax
credit to encourage aggregate investment were not well understood,
and Kennedy's proposal gained credibility through prominent
scholarly backing.5 7 Whether influenced by this support or not,
the Revenue Act of 1962 -58 included the credit in significantly ex-
panded form.59  (It also included Kennedy's business meal and
entertainment proposals, although in significantly weakened form.)
Enactment of the investment tax credit did not result from lobbying
by the business community, its principal direct beneficiary.
Business was split, with many companies preferring rate cuts and
more favorable depreciation to enactment of the credit. Reflecting
this lack of business support, Republicans in the House of Repre-
sentatives voted 163-0 in favor of an unsuccessful floor amendment
that would have deleted the investment credit from the legislation.
Congressional Democrats overwhelmingly supported the credit
despite vocal opposition by organized labor.
60
At least in the short run, the instrumentalist side of the 1962 Act
proved more influential than its reformist side. The Revenue Act
of 196461 expanded tax preferences, 62 again on the broad instru-
mentalist ground of increasing investment. 63 The Tax Reform Act
of 196964 moved the other way, responding to an uproar that
greeted publication of information about the number of wealthy
individuals who were legally paying no tax.65  Among other
increased slightly after enactment of the investment tax credit in 1962 and its
reenactment in 1971. However, it fell after the enactment of investment incentives in
1978 and 1981, and rose slightly after the repeal of such incentives in 1986. See
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, app. B at 310
(1989) (Table B-2) [hereinafter ECONOMIC REPORT].
57 See J. WrrTE, supra note 10, at 158-59; Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a
Goal of Income Tax Refomw 80 HARv. L. REV. 925, 926 n.2 (1967).
58 Pub. L. No. 87-834, 76 Stat. 960 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1464 (1988)
and in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. (1988)).59 Congress revised Kennedy's investment tax credit proposal both to benefit more
types of assets and to reward all investment in favored assets, not just increases in a
taxpayer's level of investment. SeeJ. WITrE, supra note 10, at 157.
60 See id. at 156-57, 407 n.4.
61 Pub. L. No. 88-272, 78 Stat. 19 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C. and in 42 U.S.C. §§ 409, 411 (1988)).
62 SeeJ. WRITE, supra note 10, at 160-65.
63 See id. at 162, 408 n.15.
64 Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
65 See 115 CONG. REC. 2773 (1969) (statement of Treasury SecretaryJoseph Barr
before the Joint Economic Committee); see also Treasuy Chief Warns of TaxpayerRevol
Cites $50 Billion a Year in Preferences, Wall St. J., Jan. 20, 1969, at 4, col. 3.
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changes, the 1969 Act repealed the investment tax credit and added
a new provision called the minimum tax, which attempted to
prevent complete tax avoidance by wealthy individuals through a 10
percent levy (above a substantial exemption amount) on the value
of certain tax preferences.
The Tax Reduction Act of 197166 restored the investment tax
credit, in addition to adding other incentives such as more favorable
depreciation. 67  After further expansion of tax preferences in
1975,68 Congress at least symbolically reversed course again with
the Tax Reform Act of 1976,69 which, while disowned by some
reformers, 70 did expand the minimum tax, add new anti-tax shelter
rules to the Code, 71 and directly repeal or restrict certain prefer-
ences.
7 2
In 1978, President Garter called for further tax reform, but his
proposals went nowhere. 73 Tax incentives and "capital formation"
were the order of the day. This emphasis reflected the influence of
special interest political action committees (PACs), which were
coming to dominate campaign financing and were aided by
structural changes in Congress that shifted power away from
committee chairmen and other congressional leaders. 74 It also
reflected a shift in national mood. The late 1970s were a period of
intense taxpayer frustration. Despite repeated tax cuts, real federal
income tax burdens had risen continuously throughout the decade:
inflation-fueled "bracket-creep" and the increases in applicable
marginal tax rates which attended increases in taxpayers' nominal
incomes more than offset Congress's efforts. At the state level, "tax
revolts" were erupting, most notably in California where the passage
6 Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 497 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.).
67 See id. § 501, 85 Stat. 497, 535-49 (1971) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.
§§ 991-997 (1988)).
68 See Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, 89 Stat. 26 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C).
69 Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
26 U.S.C.).
70 SeeJ. WrTrE, supra note 10, at 194.
71 See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 465, 90 Stat. 1520, 1531-33
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 465 (1988)).
72 In particular, the 1976 Act ostensibly repealed the exclusion for pre-death
appreciation of capital assets inherited from a decedent, although this provision later
was repealed before its effective date. SeeJ. WrrrE, supra note 10, at 195.
73 See id. at 204-07.
74 See TAXING CHOICES, supra note 11, at 25; see also J. BIRNBAUM & A. MURRAY,
supra note 11, at 18;J. WrrrE, supra note 10, at 240-43.
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of Proposition 13 75 imposed severe constitutional restrictions on
property taxation. 76 In the same period, public faith in the
effectiveness of government spending declined precipitously. 77 In
this climate, even liberal newspapers ordinarily sympathetic to tax
reform began publishing articles that seemed to favor tax instru-
mentalism.
78
On a small scale in 197779 and a larger one in 1978,80 Con-
gress expanded tax preferences both for particular industries and
for investment in general. Thus, for example, oil companies were
exempted from minimum tax requirements, 8 1 and taxation of
capital gains was reduced, 82 all with an eye toward increasing
aggregate investment.8 The predicted increase failed to material-
ize.
84
In 1980, Ronald Reagan was elected President on a platform
calling for major tax cuts, not only through rate reduction, but also
through increased incentives for business investment.85 Taxes had
been a central issue in the :t980 presidential campaign, with Reagan
promising dramatic tax cuts and opponents asking how he could
simultaneously cut taxes, raise defense spending, and balance the
budget.86 Reagan initially campaigned only for a rate reduction
for individuals. On June 25, 1980, however, he appeared on the
steps of the Capitol to endorse a major business investment
incentive, the "10-5-3" depreciation plan, under which all deprecia-
ble property would be fully written off in either ten, five, or three
75 CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, §§ 1-6.
76 SeeJ. WITTE, supra note 10, at 207-08. Paul Samuelson termed the passage of
Proposition 13 the "major political or economic event of the 1970s." S. HANSEN, supra
note 28, at 1.
77 See Ladd, The Polls: Taxing and Spending 43 PUB. OPINION Q. 126, 134 (1979).
78 SeeJ. WrrTE, supra note 10, at 206-07.
79 See Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-30, 91 Stat. 126
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
80 See Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
81 See id. § 422.
8 See id. §§ 402-403.
83 See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 96TH CONG., lsT SEss., GENERAL EXPLANATION
OF THE REVENUE AcT OF 1978, 252-54, 269-70 (Comm. Print 1979).
84 See, e.g., ECONOMIC REPORT, supra note 56, at 340-41 (indicating a decrease in
total gross investment between 1979 and 1980).
85 SeeJ. BIRNBAUM & A. MURRAY, supra note 11, at 17.
86 See, e.g., J. WITTE, supra note 10, at 220-21 (noting that the tax issue was more
important in the 1980 campaign than in any other election); Greider, The Education of
David Stockman, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 1981, at 27, 29 (discussing the tax debate of
the 1980 campaign).
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years. 87 This plan was expected to reduce tax revenues by tens of
billions of dollars per year.88 Even so, Gharls Walker, a prominent
corporate lobbyist and head of the American Council for Capital
Formation, was able to use his position in the Reagan campaign to
sell the plan to an apparently befuddled candidate.8 9 Walker's
success made clear that in 1980, unlike 1962, large capital-intensive
companies were powerful participants in the tax policy making
process, actively seeking benefits for themselves.
90
B. The 1981 Act and Its Aftermath
Reagan's sweeping election victory was viewed as a mandate for
substantial tax reduction by both congressional Democrats and
those within the new Administration. 91 The White House and the
Democrats parted company, however, on the question of whose tax
reduction proposals would be enacted. The Democrats, who had
long controlled Congress and retained a majority in the House of
Representatives, were determined to pass their own bill advancing
Reagan's stated goals of "savings, investment, and productivity."
92
In February 1981, the Reagan Administration issued its initial
tax proposal, consisting principally of the rate cuts promised during
the campaign and depreciation slightly less accelerated than under
the 10-5-3 plan.93  Within a month, Chairman Rostenkowski
declared the Reagan plan dead and announced a Democratic
substitute. 94 The two plans were highly similar, except that the
Democrats provided slightly more favorable depreciation, gave
somewhat more tax relief to middle- and low- income taxpayers, and
87 SeeJ. WrITE, supra note 10, 220-21; see alsoj. BIRNBAUM & A. MURRAY, supra note
11, at 17 (explaining the 10-5-3 depreciation plan).
88 See Edsall, How a Lobbyist Group Won Business Tax Cu Wash. Post, Jan. 17, 1982,
at G1, col. 4.
89 SeeJ. BIRNBAUM & A. MURRAY, supra note 11, at 16-17. Walker explained that
Reagan agreed to the plan, despite its possible effects on the deficit, because "[h]e
didn't know what he was doing." Id. at 17.
go A study by the Joint Committee on Taxation concluded that the 10-5-3 plan would
cost Treasury $536 billion over its first ten years, effects on economic growth aside. See
Edsall, supra note 88, at G1, col. 4.
91 SeeJ. WrrrE, supra note 10, at 221.
9 See New Role for Rostenkowski Gets Him into the Thick of House Power-Playing; 39
CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 863, 864 (1981).
93 SeeJ. WrrrE, supra note 10, at 221, 222; Message to Congress Transmitting the
Proposed Package on the Program for Economic Recovery, 1981 PUB. PAPERS 115, 123-
24 (Feb. 18, 1981).
94 SeeJ. WrITE, supra note 10, at 222-23.
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added a greatly expanded saving incentive, the universal individual
retirement account (IRA), to which one could contribute up to
$2,000, deducting the amount contributed and excluding the inside
buildup of interest income until retirement.95 Even at the time,
doubts were expressed about the likely effectiveness of IRAs as a
means of increasing saving.96 Today they are widely discredited
in this respect, much as investment tax credits are discredited as a
means of increasing investment.
97
Rostenkowski soon reached agreement with Senate Finance
Committee Chairman Dole on a plan that combined the revenue-
reducing features of the Reagan and Rostenkowski plans, along with
some additional tax breaks. 98 On June 4, 1981, however, Reagan
rejected the congressional plan and announced a substitute proposal
of his own, which significantly reduced the proposed increases in
depreciation.99  There followed what the Washington Post later
dubbed the "Lear Jet Weekend," as business leaders flew in from
around the country to protest the reduction in depreciation.1
0 0
By June 9, the Administration had not only returned to the 10-5-3
plan, but had also agreed to additional tax breaks worth billions of
dollars to business.
1' 1
The stage was now set for a bitter confrontation between the
White House and congressional Democrats. The battle raged on
two levels. On television, House Speaker O'Neill accused Reagan
of sacrificing the working class to help the wealthy, 10 2 and Reagan
95 See id. at 223.
9 6 SeeJ. BIRNBAUM & A. MURRAY, supra note 11, at 244.
97 When maximum annual contributions are as low as $2,000, IRAs have only a
negligible effect at the margin on taxpayer decisions about how much to save, and
largely change only the form in which savings are held. One need not even save $2,000
in order to establish an IRA: it can be funded by simply borrowing (or not repaying)
an additional $2,000 of debt, perhaps even with deductible interest. See generally R.
MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra note 28, at 305; C. STEUERLE, supra note 54, at 127;
Andrews, supra note 53, at 1173-74; Isenbergh, supra note 53. Some argue that IRAs
may actually reduce aggregate saving, due to the income effect on taxpayers who spend
the reduction in tax liability. See Isenbergh, supra note 53. Even if this claim is
overstated and IRAs increase aggregate saving, the effect is probably trivial in relation
to the revenue cost. See, e.g., CBO.Reports, 46 TAX NOTEs 958 (1990) (noting conclusion
in Congressional Budget Office report that IRAs might not induce much new saving
because of cap on contributions while causing substantial long-term revenue loss).
98 SeeJ. Wr=TE, supra note 10, at 224.
9 See id. at 224; Greider, supi;z note 86, at 46.
100 See Edsall, supra note 88, at GI, col. 4.
101 See id.
102 See O'Neill Forecasts Loss For Reagan Tax Plan, But View is Disputed, N.Y. Times,
June 8, 1981, at Al, col. 1.
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responded that the Democrats favored high taxes whereas he
wanted to reduce everyone's taxes.1 03  In the chambers of Con-
gress, by contrast, the process was simply one of "competition for
authorship of tax concessions."104 As the two sides bid for the
support of business community, the Democrats eventually reached
the point of proposing the "full expensing of capital invest-
ments," 10 5 along with further saving incentives and a long list of
narrower tax breaks. 10 6  Reagan's highly similar bill prevailed,
however, largely due to his mastery of television and the Democrats'
refusal to endorse more than two years of unconditional rate
cuts.
1 0 7
Among other features, the 1981 Act provided cost recovery that,
including the effects of the investment tax credit, proved more
generous than expensing. 10 8 It also provided lucrative tax bene-
fits for particular groups such as the oil industry, truckers, financial
institutions, and multi-national corporations, as well as IRAs and an
"All Savers" provision that permitted permanent exclusion of up to
$1,000 of interest income per taxpayer. 0 9 Commentators recog-
nized that the 1981 Act, in its massive display of both tax instru-
mentalism and the influence of lobbyists, was "historically in a
category by itself." 1 0
The revenue reductions contained in the 1981 Act, coupled with
Reagan's immense defense buildup and the bipartisan opposition to
substantial domestic budget cuts,111 established a dominant
political framework for the 1980s. Enormous and (in nominal
103 See Television speech of President Ronald Reagan (July 27, 1981), repinted in
N.Y. Times, July 28, 1981, at B6, col. 1.
104 Greider, supra note 86, at 51; see alsoJ. WrrE, supra note 10, at 225-35; Rudder,
Fiscal Responsibility and the Revenue Committees, in CONGRESS REcONSIDERED, supra note
26, at 211-12. David Stockman later remarked about the bidding war: "The hogs were
really feeding. The greed level, the level of opportunism, just got out of control."
Greider, supra note 86, at 51.
105 j. WRrTE, supra note 10, at 227. Richard Rahn, chief economist for the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, found this "nothing short of astounding. If you'd told me a
few years ago that the Democrats would propose expensing, I would have said you were
out of your mind." Id. (quoting 39 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1137 (1981)).
'06 See i& at 227-28.
107 See id. at 228-31.
0 8 SeeJOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL EXPLANA-
TION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE TAx EQUITY AND FIScAL RESPONSIBILITY AcT
OF 1982, at 35-37 (Comm. Print 1982).
'09 SeeJ. WRrrE, supra note 10, at 221-35.
no Id. at 235.
" See D. STOCKMAN, THE TRIUMPH OF POLrIcs 208, 211-14 (1986) (regarding
President Reagan's opposition to budget-cutting).
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terms) unprecedented budget deficits were inevitable. Economists
disagree about the extent to which the deficit is actually a prob-
lem; 1 12 its most obvious significance is that, in comparison to tax-
financed pay-as-you-go budgeting, it disguises (and may shift to the
future or, if there is unanticipated inflation, to foreigners) the
incidence of who pays for the cost of government programs.
Politically, however, the budget was widely perceived as a problem,
which led to a new direction in legislative tax policy. In 1982 and
1984, Congress enacted deficit-reduction bills that raised revenue
largely through incremental reforms, such as scaling back deprecia-
tion and creating a revised and expanded minimum tax. 113 These
bills were pushed through by congressional leaders, principally
Senate Finance Committee Chairman Robert Dole, over the
opposition of the business groups whose tax preferences were
reduced.
114
Meanwhile, the 1981 Act became increasingly controversial
because of widely publicized instances of tax avoidance by high-
income taxpayers. Corporate tax planning began attracting
unfavorable attention in 1982 in response to the newly authorized
safe harbor leasing deals, whereby companies with tax losses
effectively sold their excess deductions and credits to profitable
companies for hundreds of millions of dollars."l 5 In 1984, a
labor-funded public interest lobbying group called Citizens for Tax
Justice gained media attention by releasing a study showing that
more than half of 250 prominent corporations had paid no tax for
at least one year in the early 1980s, often while reporting large
profits to shareholders. In 1985, the Treasury Department released
a study showing that roughly 30,000 individuals with earnings
exceeding $250,000 had paid little or no tax, largely due to the
deduction of tax shelter losses. Tax shelters had by this time
become both prominent and disreputable, because of heavy
marketing, over-aggressive interpretations of tax law, what seemed
112 See, e.g., R. EISNER, How REAL Is THE FEDERAL DEFICrr? 1-8 (1986).
113 See Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, §§ 201,
205(a), 206, 96 Stat. 324, 411, 427, 431 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 55, 48,
168 (1988)).
114 See S. HANSEN, supra note 28, at 92-93; Rudder, supra note 104, at 215-18.
115 SeeJ. BIRNBAUM & A. MURRAY, supra note 11, at 11. Safe harbor leasing was
repealed in 1982, see Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-
248, §§ 208-210, 217, 96 Stat. 324, 432-448, 472 (1982) (codified as amended at 26
U.S.C. §§ 168, 48, 103 (1988)), but apparently not forgotten, seeJ. BIRNBAUM & A.
MURRAY, supra note 11, at 11.
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unduly high ratios of taxes saved to cash invested, and the use of
investments (such as jojoba beans and llama breeding) that many
viewed as too esoteric to have much economic value.
1 16
Congress took heed of the change in public mood. The 1982
and 1984 Acts were in some measure efforts to curb perceived
abuses, in addition to raising revenue. On a more ambitious scale,
Democratic Senator Bill Bradley introduced a comprehensive tax
reform bill in which the elimination of many tax preferences would
pay for reducing the top marginal rate for individuals from 50
percent to 30 percent. 117 Congressman Jack Kemp soon intro-
duced a Republican version of tax reform that was similar except for
retaining more investment incentives.118 Both bills aimed at
revenue and distributional neutrality in comparison to preexisting
law. That is, they were not intended to change aggregate tax
revenues, the aggregate tax burden imposed on each income class
(relief for low-income taxpayers aside), or the amount of tax paid by
corporations. These bills thereby effectively ratified the revenue
and distributional consequences of the 1981 Act, while reversing its
instrumentalist strategy, in order to present tax reform unsullied by
extraneous issues. The bills attracted favorable attention, but little
was expected to come of them.
1 19
C. The 1986 Act
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 began as a small political miscalcu-
lation, or at least an excess of caution. President Reagan's advisors,
planning strategy for the 1984 presidential campaign, mistakenly
believed that Walter Mondale was planning to endorse Bradley-style
tax reform. To ward off the issue, Reagan announced a Treasury
Department study of tax reform that would not be released until
after the election.
1 20
116 SeeJ. BIRNBAUM & A. MURRAY, supra note 11, at 10-12.
117 See Fair Tax Act of 1983, S. 1421, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
118 See Fair and Simple Tax Act of 1984, H.R. 6165, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
119 See, e.g., J. BIRNBAUM & A. MURRAY, supra note 11, at 30, 33 (stating that many
legislators working on tax reform expressed doubts as to its feasibility);J. WrrrE, supra
note 10, at 385 (noting that if Treasury I were passed and untouched by further
legislation it would revolutionize the tax system).
12 0 SeeJ. BIRNBAUM & A. MURRAY, supra note 11, at 39-40. Congressional Democrats
were so skeptical of Reagan's reformist intentions that they greeted his announcement
of the study, during his 1984 State of the Union address, with derisive laughter. See
TAXING CHoIcEs, supra note 11, at 45.
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In the absence of outside supervision, the Treasury study was
written largely by nonpolitical senior staffers with an ideological
commitment to tax reform.12 1 The resulting document, Treasury
I, proposed the repeal of almost all express statutory tax preferences
(including many enacted in 1981) other than the home mortgage
interest deduction, 22 thus paying for a reduction of the top
marginal rate to 35 percent. While Treasury I resembled the
congressional tax reform proposals in claiming revenue and
distributional neutrality, it shifted $150 billion in tax liability over
five years from individuals to corporations. The shift resulted from
Secretary Regan's demand for a euphonious individual rate
structure of 15-25-35 percent, in place of the 16-28-37 percent,
proposed by his staffers, that he thought "sounded like a football
call." The resulting nominal tax cut for individuals proved critical
to the political success of tax reform.
123
The proposal evoked favorable press coverage 124 but massive
political opposition from various interest groups. 125 The Admin-
istration quickly disowned Treasury I, but eventually decided to
pursue tax reform, motivated largely by President Reagan's fondness
for lower rates 126 and by the lack of an alternative agenda for
Reagan's second term.127 In May 1985, Reagan gave a television
speech to hail the release of Treasury II, a revised tax reform plan
that, largely for political reasons, restored a host of preferences,
such as for depreciation, capital gains, and the oil industry.
128
Despite its compromises, Treasury II inherited from Treasury I both
the media's approbation and the interest groups' opposition.
129
121 SeeJ. BIRNBAUM & A. MURRAY, supra note 11, at 46-51. The study was overseen
by a political appointee, Treasury Secretary Regan, but he had personal and ideological
reasons for favoring a sweeping tax reform proposal. See id. at 44-46.
122 See id. at 51-58. "Structural" tax preferences such as the realization requirement
were unaffected. See id. at 55-58.
121 See id. at 59-60.
124 See Taxation Sensation, NEw REPUBLiC, Dec. 24, 1984, at 5; Up Co the Trial
Balloons, TIME, Dec. 10, 1984, at 20; Samuelson, Regan Tax Plan Even-Handed, Wash.
Post, Dec. 6, 1984, at D1, col. 1; Silk, If Tax Systen is Overhauled, N.Y. Times, Nov 28,
1984, at D2, col. 1.
125 See TAXING CHOICES, supra note 11, at 67-68.
126 While Reagan liked the rate cuts, his substantive understandingof tax reform was
low by any imaginable standard. For example, he seems to have believed that the
proposed tax reform was not a tax increase for any individual or corporation, even
though he knew that it was a tax cut for many and revenue-neutral on balance. See
TAXING CHOICES, supra note 11, at 72.
127 See id. at 70.
128 See id. at 74-77.
129 See J. BIRNBAUM & A. MuRRAY, supra note 11, at 110; TAXING CHOICES, supra
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The White House tried to counter this opposition with populist
denunciations of "abuse," but public response was tepid.
13 1
Tax reform would have died at this stage but for the enthusiastic
support it received from the previously anti-reform Chairman
Rostenkowski. Seeing, by his own account, a "challenge" that would
enable him to demonstrate leadership and prevent Republicans
from seizing tax reform as an issue, Rostenkowski rejected Treasury
II as a starting point, but had his staff issue a comparably reformist
proposal. He then began trying to steer the proposal through the
Ways and Means Committee, initially with little success. By October
15, 1985, when Rostenkowski suffered a highly publicized defeat to
banking lobbyists, the Committee not only had agreed to little
reform, but had approved new tax preferences worth billions of
dollars per year. At this point, however, criticism by the Washing-
ton media, along with changes in Rostenkowski's tactics, helped
bring about a change in direction. A principally Democratic group
of committee members united in support of reform, and after a
month of closed-door markups, they produced a bill that in broad
concept resembled Treasury II, but that shifted more tax burdens
to corporations and the wealthy (in particular, by adding a 38
percent rate bracket for high-income individuals and increasing
Treasury II's proposed rates for both corporations and capital
gains). 131
These changes led to nearly unanimous Republican opposition
on the House floor, abetted by White House indecision about
whether the bill was still acceptable. Early in December, the
Republicans (aided by about a quarter of the House's Democrats)
defeated a procedural resolution to consider the bill, and it briefly
appeared to be dead. After a personal visit to House Republicans
by President Reagan, however, during which he promised to veto
tax reform if the Senate did not eliminate the 38 percent bracket
and reduce the tax increase for business, the two parties' leader-
ships were able to win approval of the bill by a comfortable
margin.
13 2
note 11, at 80.1
3
0 See TAXING CHOICES, supra note 11, at 95; Fessler, Members Find Little Supportfor
'Refrm,' 43 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1744 (1985); Cannon, President's Tax Tour Ends
Quietly, Wash. Post, Oct. 15, 1985, at A3, col. 1; Cannon & Dewar, Tax Overhaul Hit in
Poll COP Caucus, Wash. Post, Sept. 25, 1985, at A3, col. 1.
131 See TAXING CHOIcES, supra note 11, at 88-95, 106-08, 111-12, 116-27.
132 See id. at 127-32. The House voted by 258-168 to begin considering the tax
reform bill and then adopted it by voice vote. See id. at 132-33.
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The prospects for enactment of tax reform still appeared dim.
Senate Finance Committee Chairman Bob Packwood professed to
"sort of like the tax code the way it [was]," 133 and maneuvered
transparently to discourage enactment by the House. 134  More-
over, at a planning retreat only three of the Senate Finance
Committee's twenty members had expressed support for tax
reform. 135 The Committee had a long history of being even less
sympathetic to reform than Ways and Means. 136  Nonetheless,
given the political prominence of tax reform, the support for it by
a popular President from his own party, and the challenge it
presented him in his first year as chairman, Packwood concluded
that it was a "leadership issue" on which he had to proceed.
37
Packwood's strategy, like Rostenkowski's, was to present his own
package to his committee, although in his case it was premised on
explicit advance bargaining with committee members about what
existing tax benefits were most important to them. The effort to
combine low rates with less reform left Packwood with a revenue
shortfall that he could make up only through bizarre schemes such
as denying business deductions for the payment of excise taxes.
138
The end result was a proposal that, unlike Treasury II or the initial
Rostenkowski and eventual House bill, failed to qualify as "reform"
in the eyes of the news media.
1 39
Things only worsened when committee markup began. As had
happened in Ways and Means, the members began passing amend-
ments that not only rejected specific reforms but created tax breaks
more generous than under existing law. Some of these were but
thinly rationalized, such as special treatment for "productivity
property," which more or less meant property of a sort manufac-
133j. BIRNBAUM & A. MURRAY, supra note 11, at 19.
134 See id. at 163 (describing Packwood's claim, during the House Republican revolt,
that the Senate would not change the bill's anti-business slant as a "blatant and
disingenuous attempt to kill the bill"); see also TAXING CHOICES, supra note 11, at 130
(stating that Packwood had informed President Reagan that "the Senate traditionally
accepts the basic structure of House-passed tax legislation").
135 See TAXING CHOICES, supra note 11, at 147.
136 See e.g., R. FENNO, supra note 26, at 153-54 (noting that special interest groups
exert more pressure and influence on the Finance Committee than on Ways and
Means);J. MANLEY, supra note 26, at 267-68 (stating that the Senate is more receptive
to interest groups and lobbyists than Ways and Means).
137 See TAXING CHOICES, supra note 11, at 146-47.
138 See id. at 148-50; see alsoJ. BIRNBAUM & A. MURRAY, supra note 11, at 195-98.
139 See TAXING CHOICES, supra note 11, at 151.
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tured in the home state of a Finance Committee member. 140
Finally, on April 18, 1986, Packwood, like Rostenkowski six months
earlier, suspended markup. The press reprised its earlier theme
about the triumph of the greedy special interests over the public
good, but with a difference. Rostenkowski had been portrayed
merely as losing the good fight in a committee purchased by PAC
money. By contrast, "Senator Hackwood," as the New Republic
called him,141 was himself to blame. He had served up "sausage,"
not tax reform, and failed to provide "leadership."
142
Packwood sharply changed course, and tried what he deemed
thoroughgoing real reform. First he trotted out David Brockway,
the Chief of Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, to describe
the broad contours of a possible plan for slashing the top rate to as
low as 25 percent. When press and committee reaction proved
positive, the Brockway plan became the Packwood -plan.
143
Packwood then assembled a "core group" of seven committee
members, including himself, who found the plan particularly
attractive, and together they agreed on a set of specific details,
finally emerging with a top individual rate of 27 percent.
144
The low top rate helped to produce a public impression that the
plan was an even more radical reform than Treasury I. This impres-
sion was not wholly wrong. The plan eliminated not only preferen-
tial treatment for capital gains (in common with Treasury I but no
subsequent proposal), but also the IRA deduction (which even
Treasury I had slightly expanded).14 5 In large part, however, the
Packwood plan relied on a different kind of reform than Treasury
I. In addition to retaining the committee's earlier decisions about
the taxation of business income, Packwood's plan sharply accentuat-
ed an ongoing trend (visible since Treasury II) of replacing direct
base-broadening by the repeal of tax preferences with indirect base-
broadening through what I have elsewhere called "selective
limitations": provisions that differentiate between taxpayers by
1 4 0 SeeJ. BIRNBAUM & A. MURRAY, supra note 11, at 200.
141 See TAxING CHOICEs, supra note 11, at 154.
142 See Birnbaum, Packwood Finds his Leading Role on Tax Bill Provides a Boost in
Senate Reelection Campaign, Wall St. J., July 7, 1986, at 34, col. 1; Evans & Novak, Tax
Reform-Or Sausage? Wash. Post, Apr. 18, 1986, at A21, col. 4; Rosenbaum, Tax BilL
Leadership at Issue, N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1986, at DI, col. 3.
143 See TAXING CHOICES, supra note 11, at 165-67.
144 See id. at 169-71, 175.
145 SeeJ. BIRNBAUM & A. MURRAY, supra note 11, at 223 (noting the Packwood plan's
elimination of the capital gains preference and the IRA deduction).
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denying generally allowable tax benefits solely when the taxpayer is
deemed to over-use or misuse them. 14 6 In particular, the plan
relied heavily on (1) a greatly expanded alternative minimum tax
that in effect rationed tax preferences by preventing their use to
eliminate too much of one's tax liability, and (2) a new anti-tax
shelter proposal, the passive loss rules, under which an individual's
losses from business investments in which she did not "materially
participate," while deductible against gains from such investments,
generally could not be deducted against income from sources such
as salary, interest, and dividends.
147
Within two weeks of the initial Packwood announcement, the
Senate Finance Committee approved his plan, with only minor
modifications, by a vote of 20-0. The Senate approved the commit-
tee bill, with even less change, by 97-3. Tax reform then went to a
House-Senate conference to reach agreement on a single bill. On
several occasions, the conference nearly broke down over the issue
of how steeply taxes on corporations should be increased, with
House Democratic conferees aiming about $40 billion higher over
five years than Republican Senate conferees. Eventually Rostenkow-
ski and Packwood, in closed door sessions, succeeded in negotiating
a compromise, and the resulting Tax Reform Act of 1986 was passed
by both houses and signed by President Reagan.
1 48
Among the 1986 Act's principal features were the following: (1)
reduction of the maximum individual rate from 50 percent to an
apparent 28 percent (although an actual 33 percent 49), (2)
reduction of the top corporate rate from 46 percent to 34 percent,
(3) repeal of the capital gains preference, (4) adoption of a
depreciation system for capital assets that was both less accelerated
as a whole and more neutral as between such assets, (5) repeal of
the universal IRA deduction, (6) adoption of selective limitations
such as the passive loss rules and expanded minimum tax, and (7)
elimination of tax liability for those below the poverty line (restor-
ing the situation of the late 1970s, prior to inflationary bracket
creep). In addition, the Act shifted expected tax liabilities totalling
an anticipated $120 billion over five years from individuals to
116 See Shaviro, Selective Limitations on Tax Benefits, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1189, 1191-92
(1989).
147 See 26 U.S.C. § 469 (19815) (applying to individuals and certain closely held
corporations).
148 See TAXING CHOICES, supur note 11, at 172, 179, 192, 203-25.
149 The 33 percent rate resulted from the phaseout of personal exemptions and the
benefit of a lower 15 percent rate. See 26 U.S.C. § l(g) (1988).
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corporations. 5 0 Many individuals nonetheless came inaccurately
to believe that their nominal tax liabilities had in general increased.
This misperception largely resulted from a contemporaneous
reduction in income tax withholding, which led many to receive
smaller refund checks or owe increased amounts upon filing post-
reform tax returns.
151
D. Aftermath of the 1986 Act
While the 1986 Act was somewhat of a public relations fail-
ure,152 its economic impact may have been modestly positive.
Studies by some leading economists suggest that the Act slightly
improved the allocative efficiency of investment without discernibly
affecting the aggregate level of saving and investment (which
increased post-1986, despite the elimination of various tax incen-
tives, but possibly for reasons unrelated to the Act).
153
In 1987, as part of a deficit reduction package, Congress enacted
a set of tax provisions that for the most part further advanced the
reform agenda of the 1986 Act. By 1988, however, the political
winds were beginning to shift. George Bush was elected President
on a platform calling for the restoration of various tax preferences,
including those for capital gains and oil and gas. Bush failed to
gain enactment of his proposals in 1989, despite substantial
bipartisan congressional support, due to the opposition of the
Democratic leadership. To help counter Bush's proposals political-
ly, the Democrats called for restoration of universal IRA deductions.
This proved acceptable to Bush, and as the 1990 legislative year
150 See Rosenbaum, Big Shortfall in Corporate Taxes Thwarts Key Goal of 1986 Law,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1990, at 1, col. 1 (noting that the actual shift to corporations was
far lower than $120 billion, apparently due in part to lower-than-expected corporate
profits and in part to tax planning devices such as the increased use of corporate debt).
The shift resulted principally from the dramatic base-broadening for business income,
much of which is earned by corporations. See e.g., TAXING CHOICES, supra note 11, at
3, 6 (stating that the Act broadened the base by eliminating, among other things, the
favorable tax treatment of capital gains and the investment tax credit and concluding
that elimination of the investment tax credit was the primary cause of the shift).
151 See Bristol, NTA-TIA Conference Considers the Post Tax Reform Work, 39 TAX
NOTES 1027, 1027 (1988) (citingJ. Minarik, Personal Tax Issues Raised by Tax Reform
(May 1988) (unpublished manuscript)).
152 See, e.g., K. PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF RICH AND POOR: WEALTH AND THE
AMERICAN ELECTORATE IN THE REAGAN AFTERMATH app. fat 247 (1990) (citing several
polls in which the majority of respondents believed that tax reform was unfair, too
complicated, and benefitted the rich).15 3 See Brannon, An Early Review of Tax Reforn, 45 TAX NOTES 943, 943-48 (1989).
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began, it appeared possible that both the capital gains preference
and the IRA deduction would be restored. The federal budget
deficit remained a potential obstacle, however.
E. Summary
The preceding overview of modern tax legislation suggests a
number of different points. First, the tax system has been extremely
unstable, with frequent legislation that oscillates between emphasiz-
ing tax instrumentalism and tax reform. Second, the macroeco-
nomic objectives of increasing aggregate saving and investment are
often prominent, but are pursued by strangely ineffective means.
Third, the ambitions of prominent political actors-for prominence
and praise as well as reelection-appear to be extremely important.
Fourth, the news media can play a critical role, both as a passive
transmitter (as when Reagan's 1981 speeches were telecast) and as
an active interpreter (as in the criticism of "Senator Hackwood").
Fifth, business interests variously win (as in 1981), lose (as in 1986),
and benefit fortuitously without having much direct impact (as in
1962).
Comparing 1981 with ][986, the crucial difference seems to be
how the Democratic and Republican parties tried to compete with
each other. In 1981, this competition involved bidding for business
support as a means of getting the credit for enacting a tax cut. In
1986, it involved sacrificing business interests in order to avoid
being perceived as anti-reform. The forces driving the 1981 and
1986 outcomes were essentially similar, although the outcomes were
radically different.
To develop a more systematic understanding, we must examine
theoretical frameworks that have been developed outside of the tax
context. Legal and economic literature suggest two frameworks,
public interest theory and public choice theory. As we will see, the
political science literature is considerably richer and more empiri-
cally based. For convenience, however, I will organize discussion
around the two frameworks that are familiar from law and econom-
ics, incorporating into them related political science viewpoints.
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III. THE PUBLIC INTEREST THEORY OF LEGISLATION
A. The Various Strands of Public Interest Theory
In contemporary law and economics literature, the public
interest theory of legislation 154 is little more than a strawman.
Writers describe it as an old-fashioned and now universally rejected
school of economic thought, discuss it very briefly, and then move
on to the real (public choice-based) discussion. 55 The term is
nonetheless useful because it describes a basic attitude, involving
optimism about the legislative process, that in sympathetic hands
often has specific content. I will mention three varieties of what I
(but not necessarily the exponents) call public interest theory: the
traditional economic view, the pluralist view from political science,
and the ideological view.
1. Public Interest Theory in Economics
Market economists since Adam Smith have recognized that
government could play a wealth-enhancing role in the economy by
responding to instances of market failure. Smith identified the
problem of public goods, noting that there were "certain public
works and certain public institutions, which it can never be for the
interest of any individual, or small number of individuals, to erect
154 Some writers use the term "public finance theory" instead of "public interest
theory." See Accelerating Rate, supra note 21, at 924-26.
155 See, e.g., R. McCoRMICK & R. TOLLIsON, supra note 17, at 3-5 (stating that the
theory is deficient because it assumes an "all-knowing, benevolent government");
Doernberg & McChesney, Doing Good or Doing Well?: Congress and the Tax Reform Act
of 1986, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 891,896 (1987) (stating that tax reform "cannot be explained
as an altruistic attempt by politicians to improve the Code"); AcceleratingRate, supra note
21, at 924-26 (concluding that the theory "provides little help in understanding why
taxes change, as it gives little insight into why taxes actually exist in the first place"); Kalt
& Zupan, supra note 23, at 279 (explaining that public interest theories "have correctly
been viewed as normative wishings, rather than explanations of real world phenome-
na"); Statutoiy Interpretation, supra note 21, at 223 (stating that "the current distrust of
government represents a major shift away from the dominant public perception of
'government as helper'"); McChesney, Regulation, Taxes, and Political Extortion, in
REGULATION AND THE REAGAN ERA: PoLTIcs, BuREAuCRAcY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
223 (R. Meiners & B. Yandle eds. 1989) (noting that "[b]elief that government regulates
in some disinterested 'public-interest' fashion to repair market failure has crumbled");
Tullock, Public Choice in Practice, in CoLLEcvE DECISION MAKING 30-33 (C. Russell ed.
1979) (stating that political scientists no longer believe that politicians and bureaucrats
are solely interested in the public good). Posner is an exception; he gives public interest
theory relatively extensive and sympathetic (although still ultimately skeptical)
consideration. See Posner, supra note 16, at 336-41.
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and maintain."156 Later economists discussed using government
to correct externalities, or costs and benefits associated with
consumption or production that are not reflected in market prices.
By the middle of the twentieth century, welfare economists such as
Arthur Pigou and William Baumol had recognized that these
theoretical justifications for government action could reach quite
far. 157 Moreover, John Maynard Keynes had pioneered the view
that the government should take responsibility for economic
stability and prosperity through macroeconomic budgetary poli-
cy.
158
Economic literature about the government was almost entirely
normative, rather than descriptive. The question of whether actual
government behavior might. vary sharply from ideal behavior tended
to be ignored, 159 under the assumption (often merely implic-
it 160 ) that government could be trusted to pursue the public
interest. Pigou argued that recent increases in public education and
affluence would permit sufficient monitoring of government to
ensure its probity and unselfishness. 16 1 Keynes assumed control
of government by a small and enlightened intellectual elite.
162
A cynic might say that economists had reason to favor expansion
of the government's role, since this promised to enhance their
power, prestige, and employment. Legislation of which they
disapproved "typically elicited laments about the ignorance of
politicians and recommendations for the hiring of more economists
in key governmental positions." 163 There are other explanations
for their optimism, however. They may have shared the widespread
faith in government that dominated public perceptions for several
156 A. SM-IH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 651 (E. Cannan ed. 1937).
157 See W. BAUMOL, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND THE THEORY OF THE STATE 55-56 (2d
ed. 1965); A. PiGou, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 329-35 (4th ed. 1962). Even support
for income redistribution, often considered conceptually separate, can be expressed in
terms of public goods and externalities. See Thurow, The Income Distribution as a Pure
Public Good, 85 Q.J. ECON. 327 (1971).
1
5 8 
SeeJ. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 380
(1936).
159 See J. BUCHANAN & R. WAGNER, supra note 28, at 80-81; Grossman, Tobin on
Macroeconomics: A Review Article, 83 J. POL. EGON. 829, 845-46 (1975).
160 See Farber & Frickey, supra note 23, at 890; Posner, supra note 16, at 335 n.1,
336; see also M. HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGIsLATORS: A THEORY OF POLITICAL MARKETS
17-18 (1981); R. MCCORMICK & R. TOLLISON, supra note 17, at 4.
161 See A. PIGOU, supra note 157, at 333.
162 SeeJ. BUCHANAN & R. WAGNER, supra note 28, at 78-80.
163 M. HAYES, supra note 160, at 17-18.
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* decades after the New Deal.1 64 They may have thought-as Ron-
ald Coase apparently did-that perceived moral differences between
private and public action1 65 might make the latter relatively
altruistic. Or, as Pigou's views suggest, they may have believed that
democracy naturally produces public interest outcomes. If the
public interest is the sum of everyone's private interests, there is
universal suffrage, and people accurately perceive and act in their
interests, it may seem logical to expect "good" legislation: legisla-
tors must supply it in order to be reelected. This rosy view of
politics was well in keeping with a contemporaneous school of
thought in the political science literature.
2. The Pluralist School in Political Science
One of the dominant themes in American political history,
reflected in the study of political science, is the relationship between
"special interests" and the public or general interest. Concern
about interest groups dates back to James Madison, who in the
famous Federalist No. 10 discusses "faction," or the tendency of
particular groups (principally, but not exclusively, economic groups
such as the rich, poor, debtors, creditors, farmers, and manufactur-
ers) to seek legislation injurious to members of other groups.
1 66
While the terms "special interest" and "interest group" tend to be
pejorative, the role that such groups play has not always been
viewed negatively. Madison argued that the evils of faction could
largely be controlled, through means including the creation of a
polity too large and diverse for any one interest group to command
a ready majority.1 67  Alexis de Tocqueville later described the
American passion for participating in political and social groups of
all kinds as an essential and largely beneficial aspect of American
democracy.
168
16 See Statutory Interpretation, supra note 21, at 223.
165 See Posner, supra note 16, at 340.
166 Madison defines a "faction" as "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a
majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common
impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the
permanent and aggregate interests of the community." THE FEDERAiUST No. 10, at 63
(J. Madison) (M. Dunne ed. 1901). He describes the "various and unequal distribution
of property" as the principal cause of faction, but views ideological or religious factions
as likewise important and "sown in the nature of man." Id. at 64.
167 See id. at 66-70.
168 See A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 191-98 (P. Bradley ed. 1945)
(1st ed. 1838); id. at 106-20.
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Among certain political scientists, principally in the 1950s, the
vision of political power shared among a wide array of interest
groups took on a distinctly laudatory cast. Exponents of plural-
ism 169 argued that the consequent dispersal of governmental
power yields numerous benefits for society, including political
stability, widely distributed political satisfaction, and a process of
negotiation and compromise between interests that promotes
political moderation and acceptance of others' reasonable claims.
The above claims focus on by-products of political activity, more
than on the desirability of specific political outcomes. Yet pluralists
were similarly optimistic about such outcomes. While mostly
denying the existence of a public or general interest, apart from the
aggregation of particular interests,17 0 pluralists shared an, at least
implicit, notion of equity, under which each interest should be
weighed accurately (based on numbers and intensity) in the political
balance. To demonstrate that the existing balance of power was
reasonably equitable, pluralists argued that each person is repre-
sented by numerous interest groups, including "potential" groups,
that, while as yet unorganized, stand ready to protect their members
if necessary. 17 1  With groups' power generally proportionate to
size and intensity of interest, 172 legislative outcomes tend to
aggregate accurately the underlying interests of all individuals and
thus of society. Moreover, since everyone's interests are heard and
169 For examples of pluralism in the sense in which I use the term, see A. BENTLEY,
THE PROCESS OF GOvERNMENT: A STUDY OF SOCIAL PRESSURES (1908); R. DAHL, supra
note 16; R. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY
(1961); E. LATHAM, THE GROUP BASIS OF POLITICS (1952); C. LINDBLOM, THE
INTELLIGENCE OF DEMOCRACY: DECISION MAKING THROUGH MUTUAL ADJUSTMENT
(1965) [hereinafter INTELLIGENCE OF DEMOCRACY]; D. TRUMAN, supra note 16; Miller,
Pluralism and Social Choice, 77 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 734 (1983). Some pluralists became
less optimistic over time. See, e.g., C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD'S
POLIrICAL-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS (197'7) [hereinafter POLITICs AND MARKETS] (arguing that
corporate power distorts democracy).
170 See, e.g., A. BENTLEY, supra note 169, at 258-59 (stating that "[tihe balance of
group pressures is the existing state of society"); R. DAHL, supra note 16, at 146
(asserting that governmental decisions are grounded in the appeasement of group
pressures); D. TRUMAN, supra note 16, at 50-51, 358 (arguing that "a totally inclusive
interest.., does not exist); cf INTELLIGENCE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 169, at 276-85
(suggesting that some values or interests might be collective or universal, but arguing
that a decentralized and pluralistic political process would inevitably favor these values).
171 See INTELLIGENCE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 169, at 229 ("[A]Imost any value
that any even relatively small number of citizens moderately or strongly wishes to see
weighed into the policy-making process will be weighed in at some value significantly
above zero."); D. TRUMAN, supra note 16, at 51-52 (discussing potential groups).
172 See INTELLIGENCE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 169, at 242-45.
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weighed, decisions that were not abstractly correct in advance may
be legitimated ex post by universal, process-based consent.
1 73
This pluralist defense of the legislative process differs signifi-
cantly in emphasis from the public interest view of the economists.
It emphasizes wealth distribution and value choices concerning the
nature of the good that are not objectively reducible to wealth.
Economists, by contrast, often emphasize maximizing aggregate
social wealth. In addition to having different concerns, the
pluralists and public interest economists were not conscious allies;
indeed, they appear to have been largely unaware of each other.
Their respective views nonetheless can be amalgamated as part of
a single broader view. The pluralist account of politics strongly
suggests that wealth-maximizing policies generally will be adopt-
ed.174 Moreover, it provides an attractive account of how deci-
sions apart from wealth maximization are made.
3. Ideological Views of the Public Interest
We have thus far defined public interest theory objectively, or
as holding that legislation actually tends to be "good" in the
economic or pluralistic sense. The theory can also be defined
subjectively, or as describing people's motives without regard to
what is actually good. In this sense, it holds only that legislators or
those who influence them pursue altruistic or ideological goals as
ends in themselves, and seek to do good (as they conceive of the
good) rather than solely to pursue self-interest in the narrow sense.
The question of whether (and to what extent) political actors'
motives are altruistic or ideological is extremely important.
However, it raises very different issues than the branches of public
interest theory discussed above. Accordingly, for convenience I will
defer discussing it until we have completed our examination of
public interest theory and begun to explore the difficulties of public
choice theory.
175
173 See id. at 240, 254.
174 By definition, a wealth-maximizingpolicy helps winners more than it hurts losers.
A pluralist would therefore predict, all else being equal, that such a policy will be more
strongly supported than opposed. A wealth-maximizing policy can be made Pareto-
optimal (and thus have no losers) if full compensation is paid to those who otherwise
would lose. See id. at 195 (arguing that pluralistic decision-making creates "strong
tendencies toward Pareto optima").
175 See infra notes 466-81 and accompanying text.
1990]
36 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 139: 1
B. Criticisms of Public Interest Theory
One could not sensibly assert that the public interest view of
American politics is wholly false. Surely the government does many
things that increase social well-being, such as maintaining public
roads, enforcing contracts, and deterring violent crime and foreign
invasion. Moreover, the political system reflects and responds to
the public's wishes, 17 6 at least in the extreme sense that no one
proposing the policies of a Pol Pot or a Nicolae Ceausescu would
have good prospects of sustained electoral success. 1 7 7 Disagree-
ments with the public interest view are in part a matter of degree
(the pluralists were not unrelievedly sanguine178), as well as of
emotional predilection regarding whether to focus on the system's
elements of success or failure.
Nonetheless, the public interest view has been criticized on
theoretical and empirical grounds for misapprehending both the
balance between good and bad and its underlying causation. In
keeping with academic fashions, the attack by economists has been
largely theoretical and that by political scientists largely empirical.
1. (Largely Theoretical) Criticisms by Economists
By the early 1960s, many economists had come to realize that
Congress often has little interest in deferring to their wisdom. For
example, Congress had never attempted to tailor excise taxes to
correlate with professionally estimated externalities. 79 Moreover,
economists' empirical investigations of government activity failed to
confirm their belief that government acts to correct market fail-
ure.1 80  Finally, the fashion that Mark Kelman calls "economic
176 The public's wishes may diverge from social well-being, for example, if people
are deceived about what is in their interest, ignore a general interest of society, or want
to oppress a minority. Yet, the public's wishes provide, at a minimum, strong evidence
of where social well-being lies. See I-I. PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 209-10
(1967) (arguing that a representative, in order to serve her constituents' interest, should
follow their wishes unless she has a "good explanation of why their wishes are not in
accord with their interest").
177 Of INTELLIGENCE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 169, at 232. Lindblom notes
correctly that a highly centralized system of decision-making, in comparison to one
where power is dispersed among many interest groups, is more likely to yield policies
that hurt some and benefit no one outside of government. See id.
178 See, e.g., R. DAHL, supra note 16, at 138 (noting the exclusion of blacks and
Communists from the political process).
179 See Accelerating Rate, supra note 21, at 925-26.
180 See, e.g., R. MCCORMICK & It. TOLLIsON, supra note 17, at 5 (noting that often
"there is a sizeable gap between standard economic rationalizations for state interven-
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imperialism," or extending economic analysis "to all spheres of
human activity,"181 suggested viewing legislators through the
conventional prism of rational self-interest. Economists began to
believe that politicians would reduce social welfare deliberately if
this happened to benefit them.18 2 Economists almost simulta-
neously became aware of public interest theory as a contestable way
of thinking and by consensus rejected it.18 3  We can divide the
elements of economists' rejection of public interest theory into two
categories.1
4
a. When Everyone "Wins," Everyone May Lose
The pluralists applaud a system where power is decentralized
and everyone occasionally wins-for example, where each interest
group constituency receives a share of government largesse. To
many economists, however, this pleasant distributional dream is
instead an efficiency nightmare that threatens to reduce social
wealth and leave everyone worse off than if there were no largesse
at all. They identify two principal reasons for the inefficiency of a
system that gives everyone the benefit of an occasional wealth
tion in the economy and the actual properties of specific instances of state interven-
tion"); Posner, supra note 16, at 336 (stating that "fifteen years of... research... have
demonstrated that regulation is not positively correlated with the presence of external
economies or diseconomies or with monopolistic market structure").
181 M. Kelman, supra note 23, at 206.
182 See, e.g., J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTrrTUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 19-20 (1962) (arguing that the same
basic values and self-interest that motivate individuals in the economic sphere also apply
in the political sphere). Perhaps the very naivet6 of the earlier economists' view of
politicians, see M. HAYES, supra note 160, at 128, contributed to a harsh backlash.
183 See, e.g., Kalt & Zupan, supra note 23, at 279 (noting that "public interest theories
of politics" were rejected and "replaced by models of political behavior that are
consistent with the rest of microeconomics"); Tullock, supra note 155, at 30-31
(discussing the change in attitude toward the motives of government officials from
public interest to individual interests). Some law and economics scholars espouse a
public interest view of much of the common law as developed by the courts. See, e.g.,
W. LANDES & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAw 1 (1987) (stating
that "the common law of torts is best explained as if the judges .... were trying to
promote efficient resource allocation").
184 For convenience and because it does not seem germane here, I ignore a third
category of economic analysis tending to weaken public interest theory: the study of
voting and election paradoxes such as cycling, logrolling, and the consequences of
having (in many cases) a choice between only two candidates. For discussions of these
phenomena, see A. BRETON, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
123-39,155-57 (1974); A. DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 114-41 (1957);
I. MCLEAN, supra note 7, at 25-27.
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transfer. First, the means of transferring wealth may involve using
resources inefficiently. 185 For example, assume that each of the
country's 435 congressional districts pays $1 billion dollars of
Federal taxes and is the site of $1 billion dollars of wasteful Federal
pork barrel spending (such as building army bases that serve no
military purpose). Each district benefits greatly from its own pork
barrel project (since it receives the entire benefit and bears only
1/435th of the cost), yet loses overall because, given its share of the
costs of all projects, it is exchanging $1 billion dollars cash for a
worthless asset.
186
The second reason advanced by economists for the inefficiency
of governmental wealth transfers is that, when they are available,
people sometimes expend substantial resources seeking them. For
example, imagine that each military base depends politically on the
efforts of lobbyists who must churn out favorable propaganda and
make campaign contributions to members of Congress. 8 7 Many
of the resources used in seeking all the reciprocal transfers will be
consumed, not just transferred, and thus are essentially wasted.
If everyone loses in the aggregate from transfers of government
largesse, one might think that all could simply agree to dispense
with the transfers. This solution is impeded, however, by a
collective action problem, or "prisoner's dilemma." Recall, for
example, that each congressional district benefits from its own pork
barrel project, whether or not any other district has a project. No
district benefits from foregoing its own transfer unless its decision
influences significant numbers of others to forego seeking transfers
as well. In the vast and decentralized political arena celebrated by
185 See, e.g., Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, in TOWARD A THEORY
OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 71, 71-72 (J. Buchanan, R. Tollison & G. Tullock eds.
1980) (identifying the costs of seeking transfers as an additional "social cost" which
produces inefficiency); Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Thef4 in
TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY, suapra, at 39, 49 (noting that non-
competitive behavior produces costs among those seeking a transfer, whether or not
they are successful). For a discussion of the reasons of this claimed inefficiency, see
infra text accompanying notes 188-200.
186 A more conventional example in the literature involves monopolies. If every
industry establishes a monopoly via favorable government regulation, then everyone
associated with an industry seemingly "wins," yet on balance many industries (or
everyone) may lose, since all are input purchasers and consumers as well as producers
and thus in varying measure bear the welfare triangle costs of monopoly. See Tullock,
supra note 185, at 44.
187 Another way of looking at this cost is as an opportunity cost of using the same
resources productively. See G. TULLOcK, supra note 22, at 14.
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the pluralists, any such coordination between different groups'
decisions about whether to seek transfers may be impossible.
b. Wealth-Reducing Transfers and the Theory of Groups
A question still remains as to why the transfers obtained by
districts or interest groups should be inefficient (costs of seeking
them aside). This premise was explicit in the economists' analysis
described above.188 Yet one might expect efficient transfers (such
as militarily useful bases) to be the norm even if the persons seeking
a transfer are utterly indifferent to its efficiency.189 As an exam-
ple, anyone who seeks an army base presumably must claim that it
will be militarily useful. Those outside the locality have self-
interested reasons for opposing the base unless this claim is
persuasive. In political competition, the stronger arguments for
transfers seemingly should defeat the weaker ones.
The problem, economists argue, is that this asks too much of
people outside the area where the useless army base would be
located. Information and political action-such as determining that
a base is useless and punishing politicians who support it-are costly
to voters unless they happen to enjoy politics as a hobby. There-
fore, most voters choose to become well-informed about only a
small number of issues, principally those in which they have a
substantial direct stake-such as a military base in one's own
district.190 On all other issues, voters engage in "efficient shirk-
ing": they make no effort even to understand, because the cost of
one's efforts would exceed the expected benefit.1 91 In particular,
voters shirk with regard to widely shared public goods (including
the avoidance of "public bads" such as inefficient expenditures).
Shirking is individually efficient not only because each person's
share of the benefit (or avoided detriment) is small, but because of
a collective action problem. If all affected voters cooperated to
learn and implement their interests, they all might benefit on
balance despite the costs of information and political action. Yet
188 See supra text accompanying notes 186-87.
189 See Becker, A Theoy of Conpetition Among Pressure GroupsforPolitical lnfluenc 98
Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983) (predicting that the means used by interest groups to redistribute
wealth will tend to be efficient).19 ) See D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 117-19 (1979).
191 See e.g., McCormick & Tollison, Wealth Transfers in a Representative Democracy, in
TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY, supra note 185, at 293 (applying this
insight to a theory of lobbying).
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each individual voter, having only a trivial capacity to affect political
outcomes, is tempted to free ride on others' efforts and is aware
that others may free ride on hers. From each voter's perspective,
"everyone else" will determine the outcome. One is therefore better
off not incurring the costs of diligence, regardless of whether or not
others assume this burden.
92
Accordingly, economists expect voters to function for most
purposes as virtual ciphers who ignore the legislative process for
rationally self-interested reasons, and who in turn are ignored by
participants in the process. This view, however, fails to describe the
behavior of voters who belong to small interest groups that seek
transfers from the rest of the public. One example of such an
interest group is the group of members of a congressional district
who seek a useless military base. The benefits expected by members
of an interest group may be sufficiently great to justify seeking
information and engaging in political action. Moreover, while the
free rider problem still exdsts, 193 it is less acute than for the rest
of the public. Small groups find it cheaper than do large groups to
coordinate their members' efforts and monitor shirking.
The result is a "systematic tendency for 'exploitation' of the
great [in number] by the small." 194 Contrary to the expectations
of the pluralists, "potential groups" of great numbers remain
unorganized and ineffective even in the face of exploitation.
Consumers, for example, often lose to business interests. The
former are a vast and undifferentiated group while the latter are
divided into industries, each containing only a small number of
firms that can solve the free rider problem fairly well. 195
This explanation still does not account for why interest group
transfers should be inefficient, the costs of obtaining and adminis-
tering them aside. In the military base example, assuming that the
government would spend $1 billion dollars in a particular district,
residents in that district would benefit even more if the cash were
paid to them directly instead of being spent on the base. 196 If, as
we have posited, the residents have the power to direct a $1 billion
192 See M. OLSON, supra note 20, at 11-16.
19 3 The free rider problem occurs because the transfer is a public good for members
of the interest group, who therefbre are tempted to shirk and rely on each others'
efforts.
194 Id. at 29 (footnote omitted and emphasis deleted).
'95 See id. at 126-27, 142-43.
196 When the $1 billion is spent on a useless military base, the local residents benefit
by less than $1 billion: if the money were theirs they would spend it differently.
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dollar expenditure, one would expect them to have it paid directly
to themselves. This result would be efficiency-neutral, the costs of
seeking the transfer aside. To the economist, $1 billion dollars in
the hands of one group is no better or worse than one billion
dollars in the hands of another group.
1 97
As Gordon Tullock explains, however, a direct transfer of this
sort would simply be too "raw." 198 Rent-seekers, those who
pursue transfers artificially contrived by the political process,
199
are constrained to advocate inefficient means of transferring wealth
because only then can they conceal from the public at large what is
really going on. The public, despite its general indifference to
politics, seems to enjoy following obvious scandals.
200
In short, the public is not quite the cipher economists otherwise
assume. This explains the need for a fig leaf that reduces the value
of a transfer to its recipients. Yet it still does not fully explain why
the transfer should be inefficient. For example, those who seek a
local army base should be at most indifferent to questions of
military need; they have no reason to prefer that the base be useless.
More generally, people can conceal rent-seeking motives behind
valid as well as spurious rationales.
The economists' probable response to this problem is twofold.
First, economists who already believe in the chronic inefficiency of
entire areas of government activity (such as economic regulation)
find it reasonable to assume that in each particular case their
general belief will be validated. Second, if rent seekers are
indifferent to anything beyond their private gain and all other
voters are sufficiently ignorant, then rationales need not have much
plausibility-for one to be correct would be wildly coincidental.
Indeed, if the public is highly cynical, the rationale for a transfer
may need to reduce significantly the percentage of value that is
transferred (or the directness of the transfer), even if the rationale
need not otherwise be plausible.
The economic theory of legislation will be discussed more
critically in Section IV.20 1 For now, it is enough to assert that the
197 See Craswell, Ballade of Distributional Considerations, 39 J. LEGAL ED. 54 (1989)
(noting that legal economists study a variety of topics but leave "[a]ll distributional
issues aside").
198 G. TULLOCK, supra note 22, at 19.
199 See R. AMACHER & H. ULBRICH, PRINCIPLES OF ECONoMics 677 (4th ed. 1989);
Tollison, Rent Seeking A Survey, 35 KYKLOs 575, 575 (1982).
200 See G. TULLOCK, supra note 22, at 21, 76-77.
201 See infra text accompanying notes 292-508.
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theory makes some sense on its face, and that to the extent it is
believed, it is highly damaging to any strong version of the public
interest view.
2. (Largely Empirical) Criticisms by Political Scientists.
In recent years many political scientists, like economists, have
become skeptical of the pluralist/public interest view of legislation.
This skepticism arises principally from empirical studies of who
interest groups represent and how interest groups participate in the
legislative process. The pluralists' optimism about the balance and
universality of group representation in Washington is contradicted
by substantial evidence. ]For example, registered interest groups
disproportionately represent corporate business interests20 2 (as
expected under the economic theory of groups), despite recent
growth among citizen, civil rights, and social welfare groups.
20 3
The extent to which one's interests are represented also tends to
vary positively with wealth. 20 4 Even without explicit reference to
the economic theory of groups, political scientists have come to
recognize that "potential groups" cannot redress the balance. Thus,
Elmer Schattschneider distinguished organized and unorganized
groups, noting the implausibility of assuming that "a few workmen
who habitually stop at a corner saloon for a glass of beer are
essentially the same [in political influence] as the United States
Army ... ."205
Schattschneider's work suggested that influence upon legislation
was as highly skewed as one would expect from the interests' uneven
202 See, e.g., M. HAYES, supra note 160, at 15-16 (surveying the academic debate
concerning the extent of corporate power); E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN
PEOPLE: A REALIST'S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 31 (1960) [hereinafter SEMI-
SOVEREIGN PEOPLE] (assessing the scope of business influence in American politics); K.
SCHLOZMAN &J. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 72-73 (1986)
(noting that the multiplicity of business and trade organizations to which General
Electric belongs manifests its political input).
203 See K. SCHLOZMAN & J. T]ERNEY, supra note 202, at 75. Lindblom, initially
perhaps the most optimistic of the pluralists, later decided that excessive corporate
power was a serious problem. See POLrrICs AND MARKETS, supra note 169, at 347-51.
204 As Elmer Schattschneider put it, "[t]he flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the
heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent. Probably about 90 percent of
the people cannot get into the pressure system." SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE, supra note
202, at 35. But see K. SCHLOZMAN & J. TIERNEY, supra note 202, at 73-74 (noting that
although the well-off may be favored by economic representation, "it is the have-nots
among [interest] groups who command the preponderance of... organized political
representation").
205 SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE, supra note 202, at 28.
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representation in Washington. His classic study of interest group
lobbying on the Smoot-Hawley Tariff demonstrated that business
groups seeking high tariffs were virtually unopposed by those (such
as consumers) who would have benefitted from low tariffs. 0 6
Instead of pluralist competition, he found a pattern of pervasive
logrolling, whereby business lobbyists agreed to "reciprocal non-
interference," 20 7 or support for each other's high tariff demands.
If one group sought a tariff on items that a second group needed to
purchase, the second group would settle for a "compensatory duty"
on its own products. 208 Thus, the legislative process was a posi-
tive sum game for its participants, and probably a highly negative
sum game for the country as a whole.
20 9
A later case study of tariff politics, by Raymond Bauer, Ithiel de
Sola Pool, and Lewis Dexter, showed a very different pattern for the
period from 1953 to 1962.210 Then, in keeping with pluralist
expectations, interest groups on all sides of the issue participated.
Yet Bauer, Pool, and Dexter still rejected, albeit on different
grounds, the pluralist belief that legislative policy is a product of the
balance of interest group power. They found that interest groups
were weak and under-financed, tended to offset each other, and
thus left legislators substantial freedom to follow their own
inclinations.
211
More recent studies suggest that a large number of cases,
although intermediate to those studied by Schattschneider, on the
one hand, and by Bauer, Pool, and Dexter on the other, are often
closer to the former.2 12 Interest groups may not always dictate to
the extent they did in the enactment of Smoot-Hawley, but today
they are often well-financed and influential, and usually are found
206 See E. SCHATrSCHNEIDER, POLITICS, PRESSURES, AND THE TARIFF: A STUDY OF
FREE PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN PRESSURE POLITICS, AS SHOWN IN THE 1929-1930 REVISION
OF THE TARIFF (1935).207 Id. at 135-36.
208 See iU at 144-46.
209 See id. at vii (noting that a thousand leading economists petitioned President
Hoover to veto the Smoot-Hawley Tariff).2 10 See R. BAUER, I. POOL & L. DExTER, AMERICAN BUSINESS AND PUBLIC POLICY:
THE POLITICS OF FOREIGN TRADE (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter AMERICAN BUSINESS].
211 See id. at 396-99.
212 See; e.g., M. HAYES, supra note 160, at 25-39 (providing a typology of political
processes utilizing a transactional theory of lobbying); J. KINGDON, CONGRESSMEN'S
VOTING DECISIONS (1973) (studying empirically the first session of the 91st Congress);
K. SCHLOZMAN &J. TIERNEY, supra note 202, at x-xii (considering the empirical debate
on the determinative role of interest group competition).
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only, or at least disproportionately, on one side of an issue. While
some case studies support the pluralist account, 213 one remains
puzzled why interest groups should play such varying roles.
In an influential review of the Bauer, Pool, and Dexter study,
Theodore Lowi pioneered the notion that the role played by interest
groups depends upon the nature of the issue at any given time.
2 14
Lowi posited three principal categories of public policy: distribu-
tion, regulation, and redistribution. 215 Distribution involves pork
barrel issues, the quest by narrow interest groups for subsidies,
chiefly at the expense of the rarely represented general public.
216
The contestants, as reported by Schattschneider, 217 accommodate
each other through logrolling and reciprocal noninterference.
218
Regulation involves direct choices between the interests of well-
organized competing groups (such as one industry against another).
It thus fits the pluralist model of negotiation and compromise and
also manifests instability as the winning alliances change.
2 19
Finally, redistribution again involves direct choices between
competing groups, but here the groups are large social classes, such
as rich versus poor or big business versus organized labor. While
redistribution resembles regulation in having opposite sides
represented, redistribution is more conflictive and ideological in
style, and more stable in outcome. The classes are long-term
antagonists but, given the scale and duration of conflict, a balance
of power develops and persists.
220
Lowi's topology suggests that the pluralists are clearly wrong
about distributional issues, and possibly wrong about redistribu-
tional ones as well, given the wealth bias of interest group represen-
tation. Even issues that superficially look like pure (pluralist)
2 13 See Lowi, American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory (Book
Review), 16 WORLD POL. 677, 681 (1964).2 14 See id. Lowi's topology was widely adapted. See M. HAYES, supra note 160, at 19-
39; R. RIPLEY & G. FRANKLIN, CONGRESS, THE BUREAUcRACY, AND PUBLIC POLIcY 20
(rev. ed. 1980); Smith, Toward a Comparative Theory of the Political Process, 1 COMP. POL.
498, 498-500 (1969).
2 15 See Lowi, supra note 213, at 689. Lowi expressly excludes foreign policy from his
topology. See id. at 689 n.17.
216 See id. at 692-95.
217 See E. SCHATrSCHNEIDER, sapra note 206, at 135-41, 144-46.
218 Lowi argues that Bauer, Pool, and Dexter found a different pattern on tariff
legislation because by the 1950s, tariffs were no longer a distributive issue but a
regulatory one. See Lowi, supra note 213, at 694-95.
29 See id. at 695, 699.
220 See id. at 691, 707-13.
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regulation might also be distributional if some interested parties are
unrepresented. For example, several groups that have cooperated
to win a transfer from the general public might then more visibly
compete regarding its allocation among themselves.
C. Public Interest Theory and the Problem of Cognitive Bias
Thus far, in examining the problems with public interest theory,
we have defined the public interest as maximizing social wealth and
distributing it equitably. Reserving for later the issues raised by
ideological motives, we have assumed both that people seek wealth
(defined narrowly, although taking account of the psychic cost of
time and effort), and that they are rational in deciding how to seek
it. Failures by the political system to maximize and distribute
equitably social wealth have been attributed to poorly aligned
incentives (as when free rider problems distort responses due to
information costs) and to unequal political access and power.
The one hint that people may be more idiosyncratic than the
rational-pursuit-of-wealth model recognizes came when I noted that
a district seeking a wealth transfer may need to conceal this
objective (and reduce the value transferred) by using the fig leaf of
a militarily useless Army base. This example is not necessarily
inconsistent with the model: it can be seen as showing the need to
raise information costs for those outside the district so that they will
not find it worth their while to question the expenditure. 221 Yet
the example raises some interesting problems with the model.
Might people be unusually susceptible to spurious claims about the
need for military spending? If so, does this show a lack of rationali-
ty? Alternatively, might it suggest that people prefer high military
spending without regard to effectiveness? 222 Such a preference,
while seemingly perverse, cannot be called irrational if "rationality"
implies only the selection of appropriate means to advance one's
objectives.
223
I have in mind two related issues with different implications for
public interest theory. The first is whether people's cognitive biases
22 See, e.g., G. TULLOCK, TOWARD A MATHEMATICS OF POLITICS 103-04 (1967)
[hereinafter MATHEMATICS] (discussing the importance of a political program's degree
of complexity, which must be low enough that its beneficiaries understand it and high
enough that those burdened by it ignore it).
H2 See Isenbergh, supra note 53.
2 See, e.g., A. DOwNS, supra note 184, at 5 ("[T]he term rational is never applied to
an agent's ends, but only to his means.").
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and illusions shape political choices in such a way as to provide
further grounds for skepticism about the theory. The second is
whether we can properly say that people are cognitively biased. If
they want something and the political system gives it to them, how
can they be wrong and the "true" public interest different from
what they want?
1. Cognitive Biases and Illusions as Favoring Bad
Legislation and Interest Group Transfers
We have been thinking of people as making rationally self-
interested decisions based on limited knowledge. They process with
reasonable accuracy the information that has come to their
attention, and seek more information if the expected benefit of
doing so exceeds the expected cost. While this assumption does not
lead inevitably to public interest legislation (instead, it makes certain
types of political "market failure" predictable), it appears at least
moderately helpful. Interest group transfers must be sufficiently
small or well-concealed to avoid arousing the public from its
rational ignorance. Note also that politicians may have every
incentive to alert the public to inefficient transfers supported by
their opponents.
Unfortunately, the above view of human behavior is to a certain
extent false. Instead of seeking information, people often shun it
lest it prove unpleasant, for example, by contradicting their
cherished beliefs. As Gordon Tullock has commented, "[t]he
liberals who read The National Review or the conservatives who read
The Nation, are few. Neither group really wants information which
might lead it to change its mind."224 For similar reasons, political
rhetoric often is designed to soothe rather than inform, and so
mollifies by confirming stereotyped views even if world events must
be ignored or misinterpreted.2 2 5
To the extent people receive new information, they tend to
process it in systematically inaccurate ways. Empirically demon-
strated examples include the "constancy principle" (interpreting
information in such a way as to make it consistent with one's
predispositions), "consistency bias" (agreeing with people one likes
and disagreeing with those one dislikes), "positivity bias" (the
common though not universal tendency to interpret ambiguous
224 MATHEMATICS, supra note 221, at 127-28.
25 See M. EDELMAN, supra note 25, at 8.
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information in a positive rather than a negative light), and "agree-
ment bias" (tending to agree with what one hears). 2 6  In addi-
tion, people often mistakenly consider visual information more
trustworthy than verbal information; as a Reagan Administration
official once put it, "What are you going to believe, the facts or your
eyes?" 227 These biases can be exploited by politicians or interest
groups to benefit themselves at the expense of the general public.
Examples include the "big lie" technique of constant repetition
228
and the calculated crafting of a likeable personal image-as when
President Bush publicizes showering with his dog and disliking
broccoli. 229 These methods affect principally the public's factual
beliefs, but some have suggested that self-interested politicians can
also shape the public's preferences. John Kenneth Galbraith's claim
that businesses, through advertising, can first create and then satisfy
new consumer desires 230 may apply to politicians and legisla-
tion.i
31
Perhaps the most far-reaching study of how people's irrationality
(from a narrow self-interest perspective) can further interest group
226 C. ELDER & R. COBB, supra note 25, at 11.
227 H. SMITH, supra note 25, at 412; see also A. RANNEY, supra note 25, at 14-15
(people consider television more believable than newspapers because it is more
personal).
228 Consider the advice that Treasury Secretary Brady recently gave to advocates of
restoring the capital gains preference:
[R]epeat yourself and repeat yourself and repeat yourself. If we link the idea
of double taxation and capital gains to the idea that American companies are
being prejudiced and in their home districts they are losing tax and job
opportunities because of the fact that we are not competitive on a cost of
capital basis, I think we can make it work. But you have to keep repeating
yourself and repeating yourself and repeating yourself.... Be simplistic
about it, take the heat, weather the old rich-poor gag, and I think we'll get it
done.
I Tell You Three Times: Brady Boosts Savings and Investment Incentives, 46 TAX NOTEs 987,
987 (1990).
229 The Center for Media and Public Affairs reported that Bush's dog Millie was
more often mentioned in major media stories during the first six months of the Bush
Administration than were the secretaries of education, agriculture, and veterans' affairs
combined. See Shepherd, "News of the Weird," Chicago Reader, Mar. 23, 1990, § 3, at
1.
23 SeeJ. GALBRArTH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 156 (1958).
231 See M. HAYEs, supra note 160, at 105; MATHEMATICS, supra note 221, at 15-16.
Tullock argues, however, that the Galbraithian view is overstated: "Suppose we consider
the establishment of a new 'service' industry which gives its customers floggings in
return for a reasonable fee. It will be generally agreed that no matter how zealously the
slogan 'Fifty Lashes Every Friday' was promulgated, the company would be unable to
establish a mass market." Id. at 159 n.7.
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dominance is Murray Edelman's The Symbolic Uses of Politics.
Edelman argues that, in a mass society where government is
enormously powerful but remote from everyday life, politics
becomes a "passing parade of abstract symbols .... [onto which
most people project] private emotions, especially strong anxieties
and hopes."232 They ignore substance because they feel power-
less, lack information, cannot accurately assess the effects of a
politician or a policy, and are seduced by the emotional content of
verbal abstractions. Instead of demanding tangible benefit from
government policy, they settle for easily provided symbolic reassur-
ance, such as speeches blaming scapegoats for their problems and
anxieties, or regulatory legislation that supposedly protects the
"little man" but actually enriches narrow elites.
233
Edelman names the large, unorganized groups of people that
seek symbolic satisfaction 'Pattern B" groups, to contrast them with
"Pattern A" groups, or small and well-organized interest groups in
the traditional sense. 234 Pattern A groups have sufficient infor-
mation and power to make rational, materially self-interested judg-
ments about policies and politicians. They consciously manipulate
symbols in order to win public backing for policies that favor their
interests. The result is much as predicted by the economic theory
of groups, except that (1) a Pattern A group's success depends in
large part on its ability to manipulate symbols, and (2) members of
the Pattern B groups are not merely rationally ignorant, but
contented "defenders of the very system of law which permits the
organized to pursue their interests effectively." 235  Edelman's
analysis therefore suggests more transfers to interest groups than
would follow from rational ignorance and collective action problems
alone.
2. Can People Really Be "Biased" About What They Want?
The previous section suggested that people's cognitive biases
and taste for deceptive symbolic reassurance help to show why the
public interest theory of legislation is wrong. One could argue,
however, that if people are getting what they want, as Edelman's
and even Galbraith's views suggest, then by definition the public
232 M. EDELMAN, supra note 25, at 5.
23 See id. at 4, 22-27.
234 See id, at 36.
235 Id. at 40.
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interest is being served. For example, assume that consumers
support existing safety regulation of the automobile industry but
that an economist could show that the regulation has no effect on
safety and enriches the industry at the consumers' expense.
236
The economist's view is of no relevance if definitionally people's
interest is whatever they think it is.
In this simple case, it may be easy to show that the public
interest is not being served. If people support the safety regulation
because they want to save lives, and the regulation, contrary to their
belief, fails to do so, then they are not really getting what they
want. 23 7  Yet what if people, in addition to wanting increased
safety if possible, want to be comforted and reassured by a show of
government concern? (This desire may be responsible for their
clinging to the false belief that the regulation saves lives.) They may
implicitly regard the cost of the regulation as a price worth paying
for psychic reassurance in a world where automobiles are unavoid-
ably dangerous.
Making the problem even harder is the fact that not all legisla-
tion that economists scorn as wealth-reducing is based on falsifiable
factual claims. Consider farm subsidies that lower the gross
national product (by supporting an "inefficiently" large farm sector),
but cater to a popular sentiment that farmers and rural life are
admirable. If one assigns sufficient value to increasing the size of
the farm sector, the subsidy is by definition "wealth-maximizing."
It provides a public good (more farms) that private individuals
might not be able to provide through voluntary contributions, even
if everyone wanted a society with more farms, due to collective
action problems. Thus, while an economist can demonstrate that
the subsidy has costs (since it lowers the gross national product), she
cannot show that it is bad without specifying the appropriate value
choice about farms.
The underlying danger is clear. To insist that publicly support-
ed policies are bad, and thus that people do not know their own
interests, is to risk engaging in the insidious elitism of ascribing
236 This example is derived from Peltzman, The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation,
83 J. POL. EcON. 677 (1975), but I do not mean to imply agreement with Peltzman's
claims about auto safety regulation. See C. SUNSTEIN, AFER THE RIGHTs REVOLUTION:
RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 77-80 (1990); M. Kelman, supra note 23, at 239-
45.
27 Cf. G. TULLOCK, supra note 22, at 30 (discussing whether costs were imposed
when an eighteenth century medical patient asked to be bled based on the mistaken
belief that this treatment would cure his illness).
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"false consciousness" to anyone whose values differ from one's own.
Even granted that people often misperceive their interests, it is wise
to be skeptical of anyone who claims to know better. Economists
are only human, and may suffer like the rest of us from ideological
bias and egocentrism.
Nonetheless, strong grounds exist for resisting the view that
transfers to small interest groups must serve the public interest if
they are popularly supported. Public support may be founded on
misapprehension of causal relationships or on the failure to
understand costs. The psychic reassurance provided by legislation
may even correlate positively with the likelihood that it will be
ineffective. 238 One also may question whether the public benefits
from being deceived, or truly wants to be deceived, even if its
embrace of false factual claims suggests some such (at least
subconscious) inclination.
A further problem is suggested by Edelman's account of govern-
ment as systematically creating public anxiety through the manipu-
lation of supposed crises (as with McGarthyism or the drug war) and
then easing this anxiety through symbolic responses. 239 Despite
the sense of relief created by the symbolic response, government
may have lessened public well-being, just as, though one may be
better off paying blackmail than not, it may be better still if the
blackmailers could not mTke their threats.
240
D. Public Interest Theory and Income Tax Legislation
We have now examined a number of reasons for considering
public interest theory overly optimistic. Information costs and
collective action problems lead to transfers from the many to the
few, and may reduce social well-being even if everyone is among the
favored "few" on some issues. Unequal political power and access
impeach the pluralists' account of broad-based negotiation and
compromise. People's cognitive biases and response to symbols
facilitate manipulation by the well-informed.
How does income tax legislation fit into this picture? To
address this question, we will examine in turn the recent legislation
238 See, e.g., R. NOLL, REFORMING REGULATION: AN EVALUATION OF THE ASH
COUNCIL PROPOSALS 101 (1971) (noting Congress's preference for writing legislation
with "fatuous, self-contradictory wish-lists").
29 See M. EDELMAN, supra note 25, at 69-70.
240 See, e.g., Epstein, Blackmnaii Inc., 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 553 (1983) (discussing the
reasons for the criminalization of blackmail).
[Vol. 139: 1
BEYOND PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC INTEREST
itself, the role played in tax matters by interest groups, and public
comprehension of tax issues.
1. Assessing Public Interest Explanations of
Income Tax Legislation
There are a number of different ways in which we could try to
explain the consistency of recent income tax legislation with public
interest theory. As we will see, however, these explanations, though
not entirely wrong (and hard to assess given the ambiguity of what
is good tax law), do not seem to explain very much.
a. Tax Reform
The enactment of sweeping tax reform legislation in 1986 looks
like a good example of public interest theory at work. Many would
agree that tax reform is a good thing, both in principle and, to a
lesser extent, as enacted. Moreover, the basic reform principle of
repealing tax preferences in order to pay for lower rates seems the
very antithesis of what one would expect based on interest group
theories of politics (optimistic pluralism aside). The 1986 Act
therefore poses a significant challenge for such theories. Yet it falls
far short of validating public interest theory. One is left wondering
how to explain either the frequency of anti-reform legislation or the
congressional habit of oscillating between reform and instru-
mentalism. Moreover, one must explain the tendency of the 1986
Act, magnified at each stage of the legislative process, to address
perceptions of abuse through selective limitations at the expense of
straightforward base-broadening. This had obvious political
advantages, but greatly increased the Act's complexity and reduced
its efficiency. 241 Although the shift to selective limitations does
not necessarily contradict attributing public interest motives to
Congress, which may simply have been misguided, it does perhaps
justify heightened skepticism.
b. Level of Taxation
The level of taxation responds to some extent to public opinion.
Tax increases in the late 1970s as a result of inflation-caused bracket
creep, and public dissatisfaction with governmental perform-
241 See Shaviro, supra note 146, at 1190.
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ance,2 42 contributed to the 1981 tax cut. Concern about the post-
1981 budget deficit helped prompt tax increases in 1982 and 1984.
If the public interest with regard to spending levels is defined as
whatever the public wants (a plausible definition, given that people
often are the bestjudges of their own interests, if one disregards the
issue of redistributive spending to benefit voting minorities such as
the poor), this example may seem to support a public interest view.
One nonetheless cannot make a strong case that tax legislation,
by adjusting expected revenues, rationally implements the public
interest in this sense. The real societal burden of government is of
course a function of spending, not taxation, which merely repre-
sents one way of paying for spending. During the 1980s, federal
government spending increased in real terms despite a popular and
powerful President's stated policy of reducing it.
Voters often support tax cuts without spending cuts because
they are more aware of overt than actual burdens. 243 For similar
reasons, they prefer taxes with disguised incidence to those with
clear incidence (a major reason for the political utility of the 1986
Act's shift of expected tax liability from individuals to corpora-
tions).2 44 Thus, what Susan Hansen calls "fiscal illusion" has
much to do with decision-making about revenue and spending
levels, and the prevalence of such illusion permits politicians to
increase even literal and direct taxes without incurring the public's
wrath.24 5
c. Increasing Saving and Investment
Much instrumentalist tax legislation is enacted on the stated
ground that it will increase aggregate saving and investmenc. Such
legislation seems to respond to concern about the United States' low
levels of private saving and investment over the last thirty years,
compared either to previous levels or to those in foreign countries
such asJapan. Yet the clear, historically documented ineffectiveness
of the means employed to remedy this problem seriously weakens
242 See S. HANSEN, supra note 28, at 243-44.
243 See id. at 34. Voters may also rationally hope to transfer the costs of government
to future generations through deficit spending or to lenders through unexpected
inflation. The latter strategy is unlikely to work for very long.
2 44 See supra notes 123 & 150 and accompanying text. The perceived (and perhaps
actual) progressivity of raising corporate income taxes had a mixed political impact,
increasing Democratic support for tax reform at the expense of Republican support.
145 See S. HANSEN, supra note 213, at 22-23, 35-36.
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a public interest explanation, since one would think that by now, if
not as early as 1962, the lesson would have been learned. Such
ineffectiveness suggests alternative explanations for saving and
investment incentives, such as the manipulation of "capital forma-
tion" as a symbol by self-interested politicians or interest
groups.
246
d. Adjusting for Inflation
One possible public interest explanation for the wanderings of
the tax base during the 1980s would focus on how inflation distorts
income measurement and the after-tax cost of capital. The tax
system does not index depreciation deductions to reflect inflation,
whereas an economically accurate system, which one could argue is
both in the public interest and understood to be so, would adjust
for inflation.247 (Such a system would also index the basis of all
assets and treat only real interest, or nominal interest minus the rate
of inflation, as income or a deductible expense.) Due to high
inflation in 1981, highly accelerated cost recovery arguably was
necessary (in the absence of indexing) to measure with reasonable
accuracy income from capital assets. Once inflation receded, the
1981 allowances became highly preferential, and accordingly they
were reduced (through slower depreciation and repeal of the
investment tax credit) between 1982 and 1986. Therefore, assuming
that it is desirable to measure real income with reasonable accuracy
(and also assuming that indexing is too complicated), the tax system
seems to have responded appropriately to the problems posed by
fluctuating levels of inflation.
This explanation may have some merit. Perhaps high inflation
added credibility to the arguments of those favoring business
incentives in 1981. Once inflation declined, the 1981 system
became such a powerful tool for controversial tax shelters that it in
effect brought about its own demise. Yet, the public interest
argument cannot be taken very far. Demonstrating causation is
246 A reason (aside from their ineffectiveness) for dismissing as symbolic rather than
substantive current proposals to boost savings and investment through tax incentives is
their small scale. As Eugene Steuerle asks, "Does anyone really believe that raising or
lowering taxes by a few billion... can have much effect on saving or investment in an
economy that approaches $6 trillion per year in output... ?" Steuerle, Leadership and
the Rostenkowski Plan, 46 TAX NOTES 1591, 1591 (1990).
247 See, e.g., J. DODGE, THE LOGIC OF TAx 251 (1989) (noting that indexing for
inflation is a direct solution to the inflation problem which accelerated depreciation
addresses only indirectly).
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problematic, particularly in 1981. Political arguments for accelerat-
ed depreciation focused far more on the raw need to increase
investment than on the significance of inflation. Inflation's main
political impact may simply have been predisposing the public, for
the unrelated reason of bracket creep, to view all tax cutting
arguments with sympathy. Even if the 1981 changes, at then
existing inflation rates, corrected overtaxation of capital income
rather than creating undertaxation, the likelihood remains that they
affected the allocation of investment (arguably inefficiently) far
more than its amount.
248
e. Arguments for Tax Preferences
Perhaps the broadest. public interest argument about tax
legislation would seek to justify the continual existence, even after
1986, of extensive tax preferences. Preferences may significantly
affect the allocation of economic resources, even if they have little
impact on the relatively inelastic categories of consumption, saving,
and investment. These allocative effects are not necessarily bad.
Consider, for example, a preference that increased the relative
return from an item with positive externalities. 249 Also consider
the argument that preferences for the domestic oil industry are
desirable because they lessen our dependence on unreliable foreign
sources. 250  Such an argument surely might have merit, and one
could hardly hope to assess it a priori or based solely on general
theories about taxation.
While public interest arguments for any one tax preference may
be plausible, such arguments are difficult to accept in the aggregate.
The public rationales for preferences often seem suspiciously
weak. 251 Even where plausible, they often contradict each other
248 One cannot even make a sixong case for the putative improvement in income
measurement on horizontal equity grounds. Since nominal as well as real interest
expense remained deductible, debt financing permitted owners of capital assets to avoid
being tax penalized by inflation even without incentives, and the incentives enabled
them to be undertaxed.
249 An example is research and development, which may attract too little investment
in a non-tax world since the person who makes the investment may lose some of the
expected profits to competitors.
250 See, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., 1ST SESS., TAX
REFORM PROPOSALS: TAXATION O1 CAPITAL INCOME 103 (Comm. Print 1985) (noting
the Reagan Administration's contention that tax incentives for oil drilling were
necessary to prevent a reduction in domestic oil production and an increase in
"vulnerability to oil import interruptions").
251 Saving and investment incentives are one example. Incentives for domestic oil
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or the effects of other government action. 252 It also is unclear
how one would explain legislative changes in tax preferences over
time; the public interest view would require relating these to
changes in national needs. 253 As we will see below, perhaps the
strongest argument against the public interest view of preferences
is systemic. Once one has examined the politics of tax legislation,
one may conclude that there is no reason to expect more than a
very mild positive correlation (if that) between tax preferences and
valid social or economic arguments.
f. Summary
A public interest view of tax legislation is not entirely wrong.
Good arguments for a provision do not hurt and may even help.
Public sentiment, founded on voters' assessments of what is in their
individual or collective interest, clearly plays a political role. Yet,
the public interest view does not explain very much, and thus invites
consideration of how well the broader theoretical objections to
public interest theory apply to tax legislation.
2. The Role of Interest Groups in Income Tax Legislation
In attempting to explain the deficiencies of tax legislation, an
obvious first place to look is the role played by interest groups.
Such an examination is aided by the unambiguous nature of some
underlying facts, which have been as stable over time as legislative
outcomes have been unstable. Observers have consistently agreed
that public participation in the tax legislative process is heavily
skewed in favor of business groups that seek tax favors for them-
selves and that, through "Schattschneiderian" logrolling, almost
never oppose favors for each other.254 In most cases, opposition
production may be another; it has been argued that their real effect is to "drain
America first," or exhaust our oil reserves at a time when foreign oil is readily available,
thus leading to increased dependence in the event of a future cutoff. See id. at 103-04.
252 Consider, for example, the tax treatment of education, which is favored through
the charitable deduction, see 26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) (1988), but disfavored through
the nondeductibility of interest on student loans, see 26 U.S.C. § 163(h) (1988).
253 For example, consider trying to explain why oil, gas, and various other minerals
received the tax benefit of percentage depletion long before anyone anticipated the
energy crisis.
4 See, e.g., J. BIRNBAUM & A. MURRAY, supra note 11, at 16-19 (discussing the "new
era" in tax policy marked by the influence of business lobbyists); TAX1NG CHOICES, supra
note 11, at 10-11 (noting that tax policy is "dominated by those organized interests able
to secure" tax advantages); D. DAvIEs, UNrrED STATES TAXEs AND TAX PoLIcY 285-87
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to tax breaks comes only from the Treasury Department,
255
congressional tax staffers (principally from the nonpartisan staff of
the Joint Committee on Taxation 25 6), and a handful of public
interest lobbying groups such as Common Cause and Citizens for
Tax Justice. 257  Despite the rise of public interest lobbying, the
political importance of conventional interest groups has probably
increased in recent years due to their own growth, 258 new tech-
niques for grass roots lobbying, 259 the increased costliness of
congressional elections,260 and the decline of party allegiance
261
and the congressional seniority system as constraints on interest
group influence. In Lowi's terminology, tax legislation generally is
(1986) (noting the strong influence special interest groups have on congressional tax
and finance committees); J. MANLEY, supra note 26, at 338, 361, 376 (noting the
tendency of industry lobbyists to :upport each others' proposals); T. REESE, supra note
41, at 200 (noting that "rarely does any organized interest argue against another group's
tax cut ... ."); H. SMITH, supra note 25, at 263 (noting that interest groups rarely
compete with one another and that political action committees help interest groups
exert "very powerful influences"); Surrey, The Congress and the Tax Lobbyist-How Special
Tax Provisions Get Enacted, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1166 (1957) (suggesting that when
an interest group works for a special provision, it will not find opponents in other
interest groups). There are a few cases in which interest groups compete to raise each
other's taxes relative to their own, as in the longstanding battles between stock and
mutual insurance companies, or between taxable and tax exempt businesses.
255 See Surrey, supra note 254, at 1164-66.
256 See TAXING CHOICES, supra note 11, at 90.
257 See id. at 248-49. Public interest lobbying groups are a recent phenomenon,
unobserved, for example, by Stanley Surrey in his 1957 article. See, e.g., Surrey, supra
note 254, at 1166 (noting that "there are no private pressure groups actively defending
the integrity of the tax structure").
258 See B. CONABLE, CONGRES3 AND THE INCOME TAX 121 (1989); H. SMrH, supra
note 25, at 31.
259 See H. SMITH, supra note 25, at 236-40.
260 See id. at 32, 156-57.
261 See id. at 218.
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distributive, 262 leading one to expect that it will be a positive-sum
game for participants at the expense of the general public.
3. Public Comprehension of Income Tax Issues
As discussed previously, the economic theory of groups provides
only one ground for pessimism about the legislative process. A
second ground focuses on systematic cognitive biases and the
public's susceptibility to the manipulation of symbols. These
problems, like those caused by interest groups, are very prominent
in the tax area.
In matters of taxation, it is quite clear what people principally
want: to pay as little tax as possible while receiving as much value
from government services as possible.263 Narrowly conceived self-
interest prevails, probably because the stakes are directly monetary
and the coercion that underlies taxation is so direct and unpleasant.
Issues like abortion or the Cold War are sufficiently laden with
complex emotional symbolism to evoke broader ideological
responses from many. The dominant symbolism of taxation,
however, pits the taxpayer against a huge abstraction, the public
262 See Lowi, supra note 213, at 705-07. Progressivity is redistributive, see id. at 691,
but, as Lowi predicts of such issues, see id. at 711, has been characterized by stability.
Even the recent sharp reduction in the marginal rate of tax applying to wealthy
individuals, from 70 percent in 1980 to 28 percent starting in 1988, caused little if any
change in effective progressivity. Compare STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND
MEANS, 101ST CONG. 2D SESS., BACKGROUND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL BUDGET AND TAX
POLICY FOR FISCAL YEAR 1991 AND BEYOND 4 (Comm. Print 1990) (noting that "[t]he
individual income tax has not become significantly less progressive over the [past
decade] although it did become less progressive between 1977 and 1985," and
concluding that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 "will make the tax more progressive than
it was in 1985," but only by restoring tax rates "to their 1977 levels") with STAFFS OF THE
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS AND THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,
PROGRESSIVITY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE WAYS AND MEANS/CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
OFFICE STUDY 1 (Feb. 1990) (questioning the methodology and interpretation of the
tables relied on in the Ways and Means Committee paper as well as that report's failure
"to integrate Federal transfer payments with Federal taxes," and concluding that when
such transfers are considered, "[ajny such analysis reveals that the full set of Federal
Government taxes and transfers is highly progressive and has remained so").
One could describe the politics of the 1986 Act as regulatory in Lowi's terms.
Given the need for a revenue-neutral bill, interest groups' desires for tax breaks
necessarily conflicted with each other. However, this conclusion leaves open the
question of why Congress decided to adopt a revenue-neutral (or any) tax reform bill
in the first place-a decision that clearly did not reflect predominant interest group
influence.
263 See L. EISENSTEIN, supra note 37, at 3-5; S. HANSEN, supra note 28, at 195, 262.
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fisc, 264 and thus reinforces the motive of narrow self interest.
Taxation evokes some responses apart from narrow self interest.
For one, people often react with resentment when others, particu-
larly those wealthier than themselves, seem to be paying too little
tax.2 6 5  Another departure from narrow self interest somewhat
offsets this resentment; people often identify empathetically with
others' resistance to the tax collector. This sympathy, along with
often unrealistic hopes of upward economic mobility, help to
explain the longstanding weakness and ambivalence of public
support for progressivity even among those seemingly in a position
to gain from it.
2 66
Despite resentment and sympathetic identification, a narrow self
interest model works reasonably well for taxation. People mostly
want to pay as little as possible (assuming no effect on government
services). This motivation provides a basis for considering whether
public opinion is well informed and rational about tax matters.
When people make systematically inaccurate judgments about their
self interest in evaluating a policy, they can fairly be described as
ignorant or irrational.
From this perspective, public opinion about taxation suffers
from a number of serious defects. Rational ignorance is mixed with
just plain ignorance, creating rich opportunities for the enactment
of bad or deceptive tax legislation. The following are some of the
most important misunderstandings.
a. The Withholding Illusion
While people generally prefer to pay as little income tax as
possible, they often do not know how much they pay. They tend to
ignore the significance of income tax withholding, and thereby
confuse fluctuations in the amount due (or refundable) upon filing
an annual return with fluctuations in the amount actually paid for
the year.267  This preference permits politicians to disguise
26 See Surrey, supra note 254, at 1166.
265 See J. BIRNBAUM & A. MuRItAY, supra note 11, at 9; J. WRITE, supra note 10, at
166.266 See, e.g.,J, WrrrE, supra note 10, at 352-62 (noting the weakness of public support
for a redistributive income tax).
267 See D. BURNHAM, A LAW 'UNTO ITSELF: POWER, POLITIcS, AND THE IRS 28
(1989); S. HANSEN, supra note 28, at 179-80; Bristol, supra note 151, at 1027. In
addition to being ignorant of how much is withheld, people generally prefer to be
overwithheld, see S. HANSEN, supra note 28, at 180, either because it is pleasant to learn
that one is due a refund or as a convenient (if zero interest) form of forced saving.
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increases in tax revenues by simultaneously adjusting withhold-
ing.2 6 8  Alternatively, if taxes are reduced but withholding is
reduced even more, it can lead people inaccurately to believe that
their taxes have increased-as may have happened with individuals
after the enactment of tax reform in 1986.269
b. Fiscal Illusion and the Use of Indirect Taxation
Even accurate knowledge of one's tax bill would provide only an
extremely crude measure of the costs one is bearing by reason of
government claims on social resources. Yet people tend to assume
that it is an accurate measure. As a result, the demand for public
goods depends on how they are financed, instead of being a
function merely of benefit versus cost.270 As noted previously,
government can rely on a variety of fiscal illusions, or means of
imposing costs indirectly and otherwise camouflaging them in order
to avoid public scrutiny. 271 Examples include: increased with-
holding; inflation (the preferred method of the late 1960s and
1970s); deficit spending (the preferred method of the 1980s);272
and taxes whose incidence is disguised or unclear (for example the
corporate income tax, which was used to build public support for
the 1986 Act as simultaneously revenue-neutral and a tax cut).
273
The public not only is fooled in particular cases, but apparently
believes in general that government services can be provided for
free.
274
Maintaining fiscal illusion was recently an explicit premise of
federal budgetary policy. Under President Bush's "no new taxes"
pledge and the Bush-Darman "duck test," the merit of a revenue-
raising proposal expressly depended on whether the public
Despite the importance attached to having no lump sum payment due with the return,
people do not mention convenience of payment when asked to identify the attributes
of an attractive tax system. See id. at 257.
268 See S. HANSEN, supra note 28, at 179-80.
269 See Bristol, supra note 151, at 1027.
27 0 SeeJ. BuCHANAN, PUBLIC FINANCE IN DEMOCRATIC PROCESS 11-21 (1967).
2 7 1 SeeJ. BUCHANAN & R. WAGNER, supra note 28, at 129-34; S. HANSEN, supra note
28, at 106-13.
272 See S. HANSEN, supra note 28, at 109-11.
273 The public preference for taxing corporations is offset to some extent by
corporations' political power arising from the role of organized interest groups. Thus,
corporations often are taxed less than the public apparently would prefer. SeeJ. WrrTE,
supra note 10, at 342-43.
274 See S. HANSEN, supra note 28, at 39, 262.
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perceived it as a tax, not on whether it really was (had the effect of)
a tax.275
c. Taxation of the Wealthy and Large Corporations
While public opinion does not support a high degree of progres-
sivity, it holds that wealthy individuals should pay their "fair share"
of tax. This is a value choice rather than an illusion, but it is
associated with some illusions. The public systematically underesti-
mates the amount of tax paid by the wealthy2 76 or disregards
indirect effects of the tax system (such as corporate income taxes
borne by shareholders and implicit taxes, that is, reduced pre-tax
returns by reason of market responses to a tax preference). At the
same time, people often support tax preferences of comparatively
greater benefit to the wealthy (such as qualified residence interest)
without understanding the possible distributional consequences of
such preferences. Finally, people focus excessively on wealthy
individuals who pay zero tax while ignoring those who pay very little
tax-perhaps failing to appreciate ' the arithmetical continuity
between, say, reducing one's tax liability from $2,000,000 to
$1,000,000 and from $1,000,000 to zero. This attitude underlay the
1986 Act's reliance on selective limitations such as the passive loss
rules and alternative minimum tax.
277
Similar confusion appears with regard to the corporate income
tax. Again, the public underestimates the amount paid, supports
preferences that permit the corporate tax avoidance it abhors, and
focuses disproportionately on complete avoidance. Moreover, the
public seems to think of a corporation as if it were a distinct
individual, rather than a legal entity owned by individuals. This
misconception helps to explain popular outrage over corporations
paying zero tax. (Presumably, there would be less outrage if
members of a partnership paid no tax on their partnership income
27 5 See, Bennett, A Pledge, a Wink, and a jump into the Unknown, 47 TAX NOTES 107-
08 (1990).
276 See S. HANSEN, supra note 28, at 180-81.
277 See TAXING CHOICES, supra note 11, at 86; Shaviro, supra note 41, at 94-95. One
could call disproportionate abhorrence ofwealthy people paying zero tax a value choice,
rather than an illusion. Yet this characterization ignores indirect tax burdens such as
implicit taxes, and exalts symbolism over substance. Wealthy people may be able to
avoid the minimum tax simply by rearranging their investment portfolios (i.e., to insure
that no one of them has too high a ratio of tax-exempt bonds). This strategy might
change perceptions about the tax burden borne by wealthy people without changing the
reality. See id.
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but paid significant taxes on other income.) The belief that a
corporation is in effect a separate individual also helps to explain
why the capital gains preference has far greater political salience
than the elimination of double taxation of corporate income.
278
d. Illusions and Inconsistent Views Relating to Tax Preferences
Public opinion surveys reveal substantial public support for base-
broadening tax reform in principle. 279 Moreover, people often
seem to accept a populist account of the tax law as riddled with
"loopholes" that benefit the rich. 8 ° Yet when the questions
asked shift from the general to the specific, public opinion seems
very different. People respond favorably to a wide range of actual
and proposed tax preferences, ranging from exclusions for interest
earned on savings or government bonds to deductions for medical
and home repair expenses and college tuition fees. Many people
favor exempting interest earned on savings despite objecting to the
idea that the tax system should be used to promote saving.
281
It seems plausible (indeed, obvious) that people like tax
preferences primarily because they view them as tax cuts. Yet, as
already noted, it is an illusion to believe that one has benefitted
from a tax cut (government spending remaining constant) unless
one's total share of the costs of government, including indirect
costs, declines. If I save a few dollars of taxes due to a preference
which enables others to save a lot, while the resulting increased
deficit and/or inflation affects everyone equally, the preference may
leave me worse off.282 Still, if I am like most people, I will proba-
bly believe that I am better off.
Voters' perception of personal benefit from preferences is
extremely important for tax politics. As John Witte has noted, most
of the major preferences have huge constituencies and thus enjoy
strong political support.283 Consider, for example, the deductions
278 See Vickrey, Cut Corporation Taxes, Not Capital Gains, 45 TAx NOTES 455-56
(1989).
279 SeeJ. WRrTE, supra note 10, at 348-49.
280 See, e.g., TAXING CHOICES, supra note 11, at 249-50 (describing the media's
populist account of tax reform politics);J. WRrTE, supra note 10, at 348 (noting opinion-
poll evidence illustrating that the majority favor closing prevalent tax loopholes for the
rich).
281 SeeJ. WrITE, supra note 10, at 354-56.
282 1 am less likely to be worse offifa portion of the costs of government are shifted
outside, for example, to foreigners or future generations.
283 SeeJ. WrITE, supra note 10, at 285-88.
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allowed to homeowners for qualified residence interest and real
property taxes: highly popular and easily visible, they were the only
important tax benefits for real estate to survive the 1986 Act
unchanged. By contrast, raising the entry point for higher marginal
rate brackets would effect a tax cut of potentially enormous
significance; it is, however, one that few voters are likely to
appreciate. The politics of bracket entry thus differ sharply from
those surrounding the homeowners' deductions.
28 4
Taxpayers may value preferences not only for their (perceived)
monetary advantages, but also for the psychic benefits they provide.
To take advantage of a preference one often must take some action,
such as establishing an IRA account. This may be unpleasant if the
necessary action is too costly (i.e., to fund an IRA one must cancel
that Caribbean vacation). But if the action's cost is sufficiently low
(i.e., the IRA can be funded by shifting savings from a pre-existing
account), taking advantage of a preference may give one the satisfac-
tion of feeling like an astute planner who has escaped the peril of
owing imore tax through purposive action. 285 Alternatively, if the
preference allows one to deduct expenses that one would have
incurred anyway, then at least the deduction eases the pain and
makes one feel that one's misfortune has been recognized. In
general, then, people may value preferences for more than just the
monetary benefit.
If it is obvious why people like preferences that reduce their
own tax liability, it is less clear why they are so accepting of
preferences that reduce others' tax liability. They have, apparently,
not yet grasped the notion that preferences function as "tax
expenditures," functionally equivalent to direct outlays of govern-
ment funds. Usually associated with Stanley Surrey,28 6 this notion
has made some headway institutionally and among specialists;
28 7
284 The 1986 legislative process reflected the low visibility of bracket entry points.
Lowering such points in order to increase tax revenues was a favored device for revising
proposals to achieve revenue-neutrality. See e.g., TAXING CHOICES, supra note 11, at 122-
23 (noting that revenue neutrality provoked the Joint Committee on Taxation to
produce a bill with higher tax rates at lower income levels when attempting to install
a top rate of 38 percent).
2 In Edelman's terms, Congress has raised anxiety by nominally subjecting income
to tax, and then bought gratitude by permitting sufficiently motivated taxpayers to
escape. See M. EDELMAN, supra note 25, at 28-29.
286 See S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM vii (1973).
287 Since 1972, the Joint Committee on Taxation has annually submitted a tax
expenditure budget for the ensuing four fiscal years to the House Committee on Ways
and Means, the Senate Committee on Finance, and the House and Senate Committees
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but its popular acceptance is impeded by the intuitive gap between
paying out government funds and not collecting them in the first
place. While the payout recognizably conveys a benefit at other
taxpayers' expense, the noncollection of tax looks merely like
relieving someone's understandably unpleasant burden. People may
not realize that the relieved burden does not disappear (assuming
government spending remains constant), but instead is reallocated
invisibly.
The above discussion suggests that one oft-heard criticism of tax
preferences-that they are enacted without receiving the kind of
public scrutiny given direct expenditures-misses the mark. AsJohn
Witte correctly notes, scrutiny is not really the issue: many tax
preferences are extensively discussed, frequently revised, and
subject in general to a level of scrutiny and a process of deliberation
quite comparable to that typical of spending programs. 28 8  If
preferences provoke less public uproar than spending proposals,
this difference should be attributed not to any lack of "scrutiny" but
to the fact that people are simply more willing to allow others to
take advantage of tax breaks than they are to give them pay-
outs.
2 8 9
One could argue that people's affinity for preferences, both for
themselves and for others, is not irrational but rather a form of
consumption or a value choice, and that to call these attitudes
irrational is merely to inject one's own personal judgments on tax
policy. Yet, if the public does not understand the choices it is
making, relies on demonstrably false assumptions about the
distributional effects of preferences, and holds internally inconsis-
tent beliefs about desirable tax law,290 then the claim that it has
illusions and acts irrationally can be made with some confidence.
on the Budget. See e.g., STAFF OFJOINT CoMM. ON TAxATION, 101sT CONe., 1ST SESS.,
ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCALYEARS 1990-1994 1 (Comm. Print
1989).288 SeeJ. WrITE, supra note 10, at 311, 328-29.
289 Debate about tax preferences versus spending programs often focuses on
questions of relative administrative effectiveness. Compare S. SURREY, supra note 286,
at 148-50 (arguing for direct spending because of the greater administrative ability to
structure carefully) with B. CONABLE, supra note 258, at 101-03 (arguingfor effectiveness
of preferences where pre-planning or decentralized problem solving is needed). Such
discussions often have an air of rationalization; one suspects that the advocates'
positions antedated their consideration of the administrative issues.
290 See S. HANsEN, supra note 28, at 259. Hansen suggests that people have only
"nonattitudes" about tax and that "there seems little point to further efforts ... to
model the opinions of those who do not have them." Id.
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Arguably, the enactment of popular tax preferences creates a
fool's paradise, where people want the tax system to leave them
fiscally better off than under a broad-based regime but it does not,
and where the short-run enjoyment of benefiting from a preference
is swamped by the invisible distributional effects and efficiency costs
of transfers that have been approved because people do not really
understand them as transfers. The public is not even left very
happy by the outcome, judging from survey evidence of widespread
dissatisfaction with the income tax.291 The 1986 Act tapped this
dissatisfaction, although without successfully alleviating it.
IV. THE PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY OF LEGISLATION
A. Overview of Public Choice Theoy
In the law and economics literature, the perennially favored
alternative to public interest theory is public choice theory. In its
broadest sense, public choice theory is simply the economic study
of nonmarket (i.e., political) decision-making. 292 At this level of
generality, it requires no stronger assumption than that people act
rationally in light of their objectives, whatever these may happen to
be. 293  Following common usage, however, I will use the term
"public choice theory" to describe what is actually a sub-genre,
sometimes called the economic theory of regulation. 294  As we
will see, this sub-genre makes considerably stronger and more ques-
tionable assumptions.
In the words of Fred McChesney, "[t]he essential insight of the
economic model is that, like any other good or service, regulation
[i.e., legislation] will be provided to the highest bidder."295 The
sellers are legislators, and they are paid in votes, campaign contri-
butions, and personal benefits such as honoraria and free vaca-
29 See TAXING CHOICES, supra note 11, at 25-27.
292 See D. MUELLER, supra note 190, at 1.
293 See I. McLEAN, supra note 7, at 1.
294 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 16, at 345-56 (describing empirical and theoretical
bases of economic theory focusing on government as supplier of regulation to effective
interest groups). Other branches of public choice theory focus, for example, on the
voting paradoxes or on strategy for forming a majority coalition in a two-party system.
See, e.g., I. McLEAN, supra note 7, at 45-80 (examining the collective action problems of
voters and political coalitions as consumers).
25 McChesney, supra note 155, at 223 (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 139: 1
BEYOND PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC INTEREST
tions. 296 The buyers, drawing on the economic theory of groups,
are organized interest groups seeking wealth transfers.
297
McChesney's "essential insight" has a certain rhetorical force.
If we assume that everything else in life works a certain way, why
should politics be any different? As other public choice writers have
put it:
The point is that there is no bifurcation of personality as between
our "political" and "private" selves. We do not seek to satisfy the
"public interest" when we vote and the "private interest" when we
buy groceries. We seek our "self-interests" in both cases. While
the story of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde may make for good cinema,
it is a poor basis on which to analyze political behavior.
298
Unfortunately, this argument is somewhat misleading. Public
choice theory does not automatically follow from accepting the
continuity between our public and private selves. Take the basic
analogy to a market where people buy and sell items such as
groceries. This market has two important attributes: specific goods
to be bought and sold, and the use of money as a uniform medium
of exchange. Standard economic analysis, such as the drawing of
supply and demand curves, does not require making theoretical
assumptions about what goods people want (i.e., what nonmonetary
preferences they bring to market). It assumes only that, once in the
market, they generally try to do as well as possible in monetary
terms. All else being equal, buyers try to pay as little, and sellers to
receive as much, as possible. This assumption seems eminently
reasonable. Nonmonetary preferences are not being denied; they
merely have little effect at this stage of the process. Thus, the
economic model of a market does not (to quote a standard criticism
of economists) "posit ... [a] shallow and incomplete ... caricature"
of human nature 299 as concerned only with narrow material gain.
296 See Accelerating Rat4 supra note 21, at 926. McCormick and Tollison prefer to
call politicians "brokers" in the sale of benefits from the general public to organized
interest groups, but the distinction is merely semantic, since it is still the politicians and
interest groups who make deals for mutual benefit at the public's expense. See R.
MCCORMICK & R. ToLusON, supra note 17, at 61-77. But see Statutory Intmpretation,
supra note 21, at 228 n.24 (describing this distinction as "fundamental").
27 See, e.g., Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theoy of
Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REv. 265, 269-74
(1990).298 R. MCCORMICK & R. ToLUsON, supra note 17, at 5.
299 M. Kelman, supra note 23, at 206.
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Now consider politics. Here we have a "market" where the
goods are unspecified unless we make assumptions about people's
preferences. Voters, for example, may care about ideological or
symbolic issues that have no direct bearing on their monetary
interests. In voting, they are deciding what to buy, not how much
to pay, since each voter has but one vote and cash sales of votes are
discouraged.3 0 0 Politicians similarly may care about ideological
or symbolic issues that have no direct bearing on their monetary or
professional interests. Although public choice classifies them as
"sellers" of legislation, there is no theoretical reason why they may
not want at times to "buy" particular outcomes.3 0 1 Even treating
politicians purely as "sellers" who seek to maximize professional
self-interest, we encounter a further difference between politics and
the standard private market. In politics, despite the importance of
money, there is no uniform medium of exchange, unless we simply
assume that money is all that politicians want, as opposed to, say,
power, prestige, and flattering press coverage (either as ends in
themselves or as useful for reelection).
Public choice theory ignores these problems with the analogy to
a private market, and treats monetary exchange between interest
groups and politicians as all that matters.30 2 The public is not
only ignorant but irrelevant. Interest groups are all-powerful and
concerned purely with monetary wealth. Politicians are not only
self-interested but narrowly so; they are literally for sale.3 03  By
viewing politics so reductively, public choice theory begins to look
like the "shallow and incomplete" caricature of human nature
expected by critics of economists. Good economic analysis takes
people's preferences as a given and asks what consequences will
follow from them, assuming only means-ends rationality. Public
300 There is, of course, a fixed cost to the act of voting itself and a variable cost in
the amount of effort (other than enjoyable consumption) that one spends learning
about politics.
301 See Posner, supra note 16, at 341.
302 Presumably because of interest groups' assumed small size (which makes money
their most important resource), votes receive considerably less attention than money as
a medium of exchange. See Doernberg & McChesney, supra note 155, at 897-98.
303 Some public choice writers concede that some legislation maybe public-spirited,
rather than purchased by interest groups, but they treat the two categories as entirely
separate, and thus fail to enrich their view of interest group legislation. See, e.g.,
Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 540-41 (1983) (noting that
legislators may "seek[] only to further the public interest"); Statutoiy Inteipretation, supra
note 21, at 228 (noting that legislation may serve "legitimate, public-regarding,
macroeconomic goals").
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choice theory instead makes crudely reductive assumptions about
the preferences that people actually have. It is as if one predicted
that people will buy only healthful and nutritious groceries, or will
not pay anything extra for Cadillacs with tail fins.
304
I should clarify that this is much too harsh for the best public
choice writers-who principally teach in economics departments
rather than law schools. Gordon Tullock, for example, develops
insights about symbolic and expressive voting behavior that parallel
and rival Murray Edelman's.3 0 5 James Buchanan takes as ope of
his fundamental premises the importance of ideas. For example, his
classic study of Keynes (co-authored with Richard Wagner) shows
how the rationalization of deficit spending as a tool of macroeco-
nomic policy dramatically altered American budgetary politics.
30 6
Tullock and Buchanan could be criticized, at most, for not fully
incorporating their broader insights into their theoretical models,
and perhaps under-estimating the tension between the two.
Much public choice writing, however, particularly from law
schools, comes considerably closer to the "crude caricature." As we
will see, it thereby falsifies not only human nature, but observable
facts about the legislative process. Flattening and minimizing the
roles of politicians and unorganized voters, and overlooking
,empirical evidence that could be found through a simple library
search, it resurrects a pure interest group view of politics that
3
04 Strangely enough, for some public choice writers this crude reductiveness is not
an unwitting mistake, but apparently a central reason for the theory's attractiveness. See
infra text accompanying notes 308-40.
505 In The Economics of Special Privilege and Rent Seeking Tullock states that
[a] voter in voting may be motivated not by actual outcome of the matter up
for vote but by a desire to express his own emotions, feeling of virtue, and so
on. The voter may, in fact, vote directly against his interest because he
realizes that his vote has very little, if any, effect on the actual outcome of the
election; hence, he can get a feeling of moral satisfaction out of casting a
virtuous vote without significant cost to him.
G. TuLLocK, supra note 22, at 21 (footnote omitted). Compare this passage from
Edelman's The Symbolic Uses of Politics:
[I]ssues are a minor determinant of how people cast their ballots, most voters
being quite ignorant of what the issues are and of which party stands for what
position....
It does not follow that election campaigns are unimportant or serve no
purpose.... They give people a chance to express discontents and enthusi-
asms, to enjoy a sense of involvement. This is participation in a ritual act,
however; only in a minor degree is it participation in policy formation.
M. EDELMAN, supra note 25, at 3 (footnotes omitted).
3
0 6 SeeJ. BUCHANAN & R. WAGNER, supra note 28, at 134-42.
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political science research has long since discredited. °7  In the
remainder of this section, I will discuss some representative
examples from the legal literature, explore the broader theoretical
and empirical problems with public choice theory, and apply the
conclusions developed to income tax legislation.
B. Public Choice Theory as Practiced in the Law Schools
1. Style and Its Ad Hominem Significance
Public choice articles emanating from the law schools are so
distinctive in tone and style as to reveal something about their
substance. They tend to be slyly knowing, based on the premise
that the author has seen through some set of hollow illusions that
political insiders use to conceal from the naive and gullible what is
really going on. Consider this opening from a recent piece by
Jonathan Macey:
The concept of federalism ... is one of the most revered sacred
cows on the American political scene. Conservatives and liberals
alike extol the virtues of state autonomy whenever deference to
the states happens to serve their political needs at a particular
moment. Yet both groups are also quick to wield the power of the
supremacy clause, while citing vague platitudes about the need for
uniformity among the states, whenever a single national rule ...
furthers their political interests.
3 08
Macey continues that the relationship between state autonomy and
federal supremacy is "one of the most convenient of political
expedients," whose real meaning public choice theory reveals.
30 9
Similarly, consider Richard Doernberg's and Fred McChesney's
public choice analysis of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. After noting
a series of laudatory accounts of the Act, they write:
To the reader of these accounts, the 1986 Act must seem a
political fairy tale come to life, a saga of downtrodden good rising
victorious over evil....
307 See M. HAYEs, supra note 160, at 17-18.
308 Macey, supra note 297, at 265 (footnote omitted).
309 See id. I admit that Macey has chosen a good topic for his cynicism, since many
would agree that "for most people.., issues of federalism take second seat to particular
substantive outcomes." McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U.
CHi. L. REv. 1484, 1488 (1987), quoted in Macey, supra note 297, at 265 n.2.
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This Essay takes issue with these rosy views of the Tax Reform
Act of 1986. In our view, politicians are not doing good for the
taxpayer as much as they are doing well for themselves.
310
The pleasures of an easy and jaunty cynicism plainly loom large
here. Yet one should not be blind to the underlying anger. Macey,
for example, has written that idealized views of deliberative
"republican" governance ignore the "frightening power of man to
subvert the offices of government for what can only be described as
evil ends,"311 by which he mainly means interest group wealth
transfers.312  Doernberg and McChesney paint a devastating
portrait of politicians as parasitical rent extractors who coerce
interest groups into paying tribute, not only to obtain benefits but
to avoid harm. Only the politicians win from the "legislative
auction"; everyone else loses.
313
What is most striking about these portrayals is how they invert
the implicit self-presentation of the authors. An academic writer
implicitly claims concern for the truth, insight into the truth, and an
absence of self-interested motives beyond recognition as a good
scholar. Public choice writers emphasize these claims through their
role as the unmaskers of unpleasant realities. Politicians, by
contrast, are presented as having no concern for truth or good
policy and as heeding instead an absolute and venal self-interest,
centered on money rather than prestige. Opposite in motives, the
public choice writer and the politician are also opposite in power.
The writer, given his degree of alienation, plainly has none, whereas
310 Doernberg & McChesney, supra note 155, at 893. Doernberg and McChesney
begin their article, On the Accelerating Rate and Decreasing Durability of Tax Reform, in a
somewhat similar fashion, noting that tax reforms (by which they mean all changes in
the tax laws) "arouse a range of emotions, from evangelical zeal to hopeless despair to
bemused resignation," but in fact merely reflect legislators' and interest groups' shift
from long-term to short-term contracts for the sale of legislation. Accelerating Rate
supra note 21, at 913-14. Other public choice articles, instead of trying tojar the reader
out of naivet6, describe the shift from naivet6 to cynicism as an already accomplished
fact. See, e.g., Statutory Interpretation, supra note 21, at 223 (noting that the "current
distrust of government represents a major shift away from the dominant public
perception of 'government as helper'"); McChesney, supra note 155, at 223 (noting that
"[b]elief that government regulates in some disinterested 'public-interest' fashion...
has crumbled).
311 Macey, The Missing Element in the Republican Reviva 97 YALE L.J. 1673, 1673
(1988).
312 See id. at 1680, 1683.
s13 See, e.g., Doernberg & McChesney, supra note 155, at 898 (noting that
"[ljegislative auctions are negative-sum games, and may leave everyone, except the
politician, worse off").
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the politician not only has nominal power but is enormously skilled
at manipulating it and us. Crafty rather than wise, politicians
cynically exploit ideas like federalism and tax reform, the better to
extract wealth from society. Taking the measure of their interest
group victims, they mix threats here with favors there and bluffs
with action.3 1 4  They are a nightmarish fantasy projection, the
scholar's evil twin sibling.
One can only speculate about the needs served by this vision.
It may soothe an academic's natural frustration with politics by
explaining things purposively (much as people often embrace
conspiracy theories). It may punish politicians for their undeserved
power and lack of deference to scholars and scholarship. It may
suggest that, if scholars lack the political influence to which they
feel entitled, it is a sign of their integrity rather than of group or
personal failure. Yet none of these explanations need be convincing
for the extreme and unnuanced account of politicians, so different
from the authors' implicit self-presentation, to excite suspicion.
While the legal public choice writers are unrelentingly hostile
towards politics, they are contented to the point of complacency
towards the academy. They repeatedly remind us that their
discipline is making great strides and that increasingly everyone
realizes they are correct.0 15 Academic critics of public choice
theory not only go unanswered, but are misleadingly cited in
footnotes as supporters. 3 1" This complacency harms the public
choice writers' work by encouraging them to inhabit an airless realm
314 See id. at 898-99.
315 See, e.g., Accelerating Rate, supra note 21, at 926-27 (stating that analysts
increasingly believe that "the economic theory of regulation has supplanted public
interest theories in explaining most aspects of politics"); Macey, supra note 297, at 265-
66 (noting that public choice theory has "replaced the older cartel model as a tool for
predicting political behavior"); Statuto7y Inte pretation, supra note 21, at 223-24 (noting
the "recent" and "widespread acceptance of interest group theory"); McChesney, supra
note 155, at 223; McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theoy
of Regulation, J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 101 (1987) (noting "advance[s]" in the economic
theory of regulation, including recognition that "private interest groups other than
consumers have an incentive to organize," and that government is treated "not as a unit,
but as a complicated network of individuals, each with an incentive to maximize his own
interest"). '
316 See e.g., AcceleratingRat supra note 21, at 926 n.77 (citing Posner, supra note 16,
for "discussing the flaws of various theories of government regulation," but misleadingly
implying that he criticizes only public interest theory, when in actuality he criticizes both
public interest and public choice theory); id. at 927 n.81 (citing Kalt & Zupan, supra
note 23, as supportive because the Kalt and Zupan article mentions the widespread
acceptance of public choice theory).
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of self-congratulatory preoccupation with their abstract models317
at the expense of empirical analysis beyond supportive anecdotes.
A good example is McChesney's widely noted study of politi-
cians.31 8 He begins by stating that, despite the many triumphs of
public choice theory, "the role of the politician has not been
integrated satisfactorily into the model. The politician has re-
mained a 'mystery actor,' a passive broker among competing private
rent seekers." 319 -McChesney proposes to bring the politician to
life by developing a model of active rent extraction, under which
politicians do not merely certify the high bidder in the "legislative
auction," but work to raise the bidding by both promising benefit
and threatening harm. The point he makes is powerful as far as it
goes, and previous public choice writers had missed it. Yet
McGhesney ignores the possibility that, if he is trying to bring the
politician to life, empirical information about politicians might be
relevant. He uses such information only selectively to provide
anecdotal backing, as when he mentions "milker bills," or legislation
that is introduced to extract campaign contributions from those
threatened by it.
320
The major counter-example to the legal public choice writers'
lack of a systematic empirical focus is the analysis by McChesney
and Richard Doernberg of 1980s tax legislation. The topic makes
this analysis of particular interest here, and I discuss it in the next
sub-section.
2. Tautological Yet False: Doernberg and McChesney
on 1980s Tax Legislation
In two recent articles, On the Accelerating Rate and Decreasing
Durability of Tax Reform321 and Doing Good or Doing Well?: Congress
and the Tax Reform Act of 1986,322 Doernberg and McChesney
examine 1980s tax legislation from the perspective of public choice
317 See e.g., Macey, supra note 297, at 266 ("The [economic] model has been
employed successfully to define regulatory action, reversal of regulatory action, and
regulatory forbearance." (footnotes omitted)). The "success" apparently consists of
achieving internal logical consistency at an extremely broad level of generality.
'I, See McChesney, supra note 315. McChesney's article is cited uncritically in many
articles. See e.g., R. AMACHER & H. ULBRICH, supra note 199, at 679 n.4; Macey, supra
note 297, at 266 n.8.
319 McChesney, supra note 315, at 102 (footnote omitted).
320 See id. at 107-08.
321 See Accelerating Rate supra note 21.
322 See Doernberg & McChesney, supra note 155.
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theory. They develop two principal arguments. The first is that an
explicitly contractual model for tax legislation, under which it is
sold to the highest bidder, helps to explain the increasingly rapid
pace of recent legislation. Legislators and lobbyists for private
interest groups have been making only short-term "deals" in recent
years, in response to the increased instability of the legislative
process. 323 Long-term deals are undesirable to risk-averse private
interest groups because of rapid turnover on the congressional tax
committees and the large number of players (including staff) who
can influence legislation, since these factors increase the chance that
a long-term deal will fall apart. Moreover, long-term deals are
undesirable to members of Congress because the value they can
extract appreciates as new groups enter the bidding.
324
The problems with this "legislation as contract" model are
twofold. First, the model appears to be false descriptively. Studies
of Congress and interest groups suggest that, despite the relation-
ship between campaign contributions and legislative outcomes,
nothing so simple as a contract is involved. Interest groups buy
access, information, and. a greater likelihood of success-not
legislation as an explicit quid pro quo.325 Moreover, they tend to
concentrate their largesse on precommitted supporters, rather than
on the previously uncommitted or opposed.3 26 All this is not to
deny that campaign financing is a serious problem; it suggests only
that the contract model is too simple. Second, the contract model
adds nothing in terms of causal explanation. Doernberg and
McChesney insert it as a premise at the beginning and then extract
it as a conclusion at the end. Yet one does not need this model to
explain legislative instability following logically from rapid turnover
and an increased number of legislative players. Such instability
would follow as well from the likely impact of these changes on the
formation and stability of -coalitions, and also from the proposition
that new legislative players like to erect new statutory monuments
to themselves.
323 See id. at 898-900.
324 See id.
325 See, e.g., Evans, PAC Contributions and Roll-Call Voting. Conditional Power, in
INTEREST GROUP PoLITcs 114, 114-29 (A. Cigler & B. Loomis 2d. ed. 1986) (finding
no direct links between PAC contributions and legislative decisions).
326 As Mayhew notes, members benefit politically from consistency with their past
positions. See D. MAYHEW, supia note 25, at 67. Thus, there is an element of
precommitment to taking a publi: stand.
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Doernberg and McGhesney's second argument is a response to
those commentators who view the Tax Reform Act of 1986 as a
"legislative miracle that defied all the lessons of political science,
logic, and history."327 Finding such praise inherently implausible,
they attempt to debunk the 1986 Act, principally on three grounds.
First, they note the enormous benefits that legislators derived from
tax reform's presence on the political agenda. In 1985, for example,
members of the tax-writing committees received campaign contribu-
tions totalling $6.7 million, or about two-and-one-half times their
1983 take.328  One might observe that even $6.7 million seems
astoundingly cheap given the enormous stakes (in 1985, a typical
recent year, the income tax took in roughly $400. billion, 329 or
60,000 times as much). Doernberg and McGhesney ignore this
puzzle, however, and assume that anything so good for the members
must have been bad for the public.
330
Second, Doernberg and McChesney support their view of the
"1986 auction"3 31 with selective anecdotal evidence. In particular,
they cite unmistakable examples of the purchase and sale of tax
favors-for example, the grotesque "transition rules," such as the
one permitting steel companies, unlike almost everyone else, to
receive cash refunds for unused investment tax credits. 3 2 More
broadly, they detail the many failures of the 1986 Act to broaden
the tax base, seemingly implying that if any important tax prefer-
ences were retained, then none were eliminated.33  As part of
this argument, they erroneously predicted that widely marketed tax
shelters would survive the 1986 Act's passive loss rules.
33 4
Third, Doernberg and McChesney argue that even if the 1986
Act improved the tax laws, such improvement provides little
comfort given the likelihood that Congress will rapidly sell back to
interest groups the tax preferences that it eliminated.335 Here,
327 Doernberg & McChesney, supra note 155, at 892 (quotingJ. BIRNBAUM & A.
MURRAY, supra note 11, at 285).3 28 See Doernberg & McChesney, supra note 155, at 901; AcceleratingRat4 supra note
21, at 936.
329 See EcONOMIc REPORT, supra note 56, at 398.
330 Thus, the title of their article about the 1986 Act asks whether Congress was
"doing good" for the public or "doing well" for itself-apparently, mutually exclusive
alternatives.
331 Doernberg & McChesney, supra note 155, at 900.
332 See Accelerating Rate, supra note 21, at 957-58.
3 See Doernberg & McChesney, supra note 155, at 919-21.
334 See Accelerating Rate, supra note 21, at 959.
335 See Doernberg & McChesney, supra note 155, at 922-25.
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too, subsequent history proves somewhat awkward for them. As of
mid-1990, few tax preferences have yet been "resold" to interest
groups, and, if the tax committees are merely waiting for the
bidding to escalate, then it is hard to explain why they have
tolerated a decline in their campaign contributions since 1986.336
Doernberg and McChesney's inaccurate predictions and
disinclination to look beyond selective anecdotal evidence are only
the most obvious problems with their analysis. In addition, they fail
to distinguish between causation and the merits. Equipped with
only two simple theories of legislation, public interest and public
choice, they assume that these are the respective sources of good
legislation and bad. If the members of Congress interacted with
interest groups, the legislation must have been bad. Because the
legislation was bad, the members must have been interacting with
interest groups. Yet surely bad legislation can have non-interest-
group causation, and interest groups can support good legislation,
even if only for selfish reasons. The two separate points do not
support each other as strongly as Doernberg and McChesney
assume.
337
Moreover, Doernberg and McChesney provide an explanation
that is at once tautological and false-their style of explanation is
tautological at a broad level. of generality, but as applied to the 1986
36 According to figures compiled from the Almanac of American Politics, the Clerk
of the House of Representatives, and the Librarian of the Senate, members of the
Senate Finance Committee raised $11,054,456 in 1986-not counting Senator Long, for
whom figures were not obtained-and $10,196,524 in 1988, representing a decline of
more than 8 percent. Meanwhile, fundraising by the Senate as a whole apparently
increased by more than 10 percent, suggesting an even sharper relative decline. Similar
results were obtained for the House Ways and Means Committee. It raised $3,499,357
in 1985 (the year when it considered tax reform) as opposed to $3,075,451 in 1987, thus
registering a 13 percent decline while fundraising in the House as a whole increased by
18 percent. Even if Congress subsequently restores tax preferences, it is unclear how
repeal in 1986 helped the committees to extract more money, since it could have added
new preferences without repealing, the old ones.
A colleague has suggested to me that perhaps after 1981 it was so easy for
companies to avoid taxation that selling new preferences was no longer profitable for
Congress, which therefore needed to cleanse the Code so that bidding would resume.
This explanation is contradicted by the fact that, during the enactment of tax reform,
the Ways and Means and Finance committees continued to vote for new tax preferences
(apparently in response to lobbying) until pressure from the media and congressional
leadership brought them to heel. Moreover, by lowering marginal tax rates, Congress
made tax preferences other than credits less valuable.
337 More sophisticated writer, have noted about the 1986 Act that "a truly
remarkable political event need not have produced a truly remarkable legislative
document." TAXING CHOICES, supia note 11, at 260.
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Act, it is refuted upon close analysis. Public choice theory inherently
risks tautology, and thus lacks any rigor, because it is potentially
reconcilable with almost any and all legislation. 38  So long as
someone benefits from the legislation (as is usually the case), one can
claim that the beneficiary purchased it. Thus, perhaps the Federal
government's War on Drugs is a political payoff to drug-dealing
inner city gangs that could not compete as successfully in a
legitimate business environment. McChesney's account of politi-
cians as rent extractors3 39 makes this danger of tautology even
worse: legislation is consistent with the model so long as it either
helps or hurts someone. Rent extraction is of course critical to the
claim that the 1986 Act conformed to public choice theory, since
the Act on its face repealed special interest tax breaks in exchange
for reducing generally applicable marginal rates.3 40  Yet rent
extraction is weakened as an explanation here, not only by Con-
gress's subsequent failure to exploit the new "tax auction" opportu-
nities it ostensibly created, but also by the fact that, below the all-
important leadership level, members of the tax committees generally
responded to tax reform consistently with their preexisting positions
on tax issues. The leaders who flip-flopped (such as Rostenkowski
and Packwood) faced distinctive pressures and opportunities in
media relations and prestige among their peers to a far greater
extent than in fundraising.
This brings us to the most fundamental problem with Doernberg
and McChesney's analysis. Failing to consider the process of enact-
ment in any detail, they are unable to explain, and indeed plainly
misconstrue, the Act's origins. It is incredible to suggest, as they
apparently do, that Regan, Reagan, Rostenkowski, Packwood,
Bradley, Kemp, and the myriad other contributors to enactment of
the 1986 Act concocted and carried out a scheme to deprive interest
groups so that these groups would have to pay more tribute. Yet
anything far short of this synopsis reduces Doernberg and McChes-
ney's account to an empty tautology: politicians accept campaign
contributions and then either help or hurt the donors.
338 See Posner, supra note 16, at 348 ("[T]he economic theory is still so spongy that
virtually any observations can be reconciled with it."); see also Kalt & Zupan, supra note
23, at 280 ("Since every economic policy decision produces transfers of wealth, it is
always possible to infallibly relate political outcomes to distributional impacts.").
339 See McChesney, supra note 315, at 102.
340 See TAXING CHOICES, supra note 11, at 3-6.
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The role of the media, ambitious political leaders, public
dissatisfaction with the income tax, and the tax reform idea itself
(however crudely it was understood) were all essential in 1986, but
none plays a role in Doernberg and McChesney's account. Like a
man in front of a mirror that he mistakes for a window, Doernberg
and McChesney see their own reflections, not what is outside.
C. What Public Choice Theory Omits
Doernberg and McChesney's analysis of the 1986 Act shows how
wide of the mark public choice theory can be when interpreted
narrowly and applied universally. Yet, one should not conclude
from the theory's failure here that it lacks significant explanatory
power. It needs to be supplemented, not abandoned. To improve
public choice theory, we need a more systematic account of how and
why it fails to explain legislative politics. This section will discuss
the theory's shortcomings and the principal factors that it omits.
Though only a complex and multi-faceted approach can achieve
reasonable descriptive accuracy, two factors are particularly
important: voters' taste for symbolic legislation and politicians'
taste for power and prestige. Under circumstances of high
publicity, these factors can easily outweigh interest group politics.
1. Voters
Public choice theory treats voters as narrow profit-maximizers
who, due to information costs and collective action problems,
remain rationally ignorant and thus politically irrelevant to the
extent they are not organized into interest groups. The view,
however, runs into an immediate logical problem. The rational
voter that public choice theory posits would find the act of voting
to be irrational, even assuming full knowledge about the candidates
and issues. Given the arithmetical unimportance of any one vote,
even if the election's outcome is very important, the expected
monetary gain from voting in one's interest is almost infinitesimal
and the costs of voting (such as the expenditure of time) seem
clearly greater. 341 In view of the adverse cost-benefit tradeoff, the
fact that millions of people vote is paradoxical to many public
choice writers, 342 as is the fact that better-educated voters, whom
341 See Farber & Frickey, supra note 23, at 893-94; Kalt & Zupan, supra note 23, at
282; S. Kelman, supra note 23, at 41.
342 See, e.g., A. DOWNS, supra note 184, at 265-74 (discussing this paradox and its
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one would think more likely to be aware that voting is "irrational,"
vote more than others.
3 43
As the best public choice writers have come to recognize, the
paradox suggests that voting is based, not on narrow self-interest,
but on consumption motives, typically involving symbolic or
expressive behavior.3 44  Voters "buy" ideological, emotional, or
moral satisfaction in the course of satisfying what they may regard
as a civic duty, at an individually low cost even if voting conflicts
directly against their narrow interests. The satisfaction is derived
from the vote itself, as distinct from the electoral outcome, and thus
is a strict private good unaffected by its arithmetical unimportance
or by collective action problems.
3 45
The low value of a single vote provides only one reason for
questioning the rational voter model. Consider as well the signifi-
cance, described by Murray Edelman, of politics' status as a
"spectator sport" that most people observe only from a great
distance and as a confusing abstraction:
For most men most of the time politics is a series of pictures in
the mind, placed there by television news, newspapers, magazines,
and discussions. The pictures create a moving panorama taking
place in a world the mass public never quite touches, yet one its
members come to fear and cheer, often with passion and some-
times with action. They are told of legislatures passing laws,
foreign political figures threatening or offering trade agreements,
wars starting and ending, candidates for public office losing or
winning, decisions made to spend unimaginable sums of money to
go to the moon.
Politics is for most of us a passing parade of abstract symbols,
yet a parade which our experience teaches us to be a benevolent
or malevolent force that can be close to omnipotent. Because
politics does visibly confer wealth, take life, imprison and free
people, and represent a history with strong emotional and
effect on elections). Olson argues that the cost of voting is effectively zero because it
is below the "'threshold' [at] which costs and returns [begin to] influence a person's
action." M. OLSON, supra note 20, at 164 n.102. Unfortunately for this explanation,
what is true of the cost of voting should also be true of the expected return.
3s See H. MARGOus, SELFIsHNEss, ALTRUISM, AND RATIONALITY: A THEORY OF
SOCIAL CHOICE 17 (1982).
344 See Kalt & Zupan, supra note 23, at 282 (citing G. Brennan &J. Buchanan, Voter
Choice and the Evaluation of Political Alternatives: A Critique of Public Choice (1982)
(unpublished manuscript)); see also G. TULLOCK, supra note 22, at 21.
M5 See Kalt & Zupan, supra note 23, at 282.
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ideological associations, its processes become easy objects upon
which to displace private emotions, especially strong anxieties and
hopes.
3 46
Thus, in economic terms, voters' political consumption functions
often embrace considerably more (and less) than the rational
calculation of narrow self-interest. Emotional involvement is
facilitated by the fact that, even if one's interest in politics remains
low, much information (both true and false) may come one's way
casually, as when one watches the local news during dinner or
glances at newspaper headlines.
347
Voters' consumption motives and emotional involvement, along
with their capacity to absorb some information passively, suggest
fertile opportunities for manipulation by political actors.
3 48  If
voters were perfectly manipulable and only interest groups did the
manipulating, political outcomes might be roughly the same as
under the standard public choice account of voters as ignorant
profit-maximizers. Both of these premises, however, are false. On
the public's complete manipulability, consider East Germany or
Czechoslovakia, where more than forty years of government
propaganda apparently failed to persuade very many people, or
consider the failure of the advertising campaign for the Edsel.
Voters may be strongly inclined to "buy" some things and not
others.349  On who manipulates, consider the possible role of
political actors apart from interest groups.
Given both the arithmetical unimportance of a single vote and
voters' emotional involvement, politics evokes behavior far less
centered on narrow wealth maximization than does a private
market, even though voters, presumably without schizophrenic
personalities, participate in both. Some critics of public choice
346 M. EDELMAN, supra note 25, at 5.
347 See MATHEMATICS, supra note 221, at 122.
348 Thus, recall Edelman's account of Pattern A or conventional interest groups as
manipulating Pattern B groups that settle for symbolic satisfaction. See supra text
accompanying notes 234-35. Some have argued (and I agree) that Edelman exaggerates
the extent to which political symbols function simply as tools to manipulate Pattern B
groups. See C. ELDER & R. COBB, supra note 25, at 65-66; M. HAYES, supra note 160,
at 70.
349 For an example relating to interest groups of the importance of people's
separately derived views, consider Schattschneider's observation that importers were
ignored during consideration of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff because nativism led Congress
to view them as un-American. See E. SCHATrSCHNEIDER, supra note 206, at 161-62.
Consider also the diminished political success of multinational oil companies after the
oil shortages of the 1970s made them unpopular. SeeJ. WrrrE, supra note 10, at 184-85.
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theory see politics as a realm of greater altruism, where people
sacrifice their own interests in order to act properly towards
others.-50 This conclusion does not necessarily follow, however,
from the lesser importance of monetary self-interest. It depends on
what preferences people substitute for wealth maximization. Gary
Orren, a believer in political altruism, regards "the human desire for
solidarity, for belonging, for attachment, for approval" as a
fundamental motivation for people's political beliefs.3 51 Yet this
desire can lead to self-interested behavior on a group basis,
overcoming collective action problems, as well as to gratuitous
hostility to rival social, ethnic, or geographic groups.3 52  Orren
also argues that political beliefs reflect people's desire to find
"larger purposes that transcend their own immediate situa-
tion."353 Yet selfishness, at least in the broad sense of a taste for
self-justifying and self-flattering beliefs, may play a role.3 54
Consider the childishly egoistic "ethical imperialism" that some
think underlies much of American foreign policy.
3 55
A further aspect of voter behavior apart from altruism arises
from the pervasive role of television in bringing prominent national
and local politicians into people's living rooms on a regular basis.
The false intimacy created can lead voters to identify with and
support a politician on much the same basis as the star of a
dramatic television series. (Consider again President Bush and
broccoli.3 5 6) Here, the motive for voting may simply be affection
for the politician who seems to be a "regular person" and to
understand and share one's values (or to have attractive values of
her own). Gary Orren thinks politics has "more in common with
religion than with economics. " 57 In an age of weak party alle-
350 See Kalt & Zupan, supra note 23, at 281; S. Kelman, supra note 23, at 52-53;
Orren, supra note 23, at 27.
351 Orren, supra note 23, at 27.
352 Consider, as an obvious example, the Nazis' hatred of Jews, reflecting (in
Edelman's terms) the displacement of anxiety onto a convenient scapegoat.
353 Orren, supra note 23, at 27.
3
54 See Shaviro, Statistical-Probability Evidence and the Appearance ofJustice, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 530, 535 (1989).355 SeeJ. SCHUMPETER, CAPITAISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 373 (4th ed. 1954)
(predicting an Anglo-American post-World War I order 'in which the interests and
ambitions of other nations would count only as far as understood and approved by
England and the United States"); G. TULLOCK, supra note 22, at 32.
356 See e.g., Jones, Study Finds Americans Want News But Aren't Well Informed, N.Y.
Times,Jul. 15, 1990, § 1, at 13, col. 1 (noting that people are four times more likely to
know that George Bush hates broccoli than know that April 22 was Earth Day).
57 Orren, supra note 23, at 27.
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giances and high focus on personality, with frequent ticket-splitting,
numerous independent voters, and an increasingly fickle electorate,
a better analogy may be to the entertainment industry.
358
In summary, the public choice model of voters as narrowly self-
interested profit-maximizers seems inaccurate. It confuses low
information with no information and ignores important motivations
apart from narrow self-interest. To understand more fully the
systematic implications of these inaccuracies, it is necessary to
examine some of the other descriptive shortcomings of public
choice theory.
2. Politicians
Before McChesney's study of rent extraction, public choice
writers tended to view politicians as merely passive brokers among
the competing interest groups. McChesney makes the important
point that politicians have both goals of their own and considerable
power over outcomes. 35 9 He thus advances the descriptive power
of public choice theory, although limited by his overly narrow
consumption function for politicians.
If politicians are as exclusively "money-mad" as McChesney
posits, one wonders why they have chosen politics as their profes-
sion. Elected positions often pay less than the available private
sector alternatives, in addition to bringing long hours and relative
job instability.360 The politician who seeks to supplement her
income through private arrangements may risk disgrace and even
prison, as numerous congressmen and senators have learned in
recent years. Moreover, while politics can pave the way to a more
lucrative career (such as lobbying), many politicians remain in the
business long past the point of maximizing their lifetime earnings
potential.
3 61
358 See H. SMITH, supra note 25, at 400 (analogizing the Reagan Administration to
a long-playing television series).
359 This point should have been obvious purely from the economic theory of agency,
which posits that, in agent-principal relationships (of which member-constituent and
member-interest groups are examples), monitoring the agent is costly for the principal,
and agents therefore can engage in shirking, or secretly pursuing their own ends rather
than those of the principal. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 23, at 894-95; Kalt &
Zupan, supra note 23, at 282-84.
360 See S. Kelman, supra note 23, at 45. For multi-millionaires who spend vast
amounts of their own money seeking election, the financial self-interest argument is
particularly weak.
361 It would be hard to argue, for example, that Senator Dole or Congressman
Rostenkowski needs to stay in politics any longer from the standpoint of a future
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This is not to deny the extreme importance of money in politics,
as both a direct goal of politicians and a means of winning reelec-
tion. To replace the public choice account with one that is more
realistic, however, we must look more closely at politicians'
objectives.
a. Politicians' Varied Motives
To the extent that one can generalize, what sort of people are
politicians? The medieval sage Maimonides, echoing a long
tradition, ranked them with the enchanters, whose defect of the
logical faculty leads them to "do wonderful things by strange means
and secret arts."362  More recently, some have echoed Lord
Acton's maxim that power corrupts; 363 in Henry Adams' words,
it causes an "aggravation of self, a sort of tumor that ends by killing
the victim's sympathies." 364 Many contemporary observers agree
that politicians approach "each new situation and each other
[person] with the simplest question: What can this do for me?"
365
One senses the voice of envy in some of this. Yet even more
sympathetic observers agree that politicians generally are motivated
to an unusual degree by what is variously described as a "desire for
attention and adulation," 366 "intense and ungratified craving for
deference," 367 "ache for applause and recognition," and an "urge
for that warm feeling of importance."368 Thus, self-interest is
agreed to be extremely important to politicians, but not primarily
the narrow monetary self-interest emphasized by economists.
369
lobbying career. A dramatic proof of many politicians' nonmonetary motives may come
in 1992, when members of Congress who run for reelection will lose the right to
convert their campaign funds to personal use upon retirement. See Ethics Reform Act
of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-194, tit. v, § 504, 103 Stat. 1716, 1755 (1989) (amending 2
U.S.C. § 439(a) (1988)).
362 M. MAIMONIDES, THE GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED 228 (M. Friedlander trans. 2d
ed. 1956). In the first century A.D., 11 centuries before Maimonides, PhiloJudaeus of
Alexandria took a similar view. See H. LASSWELL, supra note 26, at 8.
363 See H. LAsSWELL, supra note 26, at 7-8.
364 H. ADAMS, THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS 147 (modern library ed. 1931).365 H. SMrrH, supra note 25, at 113 (quoting T. CROUSE, THE BOYS ON THE BUs 71
(1973) (quoting Richard Reeves)).
366 S. Kelman, supra note 23, at 46.
367 H. LASSWE.LL, supra note 26, at 38. It is not strictly correct to group Lasswell
with the more sympathetic observers of politicians.
368 H. SMITH, supra note 25, at 94.
369 Additionally, it appears that many politicians are motivated not only by self-
interest, but also by ideological goals and what they consider good public policy. See
e.g., S. Kelman, supra note 23, at 46 (citing evidence from surveys of politicians).
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(It is of course likely that some politicians fit the public choice
model, and one would expect to find broad variation among
individuals' motives.)
These impressionistic accounts of politicians' motives are con-
firmed by empirical studies of the U.S. Congress. Perhaps the best
two such studies, based on extensive confidential interviews, are
Richard Fenno's Congressmen in Committees and John Manley's The
Politics of Finance: The House Committee on Ways and Means.37°
Fenno found that three goals espoused by House members are "the
most widely held and the most consequential for committee
activity."371 They are (in no particular order of priority): (1)
reelection, (2) "influence" within the House, meaning power and
prestige, and (3) good public policy.372 Manley documented the
preeminence of the second of these goals, power and prestige,
among members of the Ways and Means Committee.A7 3  In the
years since Fenno's and Manley's studies, the quest for power and
prestige apparently has been generalized from one's congressional
colleagues to the broader Washington political community,3 74 and
success in this quest has become more widely and rapidly avail-
able.
3 75
Lasswell even views these motivations as selfish, terming politicians' interest in public
policy a psychological "displacement" onto public objects of the craving for deference,
"rationalized in terms of public interest." H. LASsWELL, supra note 26, at 38.
370 While Fenno's study was published in 1973 and Manley's in 1970, they continue
to be cited widely. See, e.g.,J. KINGDON, supra note 26, at 41 n.ll; R. RIPLEY, supra note
26, at 151 n.10; Price, supra note 26, at 175.
371 R. FENNO, supra note 26, at 1.
372 See id. Kingdon found similar goals. SeeJ. KINGDON, supra note 26, at 41-42.
Fenno also noted goals relating to a career beyond the House and to private gain, but
regarded them as more peripheral. See R. FENNO, supra note 26, at 1. For "influence"
including both power and prestige, see id. at 3-4.
37- SeeJ. MANLEY, supra note 26, at 53-58; see also R. FENNO, supra note 26, at 2-5
(finding that the "desire to have mtore influence inside the House than other Congressmen is
the distinctive dominant goal of Appropriations and Ways and Means members"). At
the time of these studies, the Ways and Means Committee may have been more of a
magnet for influence-seekers than at present, since it possessed the vitally important
power of appointment to all House committees, a power that it lost in 1975. See
Bullock & Loomis, The Changing Congressional Career, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED, supra
note 26, at 74.
374 See, e.g. J. KINGDON, supra note 26, at 42 (stating that an important goal "of
many members of Congress is enhancing their intra-Washington reputation"); Price,
supra note 26, 167-68 (arguing that congressional members seek power and prestige
within the government establishment as well as Congress).
375 See, e.g., H. SMITH, supra note 25, at 39 (stating that television helped "throw
open the power game"); Bullock & Loomis, supra note 373, at 67 (noting that the
increasing media coverage of Capitol Hill allows junior members greater exposure
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Of the three goals cited by Fenno, reelection, while obviously a
prerequisite to all else, is not a serious problem for everyone.
Incumbents win reelection well over 90 percent of the time (at least
in the House3 76), and some incumbents, being stronger than
others, are particularly safe. While incumbents' success results in
part from their doing what they have to do,3 77 the high success
rate does suggest some freedom to pursue goals other than
reelection.3 7 1 Such freedom is particularly great for many senior
members in leadership positions. Their seniority is both evidence
of electoral strength and a source of strength, 7 9 while their
leadership positions help make influence and policy both more
important and more attainable as goals.38 0 I will reserve for the
next subsection consideration of how the goal of reelection affects
the legislative process, and focus for now on the goals of attaining
power and prestige and making good policy.
Beginning with power and prestige, its implications obviously
depend on the context. For a leader, such as the Speaker of the
House or a committee chairman, it often depends on winning
legislative victories. Wilbur Mills, the Chairman of the Ways and
Means Committee from 1958 to 1974, who never lost a tax bill on
the House floor,3 8 1 seemingly regarded his "aura of invincibility"
as more important than the content of legislation.3 8 2 To this end,
he practiced "followership," extensively consulting his colleagues so
that he could supply the legislation that they wanted.38 3  Chair-
man Rostenkowski, while less collegial and less consistently
beyond their constituencies).
376 See Dodd & Oppenheimer, The Elusive Congressional Mandate: The 1984 Election
and Its Aftermath, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED, supra note 26, at 1-3; Erikson & Wright,
Voters, Candidates, and Issues in Congressional Elections, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED, supra
note 26, at 97.
377 See D. MAYHEW, supra note 25, at 37.
378 As Mayhew notes, politicians aim to stay in office, not to win 100 percent of the
votes. Thus, while there may be some value to winning by large margins (i.e., to deter
future challengers), the value of additional votes drops as one's expected majority
increases. See id. at 46.
379 Seniority is a source of political strength both because it means one has had the
opportunity to develop strong constituent ties and because it may assist one in
delivering narrow pork barrel benefits (thus purchasing greater freedom in broad policy
areas). See M. FIORINA, supra note 25, at 50-51.
980 See M. DERTHICK & P. QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION 103 (1985).
381 See T. REESE, supra note 41, at 110.
382 SeeJ. MANLEY, supra note 26, at 111-15; T. REESE, supra note 41, at 110-11.
383 See J. MANLEY, supra note 26, at 100, 108 (using the less felicitous term
"followmanship").
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successful, likewise hates to lose and fights intensely to win.38 4 At
moments of high publicity, the leader's goal of winning often is
joined by a second goal: recognition as a statesman. 385 Senator
Dole's leadership in deficit reduction in 1982 and 1984, and the tax
reform efforts of Chairmen Rostenkowski and Packwood in 1986,
are good examples of this motivation.
For members not in leadership positions, the routes to power
and prestige are more varied. A member can gain status by
introducing ideas that become widely discussed, whether or not the
ideas are enacted.3 86 Examples include tax reform, which bene-
fitted Senator Bradley and Congressman Gephardt even before
enactment became plausible, 387 and Senator Moynihan's recent
proposal to roll back scheduled increases in the social security
tax.38 8 In addition, even a junior member can gain influence by
emerging as a compromise broker and coalition builder.3 89 One
can gain stature from involvement in the drudgery of committee
work and development of legislation. 390  With the increased
popularity of TV talk shows such as "Nightline" and "20/20," along
with C-SPAN's full-time coverage, one can pursue a career as a
"84 See, e.g., TAXING CHOIcES, supra note 11, 88-92 (noting the political, policy, and
personal considerations that propelled Rostenkowski's leadership and the 1986 Tax
Reform Act); Rudder, supra note 104, at 215-21 (describing the emergence of
Rostenkowski and Senator Dole as leaders in Congress's efforts to reduce the deficit
during Reagan's first term).
585 See Hook, By Shifting Tactics on Clean Air, Dingell Guarded His Power, 48 CONG.
Q. 1453 (1990).
-86 As Kingdon puts it: "Affecting policy agendas on the Hill and downtown
demonstrates that one is a figure of some consequence, a 'heavyweight' who must be
taken seriously." J. KINGDON, supra note 26, at 42; see also N. POISBY, supra note 25, at
161-62 (discussing policy innovation as a route to prominence for prospective
presidential candidates).
387 See, e.g., H. SMITH, supra nol:e 25, at 145 (noting that Gephardt and Bradley co-
sponsored the 1986 tax bill which was supported by both Reagan and Congress).
388 See Yang, Moynihan Basks in the Limelight as Washington Takes Sides on His Plan
to Cut Social Security Tax, Wall St. J., Feb. 28, 1990, at A-6, col. 1.
389 See, e.g., H. SMrrH, supra note 25, at 143 (discussing Gephardt as the personifica-
tion of a new breed of Democrats--not only effective on television, but also successful
at the "inside game of coalition politics" that results in legislative action); Bullock &
Loomis, supra note 373, at 77-78 (describing Gephardt as illustrative of how "one
member can integrate policy initiatives with personal career goals," and specifically how
he has risen within Democratic party leadership in the House).
390 See Price, supra note 26, at 16.
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television celebrity,391 although at the risk of gaining an inside
reputation as a "show horse" who is all talk and no action.
392
In the struggle for power and prestige, interest groups can help
a member. They can provide the political support that is crucial to
winning a legislative contest.393 (Recall the 1981 bidding war be-
tween the Democrats and Reagan for business support of their tax
bills.) They can be a source of politically salient ideas (as with
Reagan's business tax cut proposal in the 1980 campaign). It seems
clear, however, that interest groups are relatively less important in
the quest for power and prestige than they are with regard to fund-
raising. Ideas, for example, emanate far more from government
insiders and academics than from interest groups.394 The politi-
cal salience of an idea, as with tax reform, often varies positively
with it being hostile to what the media perceives as the "special
interests." 395  Thus, interest groups are far less powerful and
important in a world where members compete for power and
prestige than in a world of McChesneyian money monsters.
Now consider the goal of making good policy or furthering
one's ideology. This goal is so important, according to some
studies, that ideology is a better predictor of legislative voting
behavior than economic interest variables. 396 Moreover, there is
anecdotal evidence that members often derive great pleasure from
putting ideas into action and having an effect on society.
3 97
Again, while interest groups can help a member (for example, by
exploiting an ideology that serves their purposes, or suggesting
391 See Ornstein, Peabody & Rohde, The Senate Through the 1980s: Cycles of Change,
in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED, supra note 26, at 13, 18; Bullock & Loomis, supra note 373,
at 80.
392 See e.g., H. SMrTH, supra note 25, at 143 (describing Gephardt as unusual because
he has experienced success as both a legislator and in the realm of "video politics");
Price, supra note 26, at 169-70 (noting that Congress's committee system works to
insure that such "show horses" often fail to gain the power and prestige coveted on
Capitol Hill).
393 See Roberts, Tax Bill Maneuvering: A Political Tug-of-War, N.Y. Times, July 18,
1981, at 30, col. 5.
394 SeeJ. KINGDON, supra note 26, at 23-46, 52-59.
395 See infra notes 455-65 and accompanying text.
"'5 See Farber & Frickey, supra note 23, at 897-900; Kalt & Zupan, supra note at 23,
at 279-85.
397 See, e.g., J. KINGDON, supra note 26, at 130 (noting that people in government
often advocate ideas to promote their own values);J. MANLEY, supra note 26, at 325-26
(describing the feeling of satisfaction many members of the Ways and Means Committee
derive from their membership).
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workable legislative proposals), their dominance is far less than in
fund-raising.
398
Perhaps the most serious problem that results from members'
goals apart from reelection has little to do with interest groups. In
today's Congress, seemingly everyone wants to be an influential
policy-maker. 399 As one member put it, "Congress exists to do
things. There isn't much mileage in doing nothing."40 0 Members
often want to participate in making policy to a far greater extent
than they know what they want to do.40 1 Moreover, those who
favor activism in a particular area tend to be the ones who seek and
get the committee assignments in that area.40 2 What results is a
bias in favor of action over inaction, a reluctance to consider
carefully the merits of legislation (which become subordinate to
one's own or one's colleagues' personal investment in it), and a
tendency to legislate for legislation's sake. 40 3  Where a bill's
enactment is a given, it often must be made more complex and less
internally coherent in order to reflect the input of more mem-
bers.40 4  Except where an issue seems too politically risky or
controversial, Congress tends not to like the advice: "Don'tjust do
something; stand there."
40 5
What is true of members of Congress is true as well of a vast
array of other "players" in the Washington political community.
3g8 See, e.g., J. KINGDON, supra note 26, at 49 (finding inverse relationship between
the ideological cast of an issue and the importance of interest groups).
399 See H. SMITH, supra note 25, at 34, 39.
4 00 j. KINGDON, supra note 26, at 41.
401 See R. FENNO, supra note 26, at 69. Or consider the Ways and Means member
who told John Manley: "The only way I can interpret what I want to be is power. I
don't know what I'd do with it when I got it but I want it where I can reach out and use
it when I want it." J. MANLEY, sup.ra note 26, at 53.
402 SeeJ. KINGDON, supra note 26, at 42-43.
403 Cf id. at 32 (noting that Cabinet members want to "put their stamp on
something" and "make their mark*).
404 Consider the great pride members of Ways and Means take in writing their own
tax legislation instead of rubber-stamping proposals from the Administration. See J.
MANLEY, supra note 26, at 325. Members of the Senate Finance Committee are similarly
committed to revising whatever Ways and Means proposes. See also R. FENNO, supra
note 26, at 159-60 (comparing the goals and ideology of the Senate Finance Committee
members to those of the Ways and Means Committee members). Kingdon has noted
that even when a member demands changes on behalf of constituents or interest
groups, she may be trying to enhance her intra-Washington reputation by demonstrat-
ing her ability to get her way, as much as working on behalf of those groups. See J.
KINGDON, supra note 26, at 42. As Stanley Surrey noted, everyone feels entitled to "a
little old amendment now and then." Surrey, supra note 254, at 1156.
405 Congress's interest in legislating could be analogized to academics' interest in
publishing articles, whether or not they have something to say.
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Like congressmen, congressional staffers, cabinet members and
other executive branch political appointees, career bureaucrats,
lobbyists, self-styled public interest advocates, journalists, academics,
and intellectuals affiliated with think tanks often push for legislation
motivated by both desire for influence and concern about policy, as
well as sheer enjoyment of the political game.40 6 As one partici-
pant described the prevailing ethos:
[Y]ou ... have to have a loaded gun, and look for targets of
opportunity. There are periods when things happen, and if you
miss them, you miss them. You can't predict it. They just come
along .... You keep your gun loaded and you look for opportu-
nities to come along. Have idea, will shoot.
40 7
b. Politicians' Means of Pursuing Reelection
An important factor in support of the public choice writers'
claim that Congress cares only about money is the vital link between
campaign financing and reelection. Fund-raising has become
increasingly important in recent years. Between 1974 and 1986, the
average cost of an incumbent's reelection campaign increased more
than sixfold, to exceed $300,000 for House members and $3 million
for Senators. 40 8 Political action committees, or PACs, which often
are synonymous with interest groups, played a major role in causing
the increase and are critical to members' meeting their financing
needs. 40 9 These needs are never-ending, even for relatively safe
incumbents. By assembling a large "war chest," a politician can
remain safe by deterring strong challengers, and any surplus can
always be used somehow (for instance, to help others' campaigns
and thus increase the politician's influence).4 10 Members tend to
406 See, e.g., J. KINGDON, supra note 26, at 139-211 (describing how interest groups,
members of the executive branch, congressional staffers and the media influence (and
fail to influence) the decisions made by Congress); M. MALBIN, UNELECTED REPRESENTA-
TIVES 9-24 (1980) (discussing generally how the size and ideological makeup of
congressional staffs have changed in the post-1947 era, and how these changes have
influenced policy); N. POLSBY, supra note 25, at 159-67 (discussing the cultural norms
and biases that cause various political actors to become policy innovators). For an
example of Washington's relentless obsession with status and grading"players" on their
effectiveness (almost without regard to what effect they are having), see Safire, Bush's
Cabinet: Who's Up, Who's Down, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1990, § 6 (Magazine), at 30.
4 07 j. KINGDON, supra note 26, at 193 (emphasis deleted).
408 See H. SMrrH, supra note 25, at 156.
409 SeeJacobson, Parties and PACs in Congressional Elections, in CONGRESS RECONSID-
ERED, supra note 26, at 131, 150-51.
410 See, e.g., H. SMITH, supra note 25, at 157-58 (discussing the need for increased
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raise funds continuously throughout their terms, often spending as
much as a quarter of their working time on the process.
4 1 1
Moreover, the inaccuracy of the claim that members literally sell
legislation is by no means fatal to a claim of interest group
dominance driven by campaign financing. For example, even if
members honestly do what they think is right, the political equiva-
lent of natural selection raight ensure that only people who agree
with interest groups win elections. We also should not underesti-
mate the capacity of a hurnan being to persuade herself that action
in her self-interest also happens to be right-especially since
members often only hear the interest group's side of the story, and
even in good faith may be swayed by feelings of obligation or
gratitude towards contributors.
Yet the implications of campaign financing for interest group
politics can easily be overstated. Only a small fraction of the money
spent on lobbying takes the form of contributions to candi-
dates4 12 -suggesting surprising inefficiency or irrationality on the
part of interest groups if campaign financing is the unique engine
of legislative success. Moreover, PAG contributions (often an
important vehicle of interest group influence) are but a part of the
campaign financing universe, responsible in 1987 and 1988 for only
24 percent of all funds in Senate campaigns and 40 percent in
House campaigns. 413 Thus, while campaign financing helps make
interest groups important, it does not make them all-important.
414
Even more significantly, campaign financing is only one factor
among many that affects reelection and other factors may dilute or
even counter interest groups' influence. Perhaps the most thorough
study of how members pursue reelection is David Mayhew's
fund-raisingand Senator Alphonse D'Amato's use of his war chest to scare off potential
Democratic opponents in the 1986 campaign).
411 See id. at 155-58.
412 See Malbin, Looking Back at the Future of Campaign Finance Reform: Interest Groups
and American Elections, in MONEY AND PoLITIcS iN THE UNITED STATES 232, 251 (M.
Malbin ed. 1984).
41s See H. Alexander, What Moral Principles Should Govern Campaign Reform? 8
(Apr. 26, 1990) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). Another important
source of funds is mass mailing by a host of single-issue (but not narrowly economic)
groups such as pro-choicers, pro-lifers, environmentalists, fundamentalists, supporters
of Israel, and opponents of South Africa. See id.
414 An additional point reducing the importance of interest groups is that a
politician may be able to "pick her spots" for cooperating with them. If one receives
enough money from a few groups, the cost of refusing to cooperate with other groups
is reduced (although not eliminated, especially since they can threaten to finance one's
opponents).
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Congress: The Electoral Connection.415 Mayhew finds that members
engage principally in three kinds of activities in pursuit of reelec-
tion. The first is advertising, or "disseminat[ing] one's name among
constituents in such a fashion as to create a favorable image but in
messages having little or no issue content."416  The second is
position taking, or "the public enunciation of ajudgmental statement
on anything likely to be of interest" to one's audience, 417 often
without regard to actual legislation. Finally, members engage in
credit claiming, or "acting so as to generate a belief.., that one is
personally responsible for causing the government, or some unit
thereof, to do something ... desirable." 418 A variation of credit
claiming is blame avoidance, or deflecting perceived responsibility
for unpopular government action.
419
Each of these activities lends importance to factors apart from
interest group influence. Consider first advertising. While paid
advertising requires campaign funds, it is generally considered
inferior to favorable free media, such as television news cover-
age.42' Not only is free media cheaper (an especial advantage
between elections, when members need to retain high visibili-
t421), it also tends to have greater credibility and to attract a
larger and more attentive audience.422  Members' success with
both free and paid media depends in large part on personality
(whether actual or apparent), and perhaps even more on sheer
repetitive exposure, since in general "to be perceived at all is to be
perceived favorably."
423
415 D. MAYHEW, supra note 25.
416 Id. at 49.
417 id. at 61.
4 1 8 Id at 52-53.
419 See; e.g., TAXING CHOICES, supra note 11, at 103-04 (noting that when the issue
of tax reform soured with the electorate, the Democrats still had reason to support it,
to avoid being blamed for the perpetuation of perceived inequalities under the existing
tax system); H. SMITH, supra note 25, at 657-58 (noting that "the incentives of the power
game reward ... finger pointing [and] damage control").
420 Despite its name, free media is not actually free, since politicians often produce
their own videotapes for transmission to television stations in the hope that the stations
will air the tapes as unattributed straight news. See H. SMrrH, supra note 25, at 125.
421 See id. at 126-28.
422 See A. RANNEY, supra note 25, at 90-91; L. SABATO, THE RISE OF PoLIcAL
CONSULTANTS: NEW WAYS OF WINNING ELECTIONS 194-95 (1981).42
3 D. MAYHEW, supra note 25, at 50 (quoting Stokes & Miller, Parly Government and
the Saliency of Congress, in ELECTIONS AND THE POLITICAL ORDER 205 (A. Campbell, P.
Converse, W. Miller & D. Stokes eds. 1966)); see also H. SMITH, supra note 25, at 127
(discussing former Senator Paul Tsongas's admission that, with respect to campaign
advertisements, "content mattered less than sheer exposure and the ease people felt
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Perhaps the most important type of advertising, especially for
members of the House, is favorable word of mouth in one's home
state or district.424 This comes in large part from casework, or
providing services to constituents other than legislation. Casework
principally involves interceding with the federal bureaucracy,
although it can be as simple as sending essay materials to high
school students or providing hospitality to constituents who visit
Washington.
425
Advertising, other than the use of paid media, dilutes interest
group influence in two respects. First, the need for constant
exposure suggests finding ways to be continually newsworthy, and
this may involve calling for legislation that is unrelated or even
hostile to interest group demands. Second, while advertising can
complement making interest group deals, it also, as a separate
source of electoral support, lowers the political cost of opposing
interest groups.
426
Now consider position.-taking, or making people feel good by
saying things that they like.427  In common with advertising,
position-taking can increase a member's political support while
having no relation to substance, as when she praises abstractions
(such as patriotism or competitiveness) or endorses goals that she
does not actually intend to advance through any substantive
action. 428 At times, it does involve substance, however, as when
about you as a person").
424 In part due to the importance of word of mouth, members of Congress often are
more impressed by grass roots lobbying that shows constituent sentiment than by
exclusively Washington-based money lobbying. See M. HAYES, supra note 160, at 74-75;
H. SMITH, supra note 25, at 239-40.
42 5 See D. MAYHEW, supra note 25, at 54-55; Cain, Ferejohn, & Fiorina, Constituency
Sewice in the United States and Great Britain, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED, supra note 26,
at 109, 116. Casework has the advantage of being generally uncontroversial (recent
cases like the Keating Five aside), whereas any political position is likely to offend
someone. See M. FIORINA, supra note 25, at 43-44.
426 See R. RIPLEY, supra note 26, at 275; see also H. SMITH, supra note 25, at 36-40
(noting that the changes in the media have fragmented the old order of Congress and
enabled savvy junior legislators to gain prominence through the news media).
427 When public opinion about a substantive issue is sharply divided, Mayhew
recommends muddying one's stance, as by saying of the Vietnam War, "We must have
peace with honor at the earliest possible moment consistent with the national interest."
D. MAYHEW, supra note 25, at 64. Even yes-or-no roll call votes can be used to muddy
one's position when there are a succession of votes on procedural issues and
amendments. See id. at 65-66.
428 A classic example is President Reagan's week-long media blitz about education,
which transformed public perceptions about Reagan's impact on education although
unrelated to any meaningful proposed action. See H. SMrTH, supra note 25, at 416-19.
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a legislator publicly proposes or votes on significant legislation.
Position-taking, like advertising, can lower the cost of opposing
interest groups, and can even make such opposition politically
beneficial-in effect, a purchase of goodwill that exceeds in value the
future campaign contributions foregone.
Finally, consider credit-claiming. Mayhew argues that it encour-
ages pork barrel legislation favoring local interests, because such
legislation usually is more plausibly attributed to the local represen-
tative than is major national legislation.429 While this may be true
on balance, there are countervailing influences. David Stockman,
for example, found while in Congress that he could oppose pork
barrel legislation and then claim credit for it anyway by attending
the ribbon-cutting ceremonies. 430 Moreover, a member who, like
Stockman, has ideological views about national issues may find that
her lack of perceived personal responsibility for legislation on such
issues facilitates blame avoidance.
In some cases credit-claiming and blame avoidance become the
basis for competition between the Democratic and Republican
parties regarding national issues. In such circumstances, interest
groups can be either helped or hurt. Thus, during consideration of
the 1981 tax bill, the parties bid against each other for interest
group backing because each wanted the credit for cutting taxes.
4 31
By contrast, in 1986, concern for credit-claiming (in the early stages)
and blame avoidance (later on) encouraged the parties to sacrifice
the concerns of many interest groups.432 Given the vast number
of legislative issues, most of which receive little public attention,
members may only infrequently benefit politically from opposing
transfers to interest groups from the general public. Yet the pu'blic
need not feel strongly about an issue, or even remember it beyond
the brief period when it appears on television, in order for a pro-
interest group position (if portrayed unfavorably) to prove costly.
429 See D. MAYHEW, supra note 25, at 53-61.
430 See Greider, supra note 86, at 30. Even well-informed interest groups can to
some extent be bamboozled by credit-claiming. Thus, Manley notes that Senate Finance
Committee members would sometimes pres& for special interest amendments that they
knew would be dropped in conference. SeeJ. MANLEY, supra note 26, at 269-70.
431 See supra text accompanying notes 91-107.
432 See, e.g., TAXING CHOICES, supra note 11, at 103-04 (discussing the way in which
the "demise of tax reform as a net positive" caused the issue to "boil!] down to blame
avoidance, pure and simple," for the Democrats); H. SMITH, supra note 25, at 659
(noting that during consideration of the 1986 tax-reform bill, "blame-game politics"
were used by President Reagan and congressional leaders to prod Congress into action
to avoid "the wrath of voters").
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The negative goodwill may outlive the public's memory of the
specific story.433 The political importance of this type of thinking
is suggested by evidence that members are obsessed with surveying
public opinion and keeping their positions consistent with it.
434
Thus, while interest groups may have undue influence, they are
not the only important force affecting the legislative process. Public
choice writers, driven by the misleading analogy between legislation
and goods sold in the marketplace, have missed a far more
promising analogy: that between politicians and mass-marketed
commercial products. Note how Mayhew's reelection activities fit
this analogy. Advertising is the creation of a brand name; position-
taking (as an end in itself) and the subjects of credit-claiming are
what the "product" is actually supposed to do. The problem with
this market is poor information. Voters cannot closely monitor how
even Congress as a whole affects them, much less the effects of an
individual legislator.435  Thus, politicians gain approval without
the same level of feedback that may result from using commercial
products.
The factors leading to public approval may be unrelated or even
adverse to good policy. As an example, position-taking encourages
Congress to enact regulatory statutes that provide "fatuous, self-
contradictory wish-lists" instead of specific mandates. 436 This ten-
dency creates uncertainty and complexity, which a regulatory
agency, subject to "capture" by the groups that it is supposed to
regulate, must try to resolve.4 37 Complaints about the agency are
relayed to Congress, allowing members to gain further public
approval through casework on behalf of complainants without being
blamed for the vague legislation.
438
433 See H. SMrrH, supra note 25, at 422 (noting Presidents who acquired lasting
negative images, "Johnson ... as Machiavellian, Nixon as devious, Carter as wishy
washy").
434 SeeJ. KINGDON, supra note 26, at 41; H. SMITH, supra note 25, at 90.
435 Indeed, the institution and the individual become disjoined, as evidenced by the
paradox that the public seems to dislike Congress but to reelect almost all incumbents.
See Shaviro, Exchange on Public Choice; 57 U. Cm. L. REv. 834, 835 (1990).
436 See R. NOLL, supra note 238, at 101.
437 See e.g., M. HAYES, supra note 160, at 104 (arguing that the capture of these
agencies was intended in the originating legislation, "for only in this way could
congressmen minimize the disturbance to the attentive groups important to their
reelection while appearing concerned with the broader public interest").
438 See M. FIORINA, supra note 25, at 48.
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c. Policy Entrepreneurship
As we have seen, both reelection and members' other goals
(such as serving ideology and enhancing prestige) encourage both
public posturing and substantive legislative activity that may be
unrelated or even hostile to interest group influence. The phenom-
enon is commonly called "policy entrepreneurship," or the invest-
ment of personal resources in promoting a particular policy, with
the anticipated "return" often depending on the enactment of
legislation. 439  (There may be no way of telling what form the
ultimate return from enactment of the legislation takes-i.e., whether
it is prestige, reelection, or ideological satisfaction-since the
motives may all point in the same direction.) Television and the
breakdown of party and leadership structures within Congress have
led to increased policy entrepreneurship in recent years, since they
permit even the most junior members of Congress to have an
immediate effect and seek rapid advancement. 440 Policy entrepre-
neurship also is encouraged by presidential campaigns, since both
active and prospective candidates often demonstrate their serious-
ness by sponsoring major proposals.
4 41
I have thus far been critical of policy entrepreneurship, because
members' demand for it is high while the discipline of seriously
considering a proposal's effects seems low. Augmenting the
problems caused by voters' lack of information, prestige within the
Washington establishment attaches to power and political impor-
tance as an end in itself. The goal is to be an effective "play-
er,"442 almost regardless of the consequences of one's "playing."
Yet policy entrepreneurship also has a positive side: it produces
419 See J. KINGDON, supra note 26, at 129; N. PoLsBY, supra -note 25, at 171-72;
Bullock & Loomis, supra note 373, at 77; Uslaner, Policy Entrepreneurs and Amateur
Democrats in the House of Representatives: Toward a More Party-Oriented Congress, in
LEGISLATIVE REFORM: THE POUCY IMPACr 105, 106 (L. Rieselbach ed. 1978).
440 See, e.g., Bullock & Loomis, supra note 373, at 66, 77 (stating that the "policy
entrepreneur" aggressively mixes policy goals with personal drives for power,
advancement, and reelection); Uslaner, supra note 439, at 112 (noting that concern for
reelection can be consistent with policy objectives in some cases).
441 See, e.g., N. POiSBY, supra note 25, at 161 (stating that candidates "must display
a willingness to grapple with human needs" and "incumbents ... must find programs
to which they can attach their names and from which they can hope to exact a little
credit").
442 See, e.g., Safire, supra note 406, at 22 (claiming that the criteria for becoming a
"player" are, among other things: management skill, intelligence or savvy, and
originality); Yang, supra note 388, at A16, col. 2 (stating that Senator Daniel Moynihan's
social security tax cut proposal has given him "new found notoriety").
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much good legislation that might not emerge from a less wide-open
system. Tax reform is only one example. Consider as well the
successes of regulatory legislation, promoted by policy entrepre-
neurs, that addressed air and water pollution, automobile safety,
consumer product safety, and racial discrimination.443 Or consid-
er recent (and arguably beneficial) examples of deregulation, as of
the trucking industry, undertaken despite interest group opposi-
tion.
444
Without the incentives and opportunities for policy entrepre-
neurship that our political system provides, much of this legislation
might not have been enacted. Policy entrepreneurship, for all its
faults, is the principal alternative to interest group politics, making
possible legislation that pits widely dispersed benefits against
narrowly concentrated costs.445 Yet public choice theory fails to
account for it.
3. Organized Interest Groups
The public choice view of organized interest groups is as narrow
and stereotyped as the public choice views of voters and politicians.
An interest group ostensibly consists of rational profit-maximizers,
cooperating to seek transfers from the rest of society because for
each participating individual the expected marginal benefit of
cooperating exceeds the expected marginal cost. As public choice
writers recognize, however, this begs the question of why free riding
does not prove as fatal to interest group activity as it does to
purposive activity by the public. The answers they suggest include
the following: (1) groups attract members through tangible goods
(such as subscriptions to a trade magazine) and provide lobbying as
a by-product for which no separate charge is levied; 446 (2) groups
with a very small number of members can agree internally to
cooperate; 447 and (3) some groups are "privileged," or have at
least one member whose share of the benefit from lobbying exceeds
the cost thereof to the entire group.
448
443 See C. SUNSTEIN, supra note 236, at 77-80 (discussing the successes of many of the
types of regulation described above).
444 See, e.g., J. KINGDON, supra note 26, at 11-12 (describing how politicians in both
major parties built public support for deregulation to overcome interest group
opposition).
. 5 See TAXING CHOIcES, supra note 11, at 254; K. SGHLOZMAN & J. TIERNEY, supra
note 202, at 84-85.
416 See M. OLSON, supra note 20, at 132-35.
147 See id. at 143.
448 See id. at 48-50. George Stigler suggests that, even for a non-privileged group,
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These explanations are not fully convincing, however. As
George Stigler notes, the by-product theory invites the "obvious
objection" that, if, say, a publisher of trade magazines adds a charge
for collective goods such as lobbying, a rival publisher that provides
no collective goods should be able to undersell it and steal its
membership. 4 9 The privileged group and small group explana-
tions, while undoubtedly true in some cases, fail to explain a great
number of existing interest groups, including economically oriented
ones such as large trade associations.
450
The answer to the "paradox" of interest group formation, as
several.empirical studies have revealed, is that, like so much else in
politics, the groups respond to more than narrow monetary motives.
Interest group rank and file members are in some ways like voters.
They join for a variety of reasons, including not only narrow self-
interest (i.e., expected economic benefit from successful lobbying
and demand for goods like trade magazines), but also what James
Q. Wilson calls solidary and purposive incentives: the social and
status pleasures of belonging to a cohesive group, and emotional
attachment to a group's political goals.451  They do not closely
monitor their leaders' activities, and can be kept in line through
symbolic behavior such as position-taking.452  Interest group
leaders exploit their own resulting freedom to pursue a combination
of goals resembling those held by members of Congress, i.e., institu-
tional survival (the equivalent of reelection), ideological goals that
benefit may exceed cost for many members due to asymmetries in interest among
members and the marginal effects of one's own participation (i.e., one can only "cheap
ride," not "free ride"). See Stigler, Free Riders and Collective Action: An Appendix to
Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELLJ. ECON. & MGT. SCI. 359 (1974). He admits that
this theory lacks firm empirical support as an explanation of actual group formation.
See id. at 365.
"0 Stigler, supra note 448, at 360.
450 See, e.g., D. STONE, PoLIcY PARADOx AND POLmCAL REASON 173 (1988)
(questioning the small group theory as contrary to the reality of large interest groups).
451 SeeJ. WILSON, POLITCAL ORGANIZATIONS 30-55 (1973). Robert Salisbury has
lent credence to this view by arguing, based on historical research, that people generally
treat interest group membership as a luxury good, to be purchased when one is well-off
and sacrificed in hard times (which makes sense if the principal benefits are intangible
rather than monetary). See Salisbury, An Exchange Theoy of Interest Groups, 8 MIDWEST
J. POL. SCI. 1, 15-19 (1969). James Wilson finds that because interest group member-
ship is a luxury good, the extent to which it is purchased varies positively with wealth.
The capacity of the wealthy to afford solidary and purposive benefits has the fortuitous
(for them) side effect that they are more successful than others in overcoming the
collective action problems that impede narrow economic lobbying. SeeJ. WILSON, supr,
at 56-77.
452 See M. HAYES, supra note 160, at 77-79; Salisbury, supra note 451, at 26-29.
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their members may not share, and the desire for power and prestige
within the Washington political community. 453  This observation
suggests once again that legislation reflects considerably more than
the narrowly economic goals emphasized by public choice theory.
4. The Media
Public choice writers often seem unaware of the news media's
political importance. Any such awareness would cause difficulty for
public choice theory, both because it contradicts viewing voters as
rationally ignorant ciphers and because narrow economic factors
typically do not determine press coverage.
454
Politicians, whom one may assume are somewhat better
informed, regard press coverage as extremely important. They
display what is often a full-time obsession with the media, and with
television in particular. Press coverage is a tool that they manipu-
late to enhance their reelection prospects and other professional
objectives. Yet it also is an independent force to which they must
respond. Consider it first merely as a passive purveyor of informa-
tion to the public. Schattschneider describes politics as a public
brawl in which the audience, not the few active combatants,
determines the outcome, and in which the balance of support
fluctuates as the audience changes in size.455 The media's deci-
sions about which stories to cover do much to determine the size of
the audience, in addition to providing the public with a description
of the fight. Washington's legions of leakers, whistleblowers, and
highly placed confidential sources have long recognized the political
importance of attracting press coverage.
456
The media is more than a passive purveyor of information,
however. Its reporting tends to have various predictable biases,
45s See M. HAYES, supra note 160, at 61-62; K. SCHLOZMAN &J. TIERNEY, supra note
202, 131-33; Salisbury, supra note 451, at 27-29. One could add to this a twist on the
by-product theory: if interest group leaders sufficiently enjoy participating in
Washington power politics, they may accept reduced monetary compensation for the
tangible goods they provide, and rhus undersell non-lobbying competitors who offer
similar tangible goods. See generallyJ. WILSON, supra note 451, at 229 (noting intangible
benefits that result from political activism); Salisbury, supra note 451, at 28 (discussing
the influence of interest group leaders' values on lobbying activity).
454 An exception to this conclu;ion would be trying to maximize consumer demand
for news products, but such an approach involves taking account of people's broader
nonmonetary tastes and preferences.
455 See SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE, supra note 202, at 2-4.
456 See H. SMrrH, supra note 25, at 81-84.
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perceptual if not partisan. For example, it focuses on personalities
and political "horse races" to a far greater extent than on ideas.
457
The media often portrays politicians as unprincipled power-seekers,
and challenges front-runners and incumbents in particular.
4 58
Perhaps most importantly, in the interest group context, the media
has a longstanding populist and muckraking tradition, rooted in
reporters' personal beliefs and professional self-images as well as in
their sense of what makes a good story. This tradition includes both
a love of political scandals4 59 and supporting the "little guy" over
the establishment.
460
Muckraking particularly influences reporting about taxation. As
Thomas Reese, writing before tax reform, noted:
Since the content of tax policy is both complex and uninteresting
to most readers, the press prefers to write about corruption and
lobbying. The ideal tax story reports on a political campaign
contribution to a member of the tax committee who has gotten a
special interest amendment adopted for the contributor.
461
In 1986, this favored way of looking at tax issues, along with
intellectual sympathy for comprehensive income taxation,4 62 led
to extremely favorable press coverage of tax reform. At each stage,
the press simplistically portrayed each tax reform proposal as the
outcome of a struggle between "good" reformers serving the public
interest and "bad" lobbyists serving the special interests.
463
Tax reform is only one example of the media's suspicion of
special interests and attunement to intellectually respectable ideas.
As another example, consider the largely hostile coverage of the
protectionist trade legislation sponsored by Congressman Gephardt
457 See, e.g., S. LICHTER, S. ROTHMAN & L. LICHTER, THE MEDIA ELIrE, 110-11, 129
(1986) [hereinafter THE MEDIA ELrrE] (noting nonideological bias in reporting); A.
RANNEY, supra note 25, at 55-58 (arguing that television news portrays politics as a
competitive game between individual politicians).
4 See, e.g., THE MEDIA ELITE, supra note 457, at 115 (describing reporters' views on
the effect of political power on the personalities of politicians); A. RANNEY, supra note
25, at 55-63 (noting adversarial relationship between the press and politicians).459 See THE MEDIA ELTE, supra note 457, at 5; H. Alexander, supra note 413 at 18-
19.
460 See, e.g., TAXING CHOICES, supra note 11, at 249-50 (noting that investigative
reporting enhances the media's legitimacy as a defender of the public interest); THE
MEDIA ELITE, supra note 457, at 130 (arguing that reporters find gratification from
aggressive reporting in the public interest).
461 T. REESE, supra note 41, at 56.
462 See id. at 55-56; see also TAXING CHOICES, supra note 11, at 29.
463 See TAXING CHOICES, supra note 11, at 251.
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and others. The media's response was founded apparently on
acceptance of free trade principles and suspicion of special interest
backing for protectionism.
464
Thus, the media is potentially a powerful ally of policy entrepre-
neurs who take positions against what are deemed special interests.
Reformers like Bradley, and (once they adopted reform roles)
Rostenkowski and Packwood, can develop a symbiotic relationship
with the media: they give it a good story, and in return it both
portrays them favorably and lends powerful support to their side of
the struggle. While the media's extremely short attention span
limits its influence, 465 policy entrepreneurs can try to keep stories
alive. Moreover, the media's influence is enhanced because players
within Washington (including the reporters themselves) have longer
political memories than the less interested general public. A
member's inside reputation may affect her future press coverage,
and maximizing the amount of one's favorable coverage may be an
end in itself.
5. Ideas and Ideology
The critical importance of ideas and ideology is one of the most
difficult aspects of politics for most public choice writers to appreci-
ate.466 A mechanical view of wealth maximization has the appeal
of a pseudo-science, purporting to unmask underlying realities and
ostensibly leading to testable theorems and predictions. Yet the
truth, of course, is that people often like ideas, find them interest-
ing, and believe in them, with the result that ideas matter a great
deal. Individual politicians pursue ideological ends, whether it is
Ronald Reagan's anti-Communism or Bill Bradley's tax reform.
4 67
An idea can sway people en masse as well as individually, whether
it is Keynes's rationalization of budget deficits468 or deregulation
of the trucking industry.
469
464 See, e.g., Lemann, The Fall ofJin Wright (Book Review), N.Y. REV. BooKs, May
17, 1990, at 18, 21 (noting that the press corps was suspicious of interest group
influence on Congressman Gephardt's trade legislation).
465 See, e.g., J. KINGDON, supra note 26, at 61-63 (discussing the media's limited
influence on government policy as a consequence of responsive reporting).
46 But seeJ. BUCHANAN & R. WAGNER, supra note 28, at 3-4 (recognizing expressly
the influence of ideas on politics); G. TULLOCK, supra note 22, at 11-25 (same).
467 For evidence that ideology provides a better predictor of congressional voting
patterns than does, say, the economic interests of one's constituents, see sources cited
supra note 396.
468 SeeJ. BUCHANAN & R. WA(;NER, supra note 28, at 31-33.
469 See M. DERTHICK & P. QUIRK, supra note 380, at 66-74;J. KINGDON, supra note
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Gordon Tullock has recently shown how an appreciation of the
role played by ideas can help to explain one of the central paradox-
es of public choice theory: the small size of the lobbying industry.
He notes that the returns from lobbying (the ratio between the
financial benefit of a favorable outcome and its cost) seem incredi-
bly high-often exceeding 100 to 1.470 These returns seemingly
should attract more and more entrants until they are bid down to
competitive levels. Yet returns remain high, and the lobbying
industry remains tiny in size when compared to the government's
potential influence over economic outcomes.471 Tullock's princi-
pal explanation for this is the "inefficient technology" forced on
interest groups by the need to present their demands for transfers
in terms that seem consistent with popular ideas.
472
This insight has broader implications than Tullock recognizes.
While acknowledging that ideas are politically important, he treats
them as a kind of on-off switch (a transfer either is or is not
effectively concealed), and assumes that members of interest groups
are not fooled by them.473  Once ideas enter the public choice
universe, however, their role cannot so easily be contained. What
if two ideas, espoused by competing interest groups, are both
publicly appealing, but one slightly more so? What if an interest
group's economic position remains unchanged but the ideological
climate changes to its disadvantage?474 What if ideology deter-
mines and does not merely rationalize an interest group's goals? It
26, at 132. Note that trucking deregulation is even harder to portray as an exercise in
McChesneyian rent extraction than tax reform, given that, while taxes predictably have
remained on the political agenda, trucking "re-regulation" predictably has not.470 See G. TULLOcK, supra note 22, at 11-12. Tullock cites examples in which the
money paid to congressmen by lobbyists (or bribers) seems trivial when compared to
the benefits to industry of favorable legislation. Uncertainty concerning the success of
the lobbying effort seems insufficient to explain the disparity.
4 7 1 See supra notes 328-29 and accompanying text (noting that, even in 1986, during
the peak of the lobbying that accompanied the 1986 Act, members of the tax
committees received only about 1/60,000 of the amount of annual tax revenues).472 See G. TULLOCK, supra note 22, at 18-25. The technology for an interest group
transfer is inefficient, from the interest group's standpoint, if it involves deadweight
social loss instead of pure transfer, and if the transfer must be shared with persons who
are not members of the interest group. See id.
473 See id. at 19.
474 See e.g., AMERICAN BusINEss, supra note 210, at 147-48 (observing that
protectionism was weaker in the 1950s than the 1930s due in part to tariffs' loss of
intellectual credibility and the replacement of isolationism by an internationalist, anti-
Communist ideology).
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rapidly becomes clear thai: the study of ideas themselves, not just
interest groups, has much to tell us about politics.
Again, the problem with thinking about the role of ideas is that
they cannot readily be modeled or predicted,47 5 whereas public
choice writers, influenced by a perhaps outdated notion of science,
crave "usable" theories with predictive power.476 Modern chaos
theory reveals, however, that complex interactive systems (of which
the legislative process is an example) are unpredictable in detail
even if one possesses an immense amount of information. 477 Yet
even if understanding of ideas' causation and effect remains elusive,
one can posit some broad generalizations. First, in a political
environment like Washington-perhaps in any environment
(including, say, academia) where people hope to gain from their
association with novel ideas-there is a tendency towards faddish-
ness. As an interviewee told one researcher:
In Washington the world of ideas is like the world of fashion.
Ideas don't last for more than four or five years. They catch on,
they become very popular, and because of that, they burn
themselves out in a burst of growth, and others take their place.
It's like a hula hoop craze.
478
Second, ideas often appeal to people for reasons of emotional
convenience that resemble but are not quite identical to conven-
tional self-interest. Farmers and oil company executives easily
convince themselves that they should receive subsidies for the good
of America. Economists and social scientists naturally believe that
their rational analysis leads to policies superior to those resulting
from messy and venal politics. 479 Third, intellectual and academic
elites can powerfully influence political agendas,
48 0 although
perhaps not quite so powerfully as the members of these elites
would prefer. Fourth, when intellectual ideas are "sold" to a mass
public, they tend to get simplified and distorted in the transla-
tion-as happened with tax reform.
48 '
475 SeeJ. KINGDON, supra note 26, at 110.
4 7 6 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 16, at 341-43 (detailing the use of various theories by
political scientists to predict interest groups' impact on the legislative process and
criticizing the usefulness of these theories).
477 See, e.g., J. GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE 3-8 (1987) (arguing that
chaos theory explains that which science cannot explain).
4 78J. KINGDON, supra note 26, at 110.
479 See D. STONE, supra note 450, at 305.
480 SeeJ. KINGDON, supra note 26, at 57-61.
481 See TAXING CHOICES, supra note 11, at 244-46.
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6. Political Rules and Structures
Public choice theory often is too grandly abstract to pay close
attention to the role played by legal rules or the structure of
political institutions. If one believes that the theory is an inevitable
application of the iron laws of markets and human nature, these
may seem to be mere minutiae. Yet legal rules and political
institutions can have an enormous effect on the role played by and
success of interest groups. Campaign financing laws are an obvious
example. Unless they are a nullity, they must be relevant to the
claim that legislation is for sale to the highest bidder. Political
science literature has identified two additional factors that enor-
mously affect interest group politics: the power of congressional
leaders and the power of political parties. The following is a brief
discussion of these three factors.
a. Campaign Financing Laws
Federal election law establishes dollar ceilings on campaign
contributions, in the amounts of $1,000 for individuals and $5,000
for PACs per candidate per campaign. 8 2 While in various ways
these limitations can be stretched or avoided,48 3 they undoubtedly
have some constraining effect. They thus reduce the descriptive
accuracy of public choice theory. Members would be far more likely
to "sell" legislation if they could simply charge what the market
would bear without any fear of legal sanction or, for that matter,
public scandal. Under the existing regime, even if each member of
Congress had her price (that is, she was explicitly willing to sacrifice
all other political objectives for a sufficient cash payment), and that
price was less than the value to interest groups of the member's
support, it nonetheless might have to go unmet.
It is well known in the economics literature that, when price
competition is constrained, nonprice competition replaces it. For
example, when, due to regulation, airlines could not undercut each
others' fares, they competed for customers by offering frills such as
482 See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A)-(2)(A)
(1982).
483 See e.g., Accelerating Rate, supra note 21, at 938-39 (noting that a PAC may avoid
the $5,000 limit payable to the candidate by requesting that each of its members make
checks directly or by forming multiple PACs, each of which may contribute $5,000 per
candidate).
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movies, free drinks, and high levels of service.4 84 In politics, even
assuming that everyone would sell out for the right cash price, the
legal regime causes a shift from price to nonprice competition
between competing policies.4 85  The importance of nonprice
competition in our political system is underscored by Gordon
Tullock's observation that American politicians, unlike, say,
presidents of Mexico, generally do not retire as vastly wealthy
individuals.
486
b. Power of Congressional Leaders
As previously noted, Congressional leaders, including both party
leaders and committee chairpersons, face stronger prestige and
ideological incentives than rank and file members (and often are
more secure from electoral challenge), with the result that leaders
tend to be less subject to interest group influence. 487 Thus, an
important variable affecting the role of interest groups, largely
ignored by public choice writers, is the extent to which the leaders
control the legislative process.
488
The great change in recent congressional history took place in
the mid-1970s, when House Democrats sharply reduced the power
of committee chairpersons and the adherence to the seniority
system through numerous rule changes. 489  While the changes
increased the authority of the Speaker of the House, their net
result, at least in the short term, was significant decentralization of
484 See G. TULLOCK, supra-note 22, at 13.
485 As we have seen, this nonprice competition takes place in the political arena
when politicians accumulate prestige, seek ideological satisfaction, and are influenced
by factors apart from fundraising that promote reelection. Seesupra text accompanying
notes 362-407.
486 See G. TULLOCK, supra note 22, at 12.
487 See, e.g., M. DERTHICK -& F. QUIRK, supra note 380, at 103 (discussing the
"distinctive pressures, opportunities, and responsibilities" that congressional leaders
face).
488 Doernberg and McChesney note the connection between structural changes in
the House of Representatives in the mid-1970s and the frequency of tax legislation, but
they fail to see any implications for the prevalence of interest group politics. See
Accelerating Rate, supra note 21, at 950-52.
489 In particular, House Democrats removed three senior members of their
chairmanships, enlarged key committees such as Ways and Means, stripped Ways and
Means of its power over committee assignments, and shifted power to subcommittees.
See, e.g., A. MAASS, CONGRESS AND THE COMMON GOOD 56-63 (1983) (describing the
reorganization measures adopted by Congress in the 1970s); Uslaner, supra note 439,
at 105-10 (1978) (noting the impact of the new power structure on legislative
procedure).
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legislative authority.490 Not surprisingly, this decenft~alization led
to increased interest group influence, particularly in the Ways and
Means Committee. 491 Tax reformers who had long been frustrat-
ed by Wilbur Mills's apparent sympathy for interest group tax
preferences learned to their surprise that he had been a restraining
influence.492 More recently, however, several aggressive commit-
tee chairpersons and party leaders have developed techniques that
enable them to expand their power and partially negate the 1974
changes. Even before the 1986 Act, this renewed centralization
helped produce the largely anti-special interest tax legislation of
1982 and 1984.49s
c. Power of Political Parties
The power of interest groups is often asserted to be inversely
proportional to the organizational power of the Democratic and
Republican parties. Interest groups are strong in American politics,
under this view, because the parties are weak.4 94 Individual mem-
bers of Congress would resist interest group pressures if political
parties dominated campaign financing and intra-Washington
advancement, and if the political parties themselves were large
enough to play a brokering role and pay relatively little attention to
any one interest group.495 Thus, interest group influence should
fluctuate with the parties' organizational strength, much as it does
with the power of the congressional leadership.
Unfortunately, the claim about the parties' effect on interest
group power is not as strong-either theoretically or empirically--as
4 90 See e.g., H. SMITH, supra note 25, at 24-26 (noting several legislators' dismay at
the gross excess of decentralization); Dodd & Oppenheimer, The House in Transition:
Partisanship and Opposition, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED, supra note 26, at 48-49 (noting
the immense power of subcommittees and their chairpersons over legislation).
491 See, e.g.,J. WrrrT, supra note 10, at 240-41 (noting this increased power); Rudder,
supra note 104, at 214, 221 (noting the Ways and Means Committee members'
vulnerability to interest group pressures).
492 See J. Wrrz, supra note 10, at 242. Mills resigned his chairmanship and
congressional seat shortly after the 1974 revolt, largely due to personal problems and
a related public scandal.
493 See Rudder, supra note 104, at 221.
494 See, e.g., E. ScHATrScHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERNMENT 196 (1942) (discussing
inability of party to discipline its members). As evidence of the parties' political
weakness, they neither command strong voter loyalties nor control most political
fundraising. See D. MAYHEW, supra note 25, at 25-26; H. SMITH, supra note 25, at 674-
77.
495 See E. SCHATrSCHNEIDER, supra note 494, at 31-32.
104 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 139:1
the claim about congressional leadership. On the interest group
side, many groups are sufficiently loyal to one party (such as big
business and the Republicans or labor and the Democrats) to
reinforce, rather than compete against, party power.496  On the
party side, absent strong ideological motives, a party is more likely
to be exclusively concerned with winning elections than an individ-
ual member, since the goal of gaining prestige may be weaker at the
institutional than the personal level. This observation suggests that
the parties may care more about fundraising than do the members,
which raises the possibility of an even stronger tendency to provide
favorable legislation to contributors. The critical question is what
strategies parties find optimal for winning elections, and here the
evidence is mixed. Sometimes parties try to assemble interest group
coalitions through logrolling;497 at other times, they appeal to
broad public interests. 498 The aggregate effect of political parties
on interest group power is unclear; but at a minimum they raise a
complication that is not currently acknowledged.
7. Implications of the Factors Apart From
Interest Group Influence
For the reasons described above, members of Congress in
enacting legislation both have considerable leeway and are subject
to significant constraints apart from interest group influence.
Specifically, members of Congress seek reelection, power, prestige,
and ideological goals in a world where ill-informed voters are
subject to symbolic responses and where the media can exercise
great and often populist influence. Beyond these broad generaliza-
tions, the details of legislative behavior are inherently unpredictable.
In particular, the incentives for policy entrepreneurship can
stimulate any number of responses. An example is taxation, in
which one may gain either by being a reformer who opposes interest
groups or by championing tax instrumentalism.
496 See Green & Guth, Big Bucks and Petty Cash: Party and Interest Group Activists in
American Politics, in INTEREST GROUP POLITCs, supra note 325, at 100-02.
4 97 
Se e.g., J. BIRNBAUM & A. MURRAY, supra note 11, at 36 (noting the importance
of logrolling to the Mondale political campaign of 1984); M. HAYES, supra note 160, at
145 (pointing out the importance of logrolling to any successful political campaign).
498 Fundraising as well as votes can be obtained by appealing to broad public
interests if one has an effective system of mass fundraising by mail. See R. RIPLEY, supra
note 26, at 79-80.
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The choice of how to seek success as a policy entrepreneur is
controlled by the individual legislator. Members of Congress may
seek the approbation of their colleagues, the media, the Washington
political establishment, or the voters in any number of ways. No
abstract model, whether narrowly economic or otherwise, can
predict in detail either what proposals will be made at any time or
which ones will succeed. Fortuity and the choices made by a small
number of idiosyncratic individuals simply play too large a role
here.
The choices made by policy entrepreneurs are heavily influenced
by and responsive to the media, but this link does not necessarily
increase predictability. In tax, for example, the media can choose
to emphasize any of a wide range of stories, since all can probably
be found anecdotally at any time. Possible stories include such
disparate possibilities as (1) big-money lobbying by special interests
seeking tax breaks, (2) greedy revenue-raising by congressional tax-
and-spenders, (3) abusive tax planning by the big corporations and
wealthy individuals, (4) unfair and anti-competitive burdens placed
on American business by the tax laws, (5) IRS abuses at the expense
of the average taxpayer, and (6) widespread cheating by the average
taxpayer. Some of these story types are directly opposite to others
in their policy implications, and whichever ones the press emphasiz-
es can be expected to inspire a response from congressional policy
entrepreneurs anxious for professional advancement. How the
media will choose is hard to say, but presumably its choices will
reflect some combination of what reporters think is important or
representative at the time and what they think their audience wants
to hear.
An interesting analogy can be made between the political-
legislative world of Washington and the movie-making world of
Hollywood. Decision-makers in the two worlds have a similar range
of motives. In Hollywood, one may seek money (the equivalent of
reelection), intra-Hollywood (or broader public) power and prestige,
or commitment to an artistic ideal (the equivalent of ideology).
Self-evidently, economic theory cannot predict in specific detail
what movies people will make or which movies will become popular.
(It may, however, tell us something about what types of movies and
publicity campaigns will generally be made and succeed.) Commer-
cially successful movie-making, like electorally successful politics, is
an art as well as a science, and cannot be modeled in a crudely
deterministic fashion.
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While the content of' legislation is difficult to predict, the
likelihood that there will be a lot of it seems clear. In particular,
the sheer number of different persons and institutions seeking
legislative influence, yet bearing little political accountability for the
real effects of their actions, promotes a dangerous lack of restraint
and discipline. As compared with the opposite extreme of a
centralized parliamentary system, the current system may tend to
yield more aggregate legislation, rather than less (as one might think
from the need for more extended bargaining), because so many
different "players" must get to do something. The resulting
legislation may be less unified and coherent than under a central-
ized parliamentary system, and thus likely to be less harmful in the
worst case, but its expected social costs (as opposed to the worst
case social costs) might conceivably be higher.
D. Application of the Broader Model to Tax Legislation
By now, we have seen riot only what is wrong with public choice
theory, but how the 1986 Act won enactment. The public was
known to be dissatisfied with the income tax system, largely due to
increased real tax burdens (because of bracket creep), growing
discontent with government performance, and widely publicized
instances of tax avoidance by wealthy individuals and large corpora-
tions. The political benefits of responding to this dissatisfaction
and the intellectual appeal of tax reform, attracted policy entrepre-
neurs in Congress and then (more fortuitously) in the Reagan
Administration. Once Reagan had made tax reform a cornerstone
of his second term, additional forces went to work. Congressional
leaders such as Rostenkowski and Packwood found that as leaders
in the public spotlight, they had powerful incentives to support tax
reform vigorously. The media's populist reporting of the issue
pressured committee members to fall in line. Thus, initial defeats
for tax reform in the committees boomeranged into dramatic
victories-in the case of the Senate Finance Committee, far exceed-
ing anyone's expectations (including Packwood's). The incentives
of the Democratic and Republican parties first to claim credit for
enacting tax reform and then to avoid the blame for killing it
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contributed to approval by both houses, 499 and also helped ensure
the success of an acrimonious House-Senate conference.
Fitting this analysis into the model of congressional behavior
that we have developed, we find that the goals of enhancing
reelection, prestige, and ideology all played a role. First, reelection
is not just a matter of fundraising (which was helped by the mere
consideration of tax reform, at least for members of both tax
committees). Reelection depends as well on accumulating goodwill
and avoiding illwill. To many in Congress, this fact suggested
paying close attention to how the media portrayed tax reform,
notwithstanding the lack of strong public support for any actual
reform proposal. Given the public's relative inattention, a member
could be harmed by a story portraying her as a venal hack even if
the public agreed with her position. Reelection motives may also
have contributed to members' concern over the allotment of credit
and blame to their political parties.
The role of prestige is fairly obvious, especially at the leadership
level and among tax reform's original promoters. Moreover, while
the leaders probably could not have prevailed against interest group
pressures absent support from either the public or the media, they
were hardly powerless to advance their objectives. They could both
adapt the legislation to meet other members' demands500 and use
promises and threats relating to future congressional business to
win broader support.
Finally, ideology contributed positively to enactment. Tax reform
proved to have strong intellectual appeal at a time when the
excesses of 1981 (increasing the deficit and encouraging highly
visible tax avoidance without providing the promised saving and
investment payoff) had temporarily discredited tax instrumentalism.
Further strengthening the chance for tax reform was its appeal both
to liberals and conservatives-liberals on grounds of equity, or
making everyone pay a "fair share," and conservatives on grounds
499 See TAXING CHoicEs, supra note 11, at 238-39. A considerable element of luck
also existed; for example, if the Iran-contra scandal had become public knowledge in
April 1986 (while the Senate Finance Committee was floundering) rather than
November 1986, the 1986 Act might not have passed.
500 Credit-claiming by a member in relation to an interest group may be enhanced
more by personally obtaining a favorable change in what remains, on balance, hostile
legislation, than by being only one of many members who helps to ensure that there is
no legislation at all. See, e.g., D. MAYHEW, supra note 25, at 53 (noting that the emphasis
is on personal accomplishment rather than party or government accomplishment: "[I]t
becomes necessary for each Congressman to try to peel off pieces of governmental
accomplishment for which he can believably generate a sense of responsibility.").
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of efficiency or getting government out of economic planning. (Of
course, tax instrumentalism, when fashionable, can likewise appeal
to both camps, since liberals often like economic planning and
conservatives often like tax relief for business and the wealthy.)
If one likes the 1986 Act, at least relative to prior law, one may
be tempted to derive from it the lesson that "the system works." In
support of such a conclusion, the enactment of tax reform is only
one of many recent occasions on which the public interest arguably
was advanced by legislation, unmistakably at the expense of the
most well-organized affected interests, through the mechanism of
policy entrepreneurship. Other events with strong political
resemblances to tax reform include the passage of environmental
legislation and various deregulations. 50 1 Purely within tax law,
the 1982 and 1984 Acts are somewhat less dramatic examples of
legislation arguably advancing the public interest at the expense of
organized interest groups. Motivated by some mixture of a desire
to play a leadership role and policy concern about the deficit and
the excesses of 1981, congressional leaders raised revenue chiefly
through loophole-closing at the expense of interest groups that were
ostensibly their allies.
The lesson that "the system works," while not entirely false,
seems too optimistic. Aside from the way the political process
successively distorted tax reform, changing it at each stage to
substitute selective limitations for direct base-broadening, consider
the 1981 Act. In 1981, the same basic congressional incentives
(reelection, prestige, and ideology) led many of the same individuals
to enact what most supporters of tax reform would agree was almost
pathologically bad special interest legislation. Public choice alone
did not produce the 1981 Act. The bidding war between the
Democrats and Reagan resulted from each side's determination,
founded on both prestige and electoral self-interest, to ensure that
its tax cuts, not the other side's largely identical tax cuts, would be
enacted. The 1981 Act reflected as well the intellectual appeal of
tax instrumentalism, with its promise of "doing something" about
economic malaise-a promise so seductive that it overcame the
powerful evidence that the saving and investment incentives being
considered would not work. Today, the appeal of tax instrumen-
talism is once again being felt. Although one could easily find
interest group backing for restoring the IRA deduction and capital
501 See TAXING CHOIcES, supra note 11, at 255.
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gains preference, it would be foolish to assert that the high-profile
politicking over these issues is directed primarily at interest groups
rather than the public.
Clearly, the correlation between tax reform's intellectual merit
and its political appeal was far from inevitable.50 2 For anecdotal
evidence of the frequency with which merit and political appeal fail
to correlate, consider McCarthyism, or the decision in the late 1960s
to have both the Vietnam War and expensive domestic programs
without tax increases, or the Bush Administration's waging of a
highly theatrical yet often ineffective "drug war."
50 3
To be more than anecdotal about how well the "political market-
place of ideas" works is difficult. Frequent and systematic failure is
inevitable, however, in a huge and complex society where, as Murray
Edelman observed:
[M]ass publics respond to currently conspicuous political symbols:
not to "facts," and not to moral codes embedded in the character
or soul, but to the gestures and speeches that make up the drama
of the state.
The mass public does not study and analyze detailed data
about secondary boycotts, provisions for stock ownership and
control in a proposed space communications corporation, or
missile installations in Cuba. It ignores these things until political
actions and the speeches make them symbolically threatening or
reassuring, and it then responds to the cues furnished by the
actions and speeches, not to direct knowledge of the facts.
50 4
In taxation, there is reason to believe that the "political market"
works particularly badly and erratically. Two opposing theories, tax
reform and tax instrumentalism, both have persistent appeal, which
leads to faddish alternation between them. People have internally
inconsistent views about tax preferences, and misunderstand prefer-
ences' effect both on ostensible social and economic objectives and
on individual shares of the true costs of government expenditure.
502 Indeed, one important element of the 1986 Act, its shift of tax burdens from
individuals to corporations, may have been popular largely on the dubious grounds that,
since the incidence of the corporate income tax is hidden, people can entertain the
illusion that it is paid by nobody.
503 See, e.g., McNulty, Bush Anti-Drug Fight Offers Good Politics, Good Theater, Chi.
Tribune, Feb. 18, 1990, § 1, at 6, col. 1 (discussing the political capital Bush accrues
from waging a popular though ineffective and perhaps irrational war on drugs); see also
Massing, The Two William Bennetts, N.Y. REV. BooKs, Mar. 1, 1990, at 29-30 (discussing
Bennett's imperviousness to any empirical evidence contradicting his public stance and
preconceptions).
5G4 M. EDELMAN, supra note 25, at 172 (footnote omitted).
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There is a strong systemic bias in favor of disguised incidence and
fiscal illusion, although the preferred tools vary over time (for
instance, inflation in the 1970s and budget deficits in the 1980s).
Certainly the future of tax legislation does not look very bright.
The policy entrepreneurs who brought us tax reform largely have
moved on or will (barring any new upheavals to bring them back).
Now that tax reform has officially been "done," there is little left to
be gained from it politically.50 5 Yet taxation-unlike, say, trucking
deregulation and many environmental issues-inevitably remains on
the legislative agenda, and there are already strong rumblings about
reversing reform, as through the capital gains and IRA proposals.
New tax preferences are being blocked at present, not by changed
public thinking about taxation, but by the budget deficit and
Chairman Rostenkowski, who regards the 1986 Act as his personal
monument and is thus hostile to dismantling it.50 6 Yet the deficit
may not be with us forever-high inflation once seemed perma-
nent-and while it continues, it may not block capital gains tax
reductions (a possible short-term revenue-gainer), or even clearly
revenue-losing preferences that can be paid for through low-
visibility taxes.5 07  Rostenkowski's personal investment in tax
reform also may not last., and is unlikely to be inherited by his
successor.
One major reason for the cyclical tax policies of the 1980s was
taxation's prominence on the national political agenda. This promi-
nence will not necessarily continue because bracket creep has been
eliminated, 50 8 because the anti-government public sentiment of
the Reagan years has somewhat subsided, and because the 1986 Act
has largely eliminated overt tax avoidance by the wealthy and large
corporations. Assuming that there are no major political, social, or
economic upheavals in the 1990s (such as a deep recession, renewed
high inflation, or a sharp leftward turn in national politics), reduced
public attention invites a return to tax instrumentalism on classic
505 See TAXING CHOICES, supra note 11, at 258-59.
5 06
See e.g., Povich, Rostenkowski Rallies Around Tax Code-As Is, Chicago Tribune, Feb.
7, 1990, § 3, at 1, col. 5 (noting Rostenkowski's personal commitment to the existing
tax structure).
507 Revenue demands can be detrimental to tax policy as well as a beneficial
constraint. The 1986 Act contained several unprincipled "revenue grabs," such as the
2 percent floor on certain for-profit deductions. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-514, § 132(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2113 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 67 (1989)). Revenue
concerns currently are impeding what is arguably a rationalization of the two-level tax
on corporate income. See Vickrey, supra note 278, at 456.
508 See 26 U.S.C. § 1(f)-(g) (1988).
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public choice-type grounds: without a larger audience, politicians'
broader motives become less operative. Only if Congress shoots
holes in its own tools for preventing tax avoidance (chiefly, the
minimum tax and passive loss rules) is renewed public outrage
likely. Congress may well do this in the long run, since the
immediate political costs of doing so are probably low and since
members can always claim credit for once again fixing the problems
they have once again created.
V. SOME BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF GOING BEYOND
PUBLIC INTEREST THEORY AND PUBLIC
CHOICE THEORY
Public choice theory is widely recognized as not just an isolated
account of legislative behavior, but a theory with broad and
important implications for contemporary legal thinking.50 9 The
multi-faceted account in this Article, with its emphasis on the power
and prestige motives of politicians and on voters' taste for symbolic
legislation, should also have broad implications. This section briefly
and preliminarily sketches some of the ways in which my account is
relevant to broader legal issues and concerns.
A. Electoral and Other-Systemic Reform
An obvious question that arises when one criticizes the legisla-
tive process is how to improve it. Institutional and procedural
tinkering is a hoary American tradition, dating back to Madison's
explanation in The Federalist of how representation, separation of
powers, and enlarging the polity could control the evils of fac-
509 See e.g., Debow & Lee, Understanding (and Misunderstanding) Public Choice: A
Response to Farber and Frickey, 66 TEX. L. REV. 993 (1988) (defending the use of public
choice theories in public law analysis); Easterbrook, The Supreme Cour 1983
Term-Foreword:. The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 14-18 (1984)
(arguing that "[o]ne of the implications of modern economic thought is that many laws
are designed to serve private rather than public interests"); Farber & Frickey, Integrating
Public Choice and Public Law: A Reply to DeBow and Lee, 66 TFx. L. REv. 1013, 1014
(1988) (noting that the influence of public choice theories on legal analysis has
continued to increase); Farber & Frickey, supra note 23, at 875-83 (discussing 'the
impact of public choice literature on contemporary thought about public law");
Hovenkamp, supra note 23, at 85-89 (noting "the sizeable body of literature suggesting
that various interest groups, rather than the electorate themselves, determine policy in
a Republican system"); Statutoty Interpretation, supra note 21, at 223 (asserting that the
political process predominantly benefits special interest groups instead of the "broader
public interests" it was designed to serve).
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tion.5 10 We often give such tinkering (in common with a type of
tax policy) the name of "reform," and count on it, at times naively,
to ameliorate problems that a less optimistic tradition might regard
as either universal or rooted deep in one's social and political
culture.
This is not to deny that reforms can be salutary, only that they
are not panaceas. To bring fundamental, not just marginal,
improvement, there really is no substitute for the unlikely prospect
of the voting population becoming significantly better educated,
better informed, more public-spirited, and more interested in
politics. Still, since law generally aims at the margin, it is worth
considering a few possibilities.
1. Campaign Financing and Expenditure Reform
The understanding that legislation is not in a simple sense "for
sale," and that campaign financing is only one of many potentially
distorting pressures, does not contradict the need- for limiting
campaign financing or expenditures. Interest group monetary
power remains a serious problem, which plainly can contribute to
bad legislation (as in the tax area). Limiting interest group power
may improve the legislative process on balance despite the alterna-
tive pathologies that may thereby attain greater scope.
It is worth remembering, however, that the presence of interest
groups offering money is not all that impedes good government, or
even all that influences reelection. Campaign reform must be
undertaken with an eye to what will be the new balance of political
forces. Campaign financing reform in the 1970s provides a classic
cautionary example. Designed to limit interest group power, it
instead launched the modern era of the PAC. 511 This develop-
ment resulted, in part, from the campaign finance laws' more
favorable treatment of PACs than individuals, but even if all
campaign financing were restricted (which would raise serious
constitutional problems5 1 2), there would still be the problem of
nonmonetary advantages-for example, endorsements by celebrities,
control over voluntary labor inputs into campaigns, and incumbents'
"brand name" advantages :and free perks from the government.
5 13
5 10 See The Federalist Nos. 10, 57 (J. Madison).
511 See, e.g., H. SMrrH, supra note 25, at 31-32 (noting, in particular, the growth in
corporate PACs);Jacobson, supra note 409, at 131 (presenting PACs as a new force in
post-finance-law-reform federal elections).
512 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
5 13 See Epstein, Modern Republicanism-Or the Flight From Substance, 97 YALE L.J. 1633,
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More fundamental is the nagging question of what we are trying
to maximize. For example, is it control of members by their
constituents (a standard reform concern), or instead a Madisonian
independence of the representative from the constituency? In
taxation, at least, either has its dangers. While interest group
politics, insulated from constituent oversight, has done much to
deform the tax code, 514 so has the goal of providing salient tax
benefits to one's constituents.
515
It may well be that public financing of all campaigns for federal
office, 516 at a high enough dollar level to dilute incumbents'
advantages and induce most candidates to renounce private financ-
ing,5 17 would improve the legislative process. The analysis in this
Article suggests, however, that such a reform might change the
process less than many people expect.
2. Power of Congressional Leadership and Parties
A second direction for reform would address the allocation of
power within Congress. In taxation, it seems clear that the collapse
of the Wilbur Mills hegemony (albeit a hegemony based on
"followership") increased the power of interest groups and the
scope of tax preferences, while the success of policy entrepreneur-
ship in 1986 required strong and skillful efforts by the leadership in
both houses. To enhance the power of the congressional leader-
ship, on the theory that such a change will at least marginally
improve the legislative process, John Witte has suggested reversing
the 1974 congressional reforms, and in particular increasing the
chairperson's power, reducing the size of key committees, reinsti-
tuting and extending closed rules (barring floor amendments) to the
Senate, and restricting open committee sessions (where the public,
which usually just means lobbyists, can observe the proceedings) to
the early stages of legislation under consideration. 51 8  These
1643-44 (1988).
514 See e.g., Surrey, supra note 254, at 1153 (pointing out inequities in the tax code
that arise, in part, from interest group pressures).
515 SeeJ. WrrrE, supra note 10, at 381.
516 For primary elections, one presumably would need some test of whether a
candidate was sufficiently "serious" to qualify for public financing.
517 This would solve the constitutional problem, see supra note 512 and accompany-
ing text, other than with regard to spending by persons at least ostensibly independent
of the candidates' campaigns.
518 SeeJ. WrrrE, supra note 10, at 381-82.
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proposals are supported by the analysis in this Article, despite the
unpredictability of how leaders will exercise power.
A related type of reform would seek to increase the power
exercised over members of Congress by their political parties by, for
example, directing public financing to the parties or moving towards
a parliamentary system. The benefits of such a reform are less clear
(given, for example, our uncertainty about the relationship between
parties and interest groups), but it might at least promote political
accountability. Good or bad conditions in a broad subject area,
such as the economy or the environment, can more plausibly and
more reliably be attributed by voters to a party commanding a
congressional majority than to an individual member. Thus, the
members' incentives to consider empirical effects might increase
slightly, and the comparative political advantage of particularized
over-broad legislation as a subject for plausible credit-claiming
might be reduced.
Both increasing the power of the congressional leadership and
strengthening the parties would tend to centralize the exercise of
legislative authority, and to remove some practical checks and
balances that are Madisonian in principle although not constitution-
ally mandated. 519 The logical endpoint of moving in this direc-
tion would be to reject even the constitutionally mandated separa-
tion of powers and adopt a parliamentary system of party govern-
ment. Whether or not preferable on balance, such a system might
well have important advantages over the present one, such as
reducing the number of independent "players" in the political
process who seek to build statutory monuments to themselves, and
increasing the political accountability of the "players" who remain.
3. Depoliticizing Particular Decisional Areas
A third direction for reform, also suggested by John Witte,
reflects greater despair about the legislative process. Witte
proposes that authority over the tax system be insulated from
politics through delegation to administrative bodies or executive
agencies. He notes that tariff law was similarly depoliticized in the
1930s through legislation empowering the President to negotiate
tariff changes that could ithen be implemented through executive
order.520 This proposal may raise concerns about elitism versus
519 For Madison's views about checks and balances such as the constitutional
separation of powers, see THE FEDERALiST NO. 48 (J. Madison).
520 See id. at 382-83. Of course, executive control is not the same thing as
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popular government as well as the danger that interest groups will
"capture" the new decision-makers. If limited to areas where
legislative parochialism seems particularly acute (for example,
control over the placement of military bases), and if insulated from
direct presidential control, it might, however, be beneficial.
For taxation, this delegation model is already followed intersti-
tially. Congress often grants the Treasury extensive authority to
prescribe regulations giving flesh to a vague and conceptual
provision.521  Broader reliance on delegation seems unlikely.
Since an agency would not necessarily be good at making political
decisions, such as what types of income should be tax-favored,
delegation would require a prior political consensus to bar such
decisions and restrict the agency's power over implementation, for
example, of an economic definition of income subject to specified
administrative constraints. The 1986 Act probably stretched the
outer limits of any such consensus.
B. Statutory Interpretation
To the extent that courts, when interpreting statutes, ought
either to function as agents of the enacting legislature or to use
their own judgment about increasing social welfare, theories about
legislative behavior may affect the question of what broad interpre-
tive principles the courts should follow.522 For this reason, public
choice writers have not been shy about drawing inferences from
their theories of statutory interpretation. Judge Frank Easterbrook
argues that courts should interpret "private-interest statutes" as
contractual "deals" between the interest groups that purchased the
statutes, thus faithfully implementing legislative intent and keeping
depoliticization, given the President's political interests. Witte argues, however, that
even political control by the President generally would be less insidious in taxation than
legislative control, because Presidents do not have the same incentive to focus on
particularistic benefits. See id. at 384.
511 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 469() (1988) (providing the Secretary with such prescriptive
authority regarding passive activity losses).
52 Questions such as whether courts should function purely as agents of the
legislature and what constitutional principles constrain statutory interpretation are
beyond the scope of this Article, and I take no position on them. See Sunstein,
Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatoy State, 103 HARV. L. REv. 407 (1989) (arguing that
legislative intent should not be the sole touchstone of statutory interpretation).
Application of several additional factors suggested by Sunstein, such as the structure of
the regulatory state or concern for minorities, would not be affected by the analysis in
this Article to the same degree as application of a legislative intent standard.
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bad laws narrow in scope. 523  The equally public-choice-driven
Jonathan Macey replies that courts should refuse to recognize a
"deal" as such unless it is explicit; by taking seriously the statutes'
insincere public interest rationalizations, courts can raise the costs
of contracting. 524  Both Easterbrook and Macey concede that
there are also true "public-interest" statutes, on the interpretation
of which public choice theory sheds no light.
5 25
It would seem that both Easterbrook and Macey overstate the
extent to which statutes can be divided into discrete "private
interest" and "public interest" categories. 526 Legislators' motives
are complex and often mixed. Interest groups' incomplete power
over the legislative process means, not that they by turns dominate
and disappear, but that their degree of influence varies over a
continuum. Thus, while the goal or effect of benefiting a particular
interest group conceivably may, for any given statute, be relevant
either to faithful interpretation or to deciding whether the court
should strike it down,52 7 the absence of a clear dichotomy (under
which interest groups are either all-controlling or absent) reduces
the usefulness and persuasiveness of both of their views.
An alternative view of statutory interpretation arguably fares
somewhat better (to the extent that one cares about intent) under
the account of legislative behavior presented in this Article. In the
well-known formulation of Henry Hart and Albert Sacks, courts
generally "should assume, unless the contrary unmistakably appears,
that the legislature was made up of reasonable persons pursuing
reasonable purposes reasonably." 528 As a subjective description
of legislators, this characterization does not seem quite accurate:
they are often pleasing interest groups, playing to the Washington
or home-state gallery, legislating for the sake of legislating, and so
forth. Yet the multiplicity of motives and the suggestion that
legislators often do not care about a statute's actual effects indicate
that subjective motivation is the wrong place to look for the relevant
intent. Legislators are playing a public role, and in a loose sense
52 Easterbrook, supra note 509, at 14-18.
524 See Statutory Intepretation, supra note 21, at 238-40.
525 See Easterbrook, supra note 509, at 16; Statutory Interpretation, supra note 21, at
228.
526 See Farber & Frickey, supra note 23, at 908-11.
527 See Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1689,1730-
31 (1984).
528 H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING
AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1415 (tentative ed. 1958).
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purporting to be Hart and Sacks's "reasonable persons." Therefore,
to the extent that one regards legislative intent as controlling, one
can indulge in the fiction of "institutional intent"529 and treat
underlying motivation, to the extent not publicly expressed within
the process of enactment, as no more relevant than what the actor
playing Hamlet, as opposed to the character Hamlet, is thinking
while on stage.
530
C. "Republicanism" and Legislative Deliberation
One of the currently popular themes in legal writing is "republi-
canism," an ostensible revival of classical and eighteenth century
American traditions in search of a liberal alternative to the mere
pluralist aggregation of selfish interests. 531 Cass Sunstein finds
roots for republicanism in Madison's Federalist No. 10, which others
have viewed as pluralist.53 2  Sunstein identifies two principal
features in Madison's thought that are central to a reconstructed
republicanism. The first is representation, embraced as theoretically
preferable to direct democracy and not just practically necessary.
Elected officials such as legislators should exercise their best
judgment instead of responding blindly to constituent pres-
sures. 533 The second is "deliberation," which means grounding
political decisions on extended dialogue and collective reflection to
permit the selection of appropriate values, the transformation of
existing preferences, and the achievement of universal consen-
sus.
534
One possible objection to Sunstein's notion of deliberation,
noted by several commentators, involves the questions of what form
deliberation should take and how it is to achieve preference
529 See Ferguson, Hickman & Lubick, Reexamining the Nature and Role of Tax
Legislative Histoy in Light of the Changing Realities of the Process, 67 TAXEs 804, 807
(1989).
5M An important consequence of focusing on institutional intent is that it shows the
importance of legislative history, even when written by staff, if (as with tax legislation)
it is an integral part of the "package" as perceived by the participants. See id. at 807-08.
531 See e.g., Michelman, Law's Republic 97 YALE LJ. 1493 (1988); Michelman,
Supreme Cour, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Governmen 100 HARv. L. REV. 4
(1986); Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA.
L. REV. 543 (1986); Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Reviva 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988);
Interest Groups, supra note 23.
532 See Interest Groups, supra note 23, at 39; supra text accompanying notes 166-74.
533 See Interest Groups, supra note 23, at 41-43, 46-47, 52.
534 See Sunstein, supra note 531, at 1541, 1545, 1548-51; Interest Groups, supra note
23, at 31, 45-47.
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transformation. 535  A subtler objection draws on the tension
between deliberation and representation. Sunstein acknowledges
that in his republican ideal, it is the legislators who do the deliber-
ating.5 36 While he wants the public to debate and reason about
political values as well,537 they will inevitably engage themselves
less in contemplating, expressing, and reexamining these values
when they are not charged with deciding outcomes. In short,
representative deliberation may to some extent displace broad
public deliberation. Even if deliberation transforms the legislators'
values, it may fail to affect the public's values.
Neither Sunstein nor Madison is to blame for the reduced public
involvement that results from delegating governmental powers to
elected representatives. The New England town meeting is dead
beyond recall in a complex world irreversibly organized into
enormous nation-states. Sunstein's treatment of deliberation as a
function principally of legislators seems inevitable whether or not
it is desirable, and in the context of his reliance on deliberation, it
provides some useful focus. For purposes of American public law,
it suggests examining congressional behavior. It is here that the
analysis in this Article becomes relevant.
In considering congressional behavior, Sunstein seems to
recognize that the public choice view rejects the possibility that the
process he advocates can ever take place.5 38 Legislators are not
deliberating when they sell legislation to the interest group that bids
the most. He responds by noting that public choice theory is
descriptively inadequate, as shown by motives relating to ideology,
power, and prestige. 53 9 The conclusion he derives from this
premise, however, seems to be a non sequitur:
What emerges is a continuum. At one pole are cases in which
interest-group pressures are largely determinative and statutory
enactments can be regarded as "deals" among contending
interests. At the other pole lie cases where legislators engage in
deliberation in which interest-group pressures, conventionally
defined, play little or no role. At various points along the
continuum a great range of legislative decisions exist where the
535 See Epstein, supra note 513, at 1633, 1635-36; Macey, supra note 311, at 1679;
Powell, Reviving Republicanism, 97 YALE LJ. 1703, 1710-11 (1988).536 See Interest Groups, supra note 23, at 46-52.
587 See Sunstein, supra note 531, at 1546-47.
538 See Interest Groups, supra note 23, at 48-49.
539 See id. at 48.
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outcomes are dependent on an amalgam of pressure, deliberation,
and other factors.
540
One could argue with this characterization of the continuum on
several related grounds. First, if pursuing power and prestige within
Washington are as important as I have suggested, the dichotomy
between deliberative and interest group outcomes is not as clear as
Sunstein claims. Selling legislation to the highest bidder and
erecting a statutory monument to oneself are equally self-interested,
and neither necessarily involves reflection about the public good.
Second, why does favoring interest groups fail to qualify as
deliberation? Legislators who enact interest group legislation often
are not mere ciphers; rather, they have deliberately chosen the
course of action that they believe best advances their objectives
(whether self-interested or otherwise). Third, why is "deliberation"
antagonistic to "pressure"? After all, "pressuring" legislators surely
involves making arguments to them, and deliberation ostensibly
involves engaging in dialogue and listening to others. The line
between threat and reasoned argument (including the argument "my
welfare matters, and this legislation hurts me") cannot be drawn
easily. Fourth, where within the range of legislative motives is
"deliberation" located? Is it a goal competing with reelection? It
does not sound like a goal, but if it is merely a process of balancing
goals, then how does it independently influence legislative behavior?
Sunstein seems to accept that self-interest is as narrow as the
public choice writers say it is (i.e., restricted to wealth maximiza-
tion). Recognizing that self-interest as they describe it is inadequate
as a description of human (or legislative) behavior, he may in effect
assume that everything they fail to account for is not self-interest
and fits into a black box called deliberation. The contents of this
black box receive his commendation but are under-analyzed.
At least without fuller analysis, the black box can be misleading.
Consider its implications for the institutional organization of Con-
gress-which seem clear although not addressed by Sunstein. From
a deliberative standpoint, it is hard to imagine a more beneficial set
of changes than the 1970s congressional reforms. They opened up
the legislative process, creating more participants, more public
access, as well as increased dialogue, negotiation, and compro-
mise.54 1  Unfortunately, however, the reforms apparently in-
540 I at 48-49.
541 SeeJ. WrrE, supra note 10, at 176-219.
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creased interest group influence and diminished Congress's capacity
to develop stable and internally coherent legislation. The solution,
many agree, is a shift away from broad-based deliberation and back
towards centralized leadership control.
D. Governmental Versus Market Solutions
One of the central claims of public choice theory is that private
markets are generally efficient while the political marketplace is
pathologically inefficient.542 Thus, whenever there is a question
of government intervention in the functioning of the economy or in
the distribution of resources, the answer is always the same: the
government should stay out. Public interest liberals, in contrast,
focus on market failure as a ground for substantial government
involvement.
It should be clear that the public choice writers have a point, but
not as good a point as they think. Government action is frequently
misguided, due not only to human error but to fundamental
misalignments between political actors' incentives and the public
interest. The fact that the pathologies are more complex and varied
than the public choice writers recognize does not weaken their
point. The systemic problems with government action must be
taken into account when one considers whether such action is likely
to improve even a concededly distasteful private outcome.
Yet no general conclusion about government action follows from
this conclusion. A particular legislative proposal may be desirable
despite the problems with other proposals, even if Congress is likely
to implement it only imperfectly. Moreover, no matter how much
one likes private markets in general, one must concede that they
have a range of predictable problems, such as failing to account for
externalities or sufficiently providing public goods. Legislation can,
therefore, increase sociall well-being.5 43  Thus, it is better to
examine each case separately than to be trapped by one's rhetoric
and policy preferences into idealizing either private markets (the
conservatives' mistake) or politics (the liberals' mistake).5 4 4
542 See, e.g., Statutoiy Inteipretation, supra note 21, at 238 n.74 (stating without
qualification that "all market transactions are efficient").
54 For a relatively uncontrov, rsial example, consider environmental legislation,
which even private market champion Richard Epstein agrees may improve on private
market outcomes. See Epstein, supra note 513, at 1647.
544 See Shaviro, supra note 435, at 834.
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E. Do We Need or Want a Legal-Economic Predictive
"Science" of Legislation?
Law and economics encompasses public choice theory. Thus, a
final issue raised by my suggestion that we replace public choice
theory with a more complex understanding of politics-a new
conceptual structure that places substantial emphasis on voters'
taste for symbolism and politicians' power/prestige motives-is the
effect on the whole of law and economics. Sophisticated practi-
tioners of law and economics recognize the tradeoff that they make
in treating human behavior as narrowly and rationally wealth-maxi-
mizing. They seek enhanced theoretical precision and predictive
power in exchange for reduced accuracy and richness. 545  My
approach can be criticized for reversing this tradeoff, enhancing
accuracy and richness at the expense of theoretical precision and
predictive power. The question presented is which side of the
tradeoff weighs more heavily: are my gains, or the public choice
writers' gains, more worth the respective losses?
As Robert Ellickson has noted, the economists' radical simplifi-
cation of human behavior is, in some instances, wise.546 Through-
out the 1970s, he argues, the theoretical advances made by law and
economics across a broad range of issues were well worth the
accompanying costs. 5 47 While Ellickson thinks law and economics
should now move on to more sophisticated models of human
behavior, 548 perhaps in many areas the gains from doing so would
be minimal. Thus, for corporate law issues that turn on the
functioning of capital markets, it could well be that narrow wealth
maximization produces the most powerful (and sufficiently accurate)
results. Investors in capital markets may act sufficiently like wealth-
maximizers for the simple law and economics model to provide
sufficient explanation.
In politics, however, the gains of public choice theory eventually
cease to be worth the costs, and beyond a certain point disappear
55 See e.g., Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEx. L. REV. 757, 772-77 (1975)
(conceding that economic analysis of law does not capture all relevant legal phenomena,
but claiming that nonetheless the field is important because its theoretical foundation
has great explanatory power); Posner, supra note 30, at 62 (claiming that the simplicity
of the economic model of law does not provide sufficient reason to abandon it
especially since the alternative models offer "an inferior track record").
546 Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of
Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 23, 24-25 (1989).
547 See id. at 24.
""' See id. at 25.
122 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 139:1
entirely. Explaining all of politics through the lens of public choice
theory becomes a game of constructing ingenious rationalizations
(as for the 1986 Act) that: are superficially tautological yet upon
close examination false. Legislation that helps any interest group,
whether intentionally or fortuitously, becomes ostensible "proof."
So does legislation that hurts interest groups.549  Legislative
action, the reversal of legislative action, and legislative inaction all
qualify equally as "proof. 
" S
The enriched model that I propose concededly does not advance
as strongly as one might like whatJudge Richard Posner calls "[t]he
object of scientific research ... [which] is to increase our ability to
predict and control our environment . .. .551 The broad con-
sumption motives that I have emphasized, such as voters' taste for
symbolic legislation and politicians' taste for prestige, inherently are
harder to model than wealth maximization. Yet public choice
theory possesses even less genuine predictive power and generates
inaccurate explanations of past events. Moreover, my broader
model can be used to generate modest short-term predictions for
particular subject areas-as I have tried to do for taxation-once one
incorporates additional information, such as that about voters'
perceptions of tax issues and the dominant opposing ideas about tax
policy. It also can be used to explain broader patterns, such as the
cyclical nature of tax instrumentalism and tax reform.
Unfortunately, a stronger version of Posner's goal of prediction
and control is simply unattainable as applied to politics. Modern
science recognizes that complex and interactive systems, ranging
from the weather to the functioning of a brain, are inherently
unpredictable in detail, even if one possesses almost unlimited
empirical information and understands their mechanics perfect-
ly.552  Often, the best that one can do is to understand and
predict the broader outlines (for example, climate as opposed to
weather). The temptation to over-predict and over-simplify may
reflect a misguided craving for the intellectual prestige of "hard"
59 See McChesney, supra note "315, at 101-03.
550 See Macey, supra note 297, at 266.
551 Posner, supra note 30, at 61.
552 SeeJ. GLEIcK, supra note 477, at 3, 7.
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science, more than a rational choice about how best to put science
to work for us.553 This craving should not blind us to the intellec-
tual merit and real advantages of developing a more accurate under-
standing of the climate of legislative politics.
553 See S. GOULD, WONDERFUL LIFE: THE BURGESS SHALE AND THE NATURE OF
HISTORY 282-90 (1989).

